The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1865 in the aftermath of the Civil War, abolished slavery in the United States. The 13th Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
On January 31, 1865, the House of Representatives passed the proposed amendment with a vote of 119-56, just over the required two-thirds majority. The following day, President Lincoln approved a joint resolution of Congress submitting it to the state legislatures for ratification.
But President Lincoln would not see final ratification: Lincoln was assassinated on April 14, 1865, and the necessary number of states did not ratify the 13th Amendment until December 6, 1865.
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, SECTION 202(y), VIOLATES THE US CONSTITUTION, 13th AMENDMENT
At a ceremony held in Emancipation Hall of the United States Capitol Visitor Center on Wednesday, December 09, 2015, President Barack Obama and leaders of Congress commemorated the 150th Anniversary of the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution. House Speaker Paul Ryan in his remarks stated that the Constitution is Supreme Law of the Land. The 13th Amendment is just 43 words long. I want to examine if those 43 words govern, rule, and operate the lives of all inhabitants of this Land.
My readers should not be surprised if I describe the US Congress as “Slave Driver.” The reason for my claim is based on a law enacted by the US Congress in 1996 that amended the US Social Security Act of 1935. This legal provision enacted by Congress is incorporated as Section 202(y) of the Social Security Act:
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE BENEFIT PAYMENTS:(y) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no monthly benefit under this title shall be payable to any alien in the United States for any month during which such alien is not lawfully present in the United States as determined by the Attorney General.
It mandates that no benefits shall be payable to any alien in the United States without showing proof of lawful residency as determined by the Attorney General. This law violates the principle enshrined in those 43 words called the 13th Amendment. US Congress enacted legislation amending Social Security Act and that amended Social Security Act is fundamentally flawed for it is unconstitutional. It takes away the property rights of individuals residing in this country. The government can impose taxes on citizens and aliens residing in the country. The Old Age Insurance Monthly Benefit paid by the Social Security Administration is not a tax; the Monthly Benefit constitutes income or property of the individual who contributed to the Insurance Plan.
The Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln in September 1862 came into effect on January 01, 1863 freeing slaves in all territory still at War with the Union. These slaves are not citizens of the Land and had no political rights or citizenship rights of their own. For all practical purposes, the slaves who lived in the US were aliens for they were not citizens of the US.
In Law, Servitude or Slavery refers to the burden imposed upon property of a person by a specified right another has in its use. Servitude involves labor in which the person who performs labor has no right to his earnings from labor. The amended Social Security Act unconstitutionally gives power to the Social Security Administration to withhold property(wage, earnings, monthly retirement income benefits) of alien workers without obtaining formal approval by the US Court of Law. This amended Social Security Act does not uphold the Constitution as the Supreme Law of this Land.
WASHINGTON – Earlier today, at a ceremony in Emancipation Hall of the United States Capitol Visitor Center, President Obama and leaders of Congress commemorated the 150th anniversary of the 13th amendment to the Constitution. Following are House Speaker Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) remarks at the ceremony, as prepared for delivery: The Thirteenth Amendment is just 43 words long. It is so short that, when you read it, you can almost miss the whole significance. You have to stop and remind yourself that 600,000 people died in the Civil War—600,000 died over 43 words. Or to be more precise, they died in a war that decided whether those 43 words would ever be written.
And not everyone supported the Thirteenth Amendment. There was fierce opposition. But I think it is telling that when the state of Maryland held a referendum to abolish slavery, it was the votes of Union soldiers that put it over the top. It was the men who had been in the field and heard the battle cries and seen heroic deeds. They knew, better than most, that everyone in that field was an American.
A private in the 89th Illinois put it best. He wrote, “I have often [heard] of men say that they would not fight beside a negro soldier but . . . the whites and blacks charged together and they fell just as well as [we] did. . . . I have seen a great [many] fighting for our country. Then why should they not be free[?]”
It took a war for us to answer that question. We should be honest with ourselves. It took centuries of cruelty and injustice. But today we celebrate the moment when our country decided: Yes, they should be free. They would be free. And we thought this decision was so important that for the first time in half a century, we amended the Constitution. From then on, it would be the supreme law of the land.
And so today we celebrate this 43-word amendment, this “new birth of freedom.” “It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.” And we should remember all that it took: the historic battles, the great generals, yes—but also the men in the ranks, the names we have forgotten, especially the men who had once been enslaved: men like William H. Carney and Andrew Jackson Smith.
These men were segregated. They were mistreated. And yet they still fought. They fought for a country that had denied them their freedom. They fought for all of us. And so when we read those 43 short and simple words, we should remember these men and what they did. We should realize those words, like their acts, are gallant, noble, profound. We have witnessed true greatness in this country. And when we ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, we committed ourselves to build a country just as great.
That is what those 43 words mean. That is what they represent. And that is more than worthy of celebration. Thank you.
Tags: U.S. Capitol, Ceremony, Constitution
H-232 The Capitol Washington D.C. 20515 P: (202) 225-0600 F: (202) 225-5117
Special Frontier Force, the military alliance between Tibet, India, and the US is primarily concerned with the security challenges posed by China’s expansionist doctrine in South Asia.
In my analysis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO will not be able to defend Europe without addressing the problem of China’s military expansionism.
Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162 USA SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE-ESTABLISHMENT No. 22-VIKAS REGIMENT
BY ISHAAN THAROOR
Is China NATO’s new adversary?
Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Oct. 1 military parade in Beijing celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. (Asahi Shimbun/Getty Images)
The West’s most venerable military alliance is marking its 70th birthday this week in Britain. And it’s going to be awkward. Leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including President Trump, will gather at Buckingham Palace on Tuesday before a rushed single meeting at an 18th-century estate outside London on Wednesday. The proceedings have been choreographed to minimize friction in an increasingly fractious group, one in which Trump’s frustrations with the alliance are hardly the sole source of tension.
Still, a NATO diplomat confided in my colleague Michael Birnbaum, “There’s a 50-50 chance that this goes south.”
Perhaps the pessimism is unwarranted. Seven decades after NATO’s founding, its 29 member states account for about half of the world’s military spending and close to half of the world’s GDP. By any calculation, it’s a formidable alliance. But differences within the bloc are becoming pronounced. French President Emmanuel Macron, for one, wants to see NATO shift away from being a Cold War-era bulwark against Russia to a more nimble security organization geared to countering terrorism.
Since coming to power, Trump has also taken a different tack, calling into question the necessity of the alliance, raging over the inadequacy of European defense spending and scrapping a key nuclear treaty with Moscow that helped shield Europe. Yet, this week, he’s expected to emphasize the need for NATO to take on a new adversary and rising 21st-century superpower — China. In the run-up to the summit, U.S. officials pointed to China as a “very strong competitor” that needs to be effectively brought to heel.
NATO officials are also getting more vocal about how China fits into the bloc’s strategic deliberations. In an interview with CNBC on Monday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said China was “shifting the global balance of power” and presenting Western policymakers with “some opportunities but also some serious challenges.” He added that the alliance — a transatlantic pact — was not focused on engaging China in its own Pacific backyard but elsewhere in the world. European politicians have also recognized that the alliance has to reckon with Beijing. “China is set to become the subject of the 21st century on both sides of the Atlantic,” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said in a speech in Washington in April. “China is a challenge on almost every topic. It is important to gain a better understanding of what that implies for NATO.”
“There’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea, but we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure,” Stoltenberg said. “We see them in Africa, we see them in the Arctic, we see them in cyberspace, and China now has the second-largest defense budget in the world.”
That may be music to the Trump administration’s ears, which sees itself at the start of a decades-long, high-tech contest with Beijing. With varying success, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has clamored for European nations to resist Chinese investments in the continent’s digital infrastructure, particularly in the development of 5G wireless networks that will underlie a whole new world of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and smart grids.
“With so much on the line, it’s urgent that trustworthy companies build these 21st-century information arteries,” Pompeo wrote in an op-ed for Politico Europe. “Specifically, it’s critical that European countries not give control of their critical infrastructure to Chinese tech giants like Huawei, or ZTE.”
The Chinese are predictably unimpressed by suggestions of a confrontation with NATO. “European nations are now faced with two options: blindly following the U.S. or cooperating with China despite U.S. preaching,” noted an editorial in Global Times, a strident English-language Chinese state mouthpiece. “Making this choice will only turn Europe … into a U.S. puppet. Is this a scenario the once strongest continent wants to see? And if European countries shut their door on China’s 5G technology, will they be able to bear the potential losses?”
Analysts in Washington aren’t reading too much into the current atmospherics. In a briefing call with reporters, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution said that Trump has “acted so unilaterally” in his tariff showdowns with China and Europe that it’s “hard to imagine” any substantial strategic decisions being forged through a multilateral body such as NATO.
Then there is a range of internal disagreements on the continent, where a number of countries have already become beachheads for significant Chinese investment and influence. “I think the question isn’t so much whether or not NATO as an alliance has the internal coherence to face China with a united front, but if Europe as a whole has that coherence, and, what is NATO’s role here?” Rachel Rizzo, the adjunct fellow at the Center for New American Security, told Today’s WorldView. “Obviously, China is a growing challenge and so it’s wise for the alliance to discuss how it might play a role in Europe’s future strategy, but I think NATO leaders are cognizant of the fact that they shouldn’t go out in search of monsters to destroy.” China said Monday that it would sanction U.S.-based nonprofit organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy and Human Rights Watch, in retaliation for new U.S. legislation that supports Hong Kong’s protesters. China also will suspend rest-and-recuperation visits to Hong Kong by U.S. military ships and aircraft, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman said, adding that further moves are possible.
REMEMBERING A WAR: THE 1962 INDIA – CHINA WAR – THE WAR’S TOP SECRET:
Kindly read the attached story titled “Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China War” and share your comments and views. The attached story is attributed to Neville Maxwell(1923 to 1974), a British journalist who worked for China’s Intelligence service. He published a book titled “India’s China War” and I call him a “PEDDLER” for he indulged in peddling information provided by China’s Intelligence Service. His story is inspired by Communist China’s Intelligence Service. I am happy to give a public response to their Communist Propaganda that aims to promote psychosis of fear among gullible Indian citizens and others. They must know that the global community is getting united to oppose China’s military occupation of Tibet.
I have the following problems with Neville Maxwell’s story about “The 1962 India-China War.” You may also share it with others who have Service experience in India and Southeast Asia.
1. Neville Maxwell justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet during 1949-50.
2. Neville Maxwell claims that Communist China respects the McMahon Line. In reality, China occupied the Aksai Chin region prior to the 1962 War. China has no legal authority inside Tibet and China cannot tell India not to cross the McMahon Line. We have valid reasons to ignore and refuse China’s legitimacy inside Tibet.
3. Neville Maxwell uses slander and innuendo to discredit General Kaul and there is no substance or proof to verify any of those claims. General Kaul’s only fault is that; Kaul is a Kashmiri Brahmin. His promotion and creation of a new Army Corps Commander position are justified because of the enemy’s hostility and threats.
4. Neville Maxwell blames Mr. N. B. Mullik, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau for doing his job. Mr. Mullik did his best under the given circumstances. To gather intelligence, we need to have aggressive patrolling and we must cross the McMahon Line to verify the enemy’s strength and intentions. I did the same thing during 1972 while I was posted in North East Frontier Agency. I went with foot patrol parties and had deliberately, and intentionally crossed the border to know and detect enemy activities. A person with basic Infantry training knows the purpose of a patrol. It is not a picnic. India has a natural right to gather intelligence about the activities of its enemy. The enemy has no jurisdictional rights or legal authority( other than the fact of its military occupation) in that area of Indian security operations.
5. Neville Maxwell gives no credit to the Simla Agreement of 1914 and the McMahon Treaty that established the legitimate boundary between Tibet and India. Manchu China had signed this Treaty apart from Tibet. China invaded and occupied Tibet during 1949-50 and changed the situation for India. China’s occupation of Tibet offers no good reason for India to initiate bilateral talks with China about border demarcation. As such, the issue was already decided by the McMahon Treaty. The essay criticizes India’s effort to control its own legitimate territory. It says India provoked an angry reaction from China as India wanted to send armed patrols to a few selected border posts. Why should not India send patrols to define its own territory? The story says that India was a bit aggressive. Look at the aggressiveness of China which had already occupied the whole of Tibet and crushed all Tibetan resistance to its military occupation.
6. India played a reasonable role to protect its interests and used its Army with the resources it had at that time. If we are facing a superior force, it does not mean that we should remain entirely passive on our side of the border.
The only mistake made by Indian Prime Minister Nehru was his inability to join the US camp to fully confront the military threat posed by Communist China. India had a very good chance to kick the Chinese out of Tibet during 1949-50 and we missed a golden opportunity as the Kashmir. issue subdued India’s initiative.
I still believe that India must prepare for this military challenge and stand up to defend Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Unfortunately, we lost Aksai Chin to China without fighting them. After Chinese unilateral occupation of Aksai Chin, We lost territory to China in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India must not relent on this border issue and our goal must be that of evicting the military occupier from Tibet.
7. Neville Maxwell justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet and blames India for defending its borders in the face of China’s superior strength. It has no word to blame China and its Expansionism.
8. The 1962 War is not a total loss. The Top Secret of the 1962 India-China War is the number of Chinese killed and wounded in this military invasion. If Communist China has any courage, I would ask them to disclose the true numbers. I am glad for we could kill the Enemy on the battlefield.
9. While I served on the Himalayan frontier (September 1971 to December 1974), I always medically inspected each soldier and made an assessment of each soldier’s physical and mental fitness. Each was physically, and mentally fully prepared to face the challenge and fight the Enemy. I have never sent a soldier to get a medical opinion from an Army Psychiatrist. Neville Maxwell talks about the divisions among the Officer Corps. I have personally met several Officers who had served in 1962 and there are no such divisions among the Officer Corps. In 1971, India won a great Military Victory in the conduct of Bangladesh Operations. Indian Army, the Officers, and men are totally united and worked together with no differences of opinion and executed the operation on the Battlefield. I had no personal or direct contact with very senior Officers but I know all Officers of the rank of Brigadier and below within my Formation. In my analysis, both during 1962 and during 1971, the men and the Officer Corps of the Indian Army were fully united to oppose the enemy and were willing to fight the enemy.
10. All said and done, the 1962 War was a good lesson and we are better prepared and more willing to fight this War again.
Dr. R. Rudra Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S., Personal Number. MS-8466 Rank Lieutenant/Captain AMC/SSC, Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle(1971-72), Personal Number. MR-03277K Rank Captain/Major AMC/DPC Medical Officer, Headquarters Establishment No. 22 C/O 56 APO(1971-74), Directorate General of Security, Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force, East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram, New Delhi – 110 022 – India.
THE GREAT LESSON LEARNED FROM THE 1962 INDIA–CHINA WAR:
COMMUNIST CHINA’S PROPAGANDA :
This story titled, “Remembering A War: The 1962 India–China War” that is reproduced below is another face of Communist China’s propaganda warfare. China has been selling this story to gullible Indians and claims that China is a victim of India’s attack on China. This entire piece does not mention the word TIBET and Communist China’s illegal occupation of Tibet and the uprising in Tibet and H.H. Dalai Lama’s getting asylum in India. Communist China used a massive force of Peoples’ Liberation Army to attack India all across the Himalayan frontier. Prime Minister Nehru is often blamed for China’s evil actions. On account of Kashmir, Nehru did not join the United States camp that may have prevented this attack. The United States was willing to check Communist China’s expansionist policy, but, unfortunately, India could not take advantage of the US policy for the US simultaneously supports Pakistan’s occupation of Kashmir.
Kindly share this view with your friends who have military service experience. It will be abundantly clear that the attached story is a pack of lies.
After the 1962 war, the Indian Army commissioned Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat to study the debacle. As is wont in India, their report was never made public and lies buried in the government archives. But some experts have managed to piece together the contents of the report. One such person is Neville Maxwell, who has studied the 1962 war in depth and is the author of ‘India’s China War’. In the articles that follow, Indians will be shocked to discover that, when China crushed India in 1962, the fault lay at India, or more specifically, at Jawaharlal Nehru and his clique’s doorsteps. It was a hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation.This is a three part series of articles by Neville Maxwell:- Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Part 2 – How the East was Lost. Part 3 – India’s Shameful Debacle.
Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War
When the Army’s report into its debacle in the border war was completed in 1963, the Indian government had good reason to keep it TOP SECRET and give only the vaguest, and largely misleading, indications of its contents. At that time the government’s effort, ultimately successful, to convince the political public that the Chinese, with a sudden ‘unprovoked aggression,’ had caught India unawares in a sort of Himalayan Pearl Harbour was in its early stages, and the Report’s cool and detailed analysis, if made public, would have shown that to be self-exculpatory mendacity. But a series of studies, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, revealed to any serious enquirer the full story of how the Indian Army was ordered to challenge the Chinese military to a conflict it could only lose. So, by now, only bureaucratic inertia, combined with the natural fading of any public interest, can explain the continued non-publication – the Report includes no surprises and its publication would be of little significance but for the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a 1962 Chinese ‘aggression.’ It seems likely now that the Report will never be released. Furthermore, if one day a stable, confident and relaxed government in New Delhi should, miraculously, appear and decide to clear out the cupboard and publish it, the text would be largely incomprehensible, the context, well known to the authors and therefore not spelled out, being now forgotten. The Report would need an Introduction and gloss – a first draft of which this paper attempts to provide, drawing upon the writer’s research in India in the 1960s and material published later. Two Preambles are required, one briefly recalling the cause and course of the border war; the second to describe the fault-line, which the border dispute turned into a schism, within the Army’s officer corps, which was a key factor in the disaster — and of which the Henderson Brooks Report can be seen as an expression. Origins of the border conflict India, at the time of Independence, can be said to have faced no external threats. True, it was born into a relationship of permanent belligerency with its weaker Siamese twin, Pakistan, left by the British inseparably conjoined to India by the chronically enflamed member of Kashmir, vital to both new national organisms; but that may be seen as essentially an internal dispute, an untreatable complication left by the crude, cruel surgery of Partition. In 1947, China, wracked by civil war, was in what appeared to be death throes and no conceivable threat to anyone. That changed with astonishing speed, however, and, by 1950, when the new-born People’s Republic re-established in Tibet the central authority which had lapsed in 1911, the Indian government will have made its initial assessment of the possibility and potential of a threat from China, and found those to be minimal, if not non-existent. First, there were geographic and topographical factors, the great mountain chains which lay between the two neighbours and appeared to make large-scale troop movements impractical (few could then see in the German V2 rocket the embryo of the ICBM). More important, the leadership of the Indian government – which is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru – had for years proclaimed that the unshakable friendship between India and China would be the key to both their futures, and therefore Asia’s, even the world’s. The new leaders in Beijing were more chary, viewing India through their Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeois state. But, in the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and, through the 1950s, New Delhi’s defence planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only “thinkable” but inevitable. From the first days of India’s Independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India’s inheritance. China’s other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing. The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable – that Beijing would allow India to impose China’s borders unilaterally and annex territory at will – Nehru’s policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it. Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing ‘aggression’ by refusing to surrender to Indian claims. From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On Oct 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India’s intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of ‘Chinese aggression’ had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: ‘If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked.’ On Oct 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along the borders, overwhelming the feeble – but, in this first instance, determined – resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the eastern sector. On Oct 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese withdrawal on the condition that India agrees to open negotiations: Nehru refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local counterattack on Nov 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total victory. The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by Nov 20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted. Naturally the Indian political public demanded to know what had brought about the shameful debacle suffered by their Army. On Dec 14, a new Army Cdr, Lt Gen JN Chaudhuri, instituted an Operations Review for that purpose, assigning the task of enquiry to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat.
Part II – How the East was Lost
All colonial armies are liable to suffer from the tugs of contradictory allegiance and, in the case of India’s, that fissure was opened in the Second World War by Japan’s recruitment from prisoners of war of the Indian National Army to fight against their former fellows. By the beginning of the 1950s, two factions were emerging in the officer corps:- · One patriotic but above all professional and apolitical, and orthodox in adherence to the regimental traditions established in the century of the Raj; · The other nationalist, ready to respond unquestioningly to the political requirements of their civilian masters and scorning their rivals as fuddy-duddies still aping the departed rulers, and suspected as being of doubtful loyalty to the new ones. The latter faction soon took on an eponymous identification from its leader, B M Kaul. At the time of Independence, Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. Although Sandhurst-trained for infantry service, he had eased through the war without serving on any frontline and ended it in a humble and obscure post in public relations. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that Independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman. Boosted by the prime minister’s steady favouritism, Kaul rocketed through the Army structure to emerge in 1961 at the very summit of the Army HQ. Not only did he hold the key appointment of Chief of General Staff but the Army Commander, Thapar, was, in effect, his client. Kaul had, of course, by then acquired a significant following, disparaged by the other side as ‘Kaul boys’ (‘call-girls’ had just entered usage), and his appointment as CGS opened a putsch in HQ, an eviction of the old guard, with his rivals, until then his superiors, being not only pushed out but often hounded thereafter with charges of disloyalty. The struggle between those factions both fed on and fed into the strains placed on the Army by the government’s contradictory and hypocritical policies – on the one hand, proclaiming China an eternal friend against whom it was unnecessary to arm; on the other, exerting armed force to seize territory it knew China regarded as its own. Through the early 1950s, Nehru’s covertly expansionist policy had been implemented by armed border police under the Intelligence Bureau, whose director, NB Mullik, was another favourite and confidant of the prime minister. The Army high command, knowing its forces to be too weak to risk conflict with China, would have nothing to do with it. Indeed when the potential for Sino-Indian conflict inherent in Mullik’s aggressive forward patrolling was demonstrated in the serious clash at the Kongka Pass in Oct 1959, Army HQ and the MEA united to denounce him as a provocateur and insisted that control over all activities on the border be assumed by the Army, which thus could insulate China from Mullik’s jabs. The takeover by Kaul and his ‘boys’ at Army HQ in 1961 reversed that. Now, regular infantry would take over from Mullik’s border police in implementing what was formally designated a ‘forward policy,’ one conceived to extrude the Chinese presence from all territory claimed by India. Field commanders receiving orders to move troops forward into territory the Chinese both held and regarded as their own warned that they had no resources or reserves to meet the forceful reaction they knew must be the ultimate outcome: they were told to keep quiet and obey orders. That may suggest that those driving the forward policy saw it in kamikaze terms and were reconciled to its ending in gunfire and blood – but the opposite was true. They were totally and unshakably convinced that it would end not with a bang but a whimper – from Beijing. The psychological bedrock upon which the forward policy rested was the belief that, in the last resort, the Chinese military, snuffling from a bloody nose, would pack up and quit the territory India claimed. The source of that faith was Mullik, who from beginning to end proclaimed as oracular truth that, whatever the Indians did, there need be no fear of a violent Chinese reaction. The record shows no one squarely challenging that mantra at higher levels than the field commanders who throughout knew it to be dangerous nonsense: there were civilian ‘Kaul boys’ in the ministries of external affairs and defence too and they basked happily in Mullik’s fantasy. Perhaps the explanation for the credulousness lay in Nehru’s dependent relationship with his IB chief: since the prime minister placed such faith in Mullik, it would be at the least lese majeste, and even heresy, to deny him a kind of papal infallibility. If it be taken that Mullik was not just deluded, what other explanation could there be for the unwavering consistency with which he urged his country forward on a course which, in rational perception, could lead only to war with a greatly superior military power and, therefore, defeat? Another question arises: who, in those years, would most have welcomed the great falling-out which saw India shift in a few years from strong international support for the People’s Republic of China to enmity and armed conflict with it? From founding and leading the Non-Aligned Movement to tacit enlistment in the hostile encirclement of China which was Washington’s aim? Mullik maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi, Harry Rossitsky. Answers may lie in the agency’s archives. China’s stunning and humiliating victory brought about an immediate reversal of fortune between the Army factions. Out went Kaul, out went Thapar, out went many of their adherents – but by no means all. Gen Chaudhuri, appointed to replace Thapar as Army chief, chose not to launch a counter-putsch. He and his colleagues of the restored old guard knew full well what had caused the debacle: political interference in promotions and appointments by the prime minister and Krishna Menon, defence minister, followed by clownish ineptitude in the Army HQ as ‘Kaul boys’ scurried to force the troops to carry out the mad tactics and strategy laid down by the government. It was clear that the trail back from the broken remnants of the 4th Division limping onto the plains in the north-east, up through intermediate commands to the Army HQ in New Delhi and then, on to the source of political direction, would have ended at the prime minister’s door – a destination which, understandably, Chaudhuri had no desire to reach. (Mullik was anyway to tarnish him with the charge that he was plotting to overthrow the discredited civil order, but, in fact, Chaudhuri was a dedicated constitutionalist – ironically, Kaul was the only one of the generals who harboured Caesarist ambitions.) The Investigation While the outraged humiliation of the political class left Chaudhuri with no choice but to order an enquiry into the Army’s collapse, it was up to him to decide its range and focus, indeed its temper. The choice of Lt Gen Henderson Brooks to run an Operations Review (rather than a broader and more searching board of enquiry) was indicative of a wish not to make the already bubbling stew of recriminations boil over. Henderson Brooks (until then in command of a corps facing Pakistan) was a steady, competent but not outstanding officer, whose appointments and personality had kept him entirely outside the broils stirred up by Kaul’s rise and fall. That could be said too of the officer Chaudhuri appointed to assist Henderson Brooks, Brig PS Bhagat (holder of a WW II Victoria Cross and commandant of the military academy). But the latter complemented his senior by being a no-nonsense, fighting soldier, widely respected in the Army, and the taut, unforgiving analysis in the Report bespeaks the asperity of his approach. There is further evidence that Chaudhuri did not wish the enquiry to dig too deep, range too widely, or excoriate those it faulted. The following were the terms of reference he set:- · Training; · Equipment; · System of command; · Physical fitness of troops; · Capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command. The first four of those smacked of an enquiry into the sinking of the Titanic briefed to concentrate on the management of the shipyard where it was built and the health of the deck crew; only the last term has any immediacy, and there the wording was distinctly odd – commanders do not usually ‘influence’ those they command, they issue orders and expect instant obedience. But Henderson Brooks and Bhagat (henceforth HB/B) in effect ignored the constraints of their terms of reference and kicked against other limits Chaudhuri had laid upon their investigation, especially his ruling that the functioning of Army HQ during the crisis lay outside their purview. ‘It would have been convenient and logical’, they note, ‘to trace the events [beginning with] Army HQ, and then move down to the Commands for more details… ending up with field formations for the battle itself’. Forbidden that approach, they would, nevertheless, try to discern what had happened at Army HQ from documents found at lower levels, although those could not throw any lighton one crucial aspect of the story – the political directions given to the Army by the civil authorities. As HB/B began their enquiry, they immediately discovered that the short rein kept upon them by the Army chief was by no means the least of their handicaps. They found themselves facing determined obstruction in Army HQ, where one of the leading lights of the Kaul faction had survived in the key post of director of military operations – Brigadier DK Palit. Kaul had exerted his power of patronage to have Palit made DMO although others senior to him were listed for the post, and Palit, as he was himself to admit, was ‘one of the least qualified among [his] contemporaries for this crucial General Staff appointment.’ Palit had thereafter acted as enforcer for Kaul and the civilian protagonists of the ‘forward policy,’ Mullik foremost among the latter, issuing the orders and deflecting or over-ruling the protests of field commanders who reported up their strategic imbecility or operational impossibility. Why Chaudhuri left Palit in this post is puzzling: the Henderson Brooks Report was to make quite clear what a prominent and destructive role he had played throughout the Army high command’s politicisation, and, through inappropriate meddling in command decisions, even in bringing about the debacle in the north-east. Palit, though, would immediately have recognised that the HB/B enquiry posed a grave threat to his career and so did that entire he could to undermine and obstruct it. After consultation with Mullik, Palit took it upon himself to rule that HB/B should not have access to any documents emanating from the civil side – in other words, he blindfolded the enquiry, so far as he could, as to the nexus between the civil and military. As Palit smugly recounts his story, in an autobiography published in 1991, he personally faced down both Henderson Brooks and Bhagat, rode out their formal complaints about his obstructionism, and prevented them from prying into the ‘high level policies and decisions’ which he maintained were none of their business. In fact, however, the last word lies with HB/B – or will do if their report is ever published. In spite of Palit’s efforts, they discovered a great deal that the Kaul camp and the government would have preferred to keep hidden; and their report shows that Palit’s self-admiring and mock-modest autobiography grossly misrepresents the role he played. The Henderson Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers nearly 200 typed foolscap pages), detailed and, as far as the restrictions placed upon its authors allowed, far-ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some salient points, to give the flavour of the whole (a full account of the subject they covered is in the writer’s 1970 study, India’s China War).
Part III – India’s Shameful Debacle The Forward Policy This was born and named at a meeting chaired by Nehru on Nov 2, 1961, but it had been alive and kicking in the womb for years before that – indeed its conception dated back to 1954, when Nehru issued an instruction for posts to be set up all along India’s claim lines, ‘especially in such places as might be disputed.’ What happened at this 1961 meeting was that the freeze on provocative forward patrolling, instituted at the Army’s insistence after Mullik had engineered the Kongka Pass clash, was ended – with the Army, now under the courtier leadership of Thapar and Kaul, eagerly assuming the task which Mullik’s armed border police had carried out until the Army stopped them. HB/B note that no minutes of this meeting had been obtained, but were able to quote Mullik as saying that ‘the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.’ That opinion contradicted the conclusion Army Intelligence had reached 12 months before: that the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them. HB/B then trace a contradictory duet between the Army HQ and the Western Army Command, with HQ ordering the establishment of ‘penny-packet’ forward posts in Ladakh, specifying their location and strength, and the Western Command protesting that it lacked the forces to carry out the allotted task, still less to face the grimly foreseeable consequences. Kaul and Palit ‘time and again ordered, in furtherance of the “forward policy,” the establishment of individual posts, overruling protests made by the Western Command’. By Aug 1962 about 60 posts had been set up, most manned with less than a dozen soldiers, all under close threat by overwhelmingly superior Chinese forces. The Western Command submitted another request for heavy reinforcements, accompanying it with this admonition: ‘[I]t is imperative that political direction is based on military means. If the two are not correlated, there is a danger of creating a situation where we may lose both in the material and moral sense much more than we already have. Thus, there is no short cut to military preparedness to enable us to pursue effectively our present policy…’ That warning was ignored, reinforcements were denied, orders were affirmed and, although the Chinese were making every effort, diplomatic, political and military, to prove their determination to resist by force, again it was asserted that no forceful reaction by the Chinese was to be expected. HB/B quote Field Marshall Roberts: ‘The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable’ But, in this instance, troops were being put in dire jeopardy in pursuit of a strategy based upon an assumption – that the Chinese would not resist with force – which the strategy would itself inevitably prove wrong. HB/B notes that from the beginning of 1961, when the Kaulist putsch reshaped Army HQ, crucial professional military practice was abandoned: This lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the CGS [Kaul], his deputy, the DMO [Palit] and other Staff Directors is inexcusable. From this stemmed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces. These appointments in General Staff are key appointments and officers were handpicked by Gen Kaul to fill them. There was therefore no question of clash of personalities. General Staff appointments are stepping stones to high command, and correspondingly carry heavy responsibility. When, however, these appointments are looked upon as adjuncts to a successful career and the responsibility is not taken seriously, the results, as is only too clear, are disastrous. This should never be allowed to be repeated and the Staff as of old must be made to bear the consequences of their lapses and mistakes. Comparatively, the mistakes and lapses of the Staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of battle are more heinous than the errors made by the commanders in the field of battle. War and Debacle While the main thrust of the Forward Policy was exerted in the western sector of the border, it was also applied in the east from Dec 1961. There the Army was ordered to set up new posts along the McMahon Line (which China treated – and treats – as the de facto boundary), and, in some sectors, beyond it. One of these trans-Line posts, named Dhola Post, was invested by a superior Chinese force on Sep 8, 1962, the Chinese thus reacting there exactly as they had been doing for a year in the western sector. In this instance, however, and although Dhola Post was known to be north of the McMahon Line, the Indian government reacted aggressively, deciding that the Chinese force threatening Dhola must be attacked forthwith, and thrown back. Now, again, the duet of contradiction began, the Army HQ and, in this case, Eastern Command (headed by Lt Gen L P Sen) united against the commands below: 33 Corps (Lt Gen Umrao Singh), 4 Div (Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad) and 7 Bde (Brig John Dalvi). The latter three stood together in reporting that the ‘attack and evict’ order was militarily impossible to execute. The point of confrontation, below Thagla ridge at the western extremity of the McMahon Line, presented immense logistical difficulties to the Indian side and none to the Chinese, so whatever concentration of troops could painfully be mustered by the Indians could instantly be outnumbered and outweighed in weaponry. Tactically, again the irreversible advantage lay with the Chinese, who held well-supplied, fortified positions on a commanding ridge feature. The demand for military action and the victory it was expected to bring was political, generated at top level meetings in Delhi. ‘The Defence Minister [Krishna Menon] categorically stated that in view of the top secret nature of conferences no minutes would be kept [and] this practice was followed at all the conferences that were held by the Defence Minister in connection with these operations’. HB/B commented: ‘This is a surprising decision and one which could and did lead to grave consequences. It absolved in the ultimate analysis anyone of the responsibility for any major decision. Thus it could and did lead to decisions being taken without careful and considered thought on the consequences of those decisions.’ Army HQ by no means restricted itself to the big picture. In mid-Sep it issued an order to troops beneath Thagla ridge to:- (a) Capture a Chinese post 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post. (b) Contain the Chinese concentration S of Thagla.
HB/B comment: ‘The General Staff, sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post is astounding. The country was not known, the enemy situation vague, and for all that there may have been a ravine in between [the troops and their objective], but yet the order was given. This order could go down in the annals of History as being as incredible as the order for “the Charge of the Light Brigade.” Worse was to follow Underlying all the meetings in Delhi was still the conviction or by now, perhaps, prayer, that even when frontally attacked the Chinese would put up no serious resistance, still less react aggressively elsewhere. Thus it came to be believed that the problem lay in weakness, even cowardice, at lower levels of command. Gen Umrao Singh (33 Corps) was seen as the hub of the problem, since he was backing his div and bde commanders in their insistence that the eviction operation was impossible. ‘It was obvious that Lt Gen Umrao Singh would not be hustled into an operation, without proper planning and logistical support. The Defence Ministry and, for that matter, the General Staff and Eastern Command were prepared for a gamble on the basis of the Chinese not reacting to any great extent.’ So the political leadership and Army HQ decided that if Umrao Singh could be replaced by a commander with fire in his belly all would come right, and victory be assured. Such a commander was available – Gen Kaul. A straight switch, with Kaul relinquishing the CGS post to replace Umrao Singh, would have raised too many questions, so it was decided instead that Umrao Singh would simply be moved aside, retaining his corps command but no longer being concerned with the situation on the border. That would become the responsibility of a new formation, 4 Corps, whose sole task would be to attack and drive the Chinese off Thagla ridge. Gen Kaul would command the new corps. HB/B noted how even the most secret of government’s decisions were swiftly reported in the press, and called for a thorough probe into the sources of the leaks. Many years later Palit, in his autobiography, described the transmission procedure. Palit had hurried to see Kaul on learning of the latter’s appointment to command the notional new Corps: ‘I found him in the little bedsitter den where he usually worked when at home. I was startled to see, sitting beside him on the divan, Prem Bhatia, editor of The Times of India, looking like the proverbial cat who has just swallowed a large yellow songbird. He got up as I arrived, wished [Kaul] good luck and left, still with a greatly pleased smirk on his face.’ Bhatia’s scoop led his paper next morning. The ‘spin’ therein was the suggestion that whereas, in the western sector, Indian troops faced extreme logistical problems, in the east that situation was reversed and, therefore, with the dashing Kaul in command of a fresh ‘task force,’ victory was imminent. The truth was exactly the contrary, those in NEFA faced even worse difficulties than their fellows in the west, and victory was a chimera. Those difficulties were compounded by persistent interference from the Army HQ. On orders from Delhi, ‘troops of [the entire 7 Bde] were dispersed to outposts that were militarily unsound and logistically unsupportable.’ Once Kaul took over as Corps Cdr, the troops were driven forward to their fate in what HB/B called ‘wanton disregard of the elementary principles of war.’ Even in the dry, numbered paragraphs of their report, HB/B’s account of the moves that preceded the final Chinese assault is dramatic and riveting, with the scene of action shifting from the banks of the Namka Chu, the fierce little river beneath the menacing loom of Thagla ridge along which the under-clad Indian troops shivered and waited to be overwhelmed, to Nehru’s house in Delhi – whither Kaul rushed back to report when a rash foray he had ordered was crushed by a fierce Chinese reaction on Oct 10. To follow those events, and on into the greater drama of the ensuing debacle is tempting but would add only greater detail to the account already published. Given the nature of the dramatic events they were investigating, it is not surprising that HB/B’s cast of characters consisted in the main of fools and/or knaves on the one hand, their victims on the other. But they singled out a few heroes too, especially the jawans, who fought whenever their commanders gave them the necessary leadership, and suffered miserably from the latter’s often gross incompetence. As for the debacle itself, ‘Efforts of a few officers, particularly those of Capt NN Rawat’ to organise a fighting retreat, ‘could not replace a disintegrated command;’ nor could the cool-headed Brig Gurbax Singh do more than keep his 48 Bde in action as a cohesive combat unit until it was liquidated by the joint efforts of higher command and the Chinese. HB/B place the immediate cause of the collapse of resistance in NEFA in the panicky, fumbling and contradictory orders issued from Corps HQ in Tezpur by a ‘triumvirate’ of officers they judge to be grossly culpable: Gen Sen, Gen Kaul, and Brig Palit. Those were, however, only the immediate agents of disaster: its responsible planners and architects were another triumvirate, comprised of Nehru, Mullik and again, Kaul, together with all those who accompanied them into the fantasy that a much stronger neighbour could be confronted and overcome through guile and puny force.
As Beijing keeps riling New Delhi with J&K rants, India invites 84-year-old Tibetan leader to deliver prestigious lecture instituted in memory of its second President.
The government has given its nod to an autonomous institution funded by its Ministry of Human Resource Development that is housed in the summer retreat of President of India to invite Dalai Lama to deliver a lecture next Thursday – a move, which is likely to rile China.
The Indian Institute of Advanced Studies (IIAS) housed at Rashtrapati Nivas in Shimla has invited Dalai Lama to deliver a lecture instituted in memory of eminent educationist and philosopher Dr. Sarvepally Radhakrishnan, who had served as the first Vice President and second President of India.
New Delhi’s nod to the institution to invite Dalai Lama to deliver lecture signaled a subtle shift in its approach on engaging with the exiled Tibetans and it came about 20 months after the Cabinet Secretariat in February 2018 advised senior leaders and the functionaries of the government to stay away from events attended by Dalai Lama and other leaders of the global campaign to free Tibet from “repressive rule” of China.
Dalai Lama will deliver the 24th annual Radhakrishnan Memorial Lecture at the India International Centre in New Delhi on Thursday. Vinay Sahasrabuddhe, a member of Parliament of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Director-General of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) will be the Guest of Honor at the event, according to an invitation circulated by the IAAS.
New Delhi’s ties with Beijing came under stress once again after China joined Pakistan to oppose India’s August 5 decision to strip Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and reorganize the state into two Union Territories.
China is concerned over the implication of the Modi government’s move on Jammu and Kashmir on its protracted boundary dispute with India. The Chinese government perceived it as New Delhi’s “unilateral” move to change the status quo in the disputed territory and to strengthen its claim – not only on areas of Kashmir under occupation of Pakistan, but also on 5180 sq km of areas ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963 as well as on Aksai Chin – a disputed territory between India and China.
Though Modi hosted Xi for the second “informal summit” at a seaside resort near Chennai on October 11 and 12, China’s opposition to India’s decisions on Jammu and Kashmir cast a shadow over the meeting.
India, in fact, raised its pitch to re-assert claim over its territories illegally occupied by China, after the communist country on October 31 described the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir as “unlawful”.
US Congress Resolution Commends Dalai Lama For His Commitment To Global Peace
The resolution recognizes the cultural and religious significance of a genuinely autonomous Tibet and the deep bond between people of America and Tibet.
83-year-old Dalai Lama lives in exile in the hill town of Dharamsala WASHINGTON:
A group of four influential US lawmakers has introduced a resolution in Congress commending the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama for his commitment to global peace and non-violence.
The resolution, introduced in the House of Representatives, came weeks after US ambassador-at-large for Religious Freedom Samuel D Brownback traveled to Dharamsala in India and met the Dalai Lama and discussed ways to advance religious freedom.
The 83-year-old Dalai Lama, a globally revered figure and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, lives in exile in the hill town of Dharamsala. He fled to India in early 1959 to escape from the Chinese occupation.
The House resolution — introduced by Congressman Ted Yoho and co-sponsored by Michael McCaul, Chris Smith, and George McGovern — recognizes the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding.
The resolution recognizes the cultural and religious significance of a genuinely autonomous Tibet and the deep bond between the American and Tibetan people.
It commends the 14th Dalai Lama for his commitment to global peace and non-violence.
It would be beneficial to convene a bipartisan, bicameral forum, either through a joint meeting of Congress, a teleconference broadcast in the Auditorium at the Capitol Visitor Center, or roundtable between members of Congress and the Dalai Lama to discuss peaceful solutions to international conflicts, the resolution notes.
China, which firmly opposes any contact with the Dalai Lama by any foreign official, says the successor to the Dalai Lama must be chosen according to religious rituals and historical conventions as well as the backing from the ruling Communist Party.
Jawaharlal Nehru was born on November 14, 1889, in Uttar Pradesh’s Prayagraj, earlier known as Allahabad. He died on May 27, 1964.
He became the Prime Minister on August 15, 1947, following an active role in the freedom struggle.
Nehru’s political awakening happened when he learned about Annie Besant’s arrest in 1917. He subsequently joined the All India Home Rule League. In 1919, shortly after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre — in which 379 Indians were killed and more than 1000 injured — Nehru overheard the unrepentant orchestrator British Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer gloat about it while on a train. This outraged him further and he vowed to resolutely fight for India’s independence.
During India’s freedom movement, Pandit Nehru was imprisoned 9 times. He was jailed by the British for a total of 3,259 days which is close to 9 years of his life spent behind the bars. Pandit Nehru penned an autobiography ‘Toward Freedom’ when he was in jail.
On behalf of the Living Tibetan Spirits, I pray for the Resurrection of American Values, the foundational values that define America as a nation. My concern is not about the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. The United States must overcome fear to expose evil actions of People’s Republic of China to occupy Tibet through acts of military aggression.
Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada
Special Frontier Force-Establishment N0. 22-Vikas Regiment
US Wants UN To Take Up Dalai Lama Succession: Envoy
The United States wants the United Nations to take up the Dalai Lama’s succession in an intensifying bid to stop China from trying to handpick his successor, an envoy said after meeting the Tibetan spiritual leader.
Sam Brownback, the US ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, said he spoke at length about the succession issue with the 84-year-old Dalai Lama last week in the monk’s home-in-exile of Dharamsala, India.
Brownback said he told the Dalai Lama that the United States would seek to build global support for the principle that the choice of the next spiritual chief “belongs to the Tibetan Buddhists and not the Chinese government.”
The Dalai Lama arrives for prayers wishing him a long life at the Tsuglagkhang temple in McLeod Ganj, India in September 2019 — the US wants the UN to look at the issue of who will succeed him Photo: AFP / Lobsang Wangyal
“I would hope that the UN would take the issue up,” Brownback told AFP after returning to Washington.
He acknowledged that China, with its veto power on the Security Council, would work strenuously to block any action, but he hoped countries could at least raise their voices at the United Nations.
“I think it’s really important to have an early global conversation because this is a global figure with a global impact,” he said.
“That’s the big thing that we’re really after now, to stir this before we’re right in the middle of it — if something happens to the Dalai Lama, that there has been this robust discussion globally about it ahead of time,” he said.
US religious freedom envoy Sam Brownback, seen here at a July 2019 ministerial meeting in Washington, is raising pressure over the Dalai Lama’s succession Photo: AFP / MANDEL NGAN
“My estimation undoubtedly is that the (Chinese) communist party has thought a lot about this. So they’ve got a plan and I think we have to be equally aggressive with a plan.”
The Dalai Lama once traveled incessantly, drawing huge Western audiences with his good-humored lectures on compassion and happiness.
But the Nobel Peace Prize winner has slowed down and earlier this year suffered a chest infection, although he is not known to have serious health issues.
Brownback said he found the Dalai Lama “quite jovial” and that the monk had told him, “‘Look, I’m going to live another 15, 20 years; I’m going to outlast the Chinese government.'”
A Tibetan-in-exile carries a photograph of the Dalai Lama during celebrations marking the Lunar New Year in Kathmandu in February 2018 Photo: AFP / PRAKASH MATHEMA
But Beijing has indicated it is waiting out the Dalai Lama, believing his campaign for greater Tibetan autonomy will end with him.
China, which argues that it has brought modernization and development to the Himalayan region, has increasingly hinted that it could name the next Dalai Lama, who would presumably be groomed to support Chinese rule.
In 1995, the officially atheist government selected its own Panchen Lama and detained a six-year-old identified for the influential Buddhist position — whom rights groups called the world’s youngest political prisoner.
Indian police detain Tibetan students as they protest against the visit of China’s President Xi Jinping in Chennai in October 2019 Photo: AFP / STR
Mindful of Beijing’s plans, the 14th Dalai Lama has mused about breaking with the centuries-old tradition in which wandering monks look for signs that a young boy is a reincarnation.
He has said that he could pick his own successor, possibly a girl, or even declare himself the final Dalai Lama.
The US Congress has also stepped up efforts, including by mandating visa denials by the end of the year for Chinese officials unless Beijing eases restrictions on US diplomats, journalists and ordinary people seeking to visit Tibet.
Brownback said he would like access to Tibet, “but I want it unfettered.”
He said he similarly hoped to visit the western region of Xinjiang, which has drawn intense US scrutiny over the incarceration of one million Uighurs and other Turkic-speaking Muslims.
“It is part of the same war on faith,” Brownback said of Tibet and Xinjiang.
Brownback also visited Nepal, historically the gateway for Tibetans fleeing to India but which has increasingly clamped down under pressure from its giant northern neighbor.
Brownback said he raised fears for Tibetans with Nepal’s foreign minister, Pradeep Gyawali.
But he acknowledged Nepal’s difficult situation and said: “I would hate to be very harsh on the Nepalese because they’ve been so good over so many years to help the Tibetans.”
Brownback said that the burden was ultimately with China to allow freedom of movement — and not to interfere in Tibetan Buddhism.
“A government doesn’t own a religion,” he said. “A religion runs itself.”
“We hope we’ll get a number of other communities around the world to express similar positions and concerns.”
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE-ESTABLISHMENT NO. 22-VIKAS REGIMENT- OPERATION EAGLE 1971 AND THE VIETNAM WAR:
The military action in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that initiated the Liberation of Bangladesh during 1971 is known as Operation Eagle. This military action used the military power of ‘The Bald Eagle’ and is executed by ‘The Golden Eagle’ without getting the formal approval or sanction of the US President.
Operation Eagle was a very modest military confrontation as compared to the Vietnam War. However, a comparison must be made to understand the use of military force to defeat an enemy to obtain a political objective. The Operation Eagle was executed using US weapons, ammunition, US military radios, medical supplies, assorted tools and equipment, field gear, and U.S. Military Field Rations-Meals Ready to Eat or MREs that the US Army was using in the conduct of the Vietnam War.
The military objectives of the Vietnam War could not be accomplished because of the reliance placed upon aerial bombardment to defeat the enemy. Operation Eagle was small in its scope and size. But, it did not rely upon the use of aerial bombardment. We operated on a ‘manpack’ basis, went in search of enemy positions, and directly challenged the enemy at his own post. United States failed to attack the enemy on the ground during the Vietnam War. To defend South Vietnam, the military strategy and planning would call for Infantry attacks on the enemy inside North Vietnam. United States used more bombs as compared to the number of bombs that were dropped during the Second World War and yet could not dislodge the enemy from his entrenched positions. We need to fight and engage the enemy on the ground. Secondly, during Nixon’s presidency(1969-1974), while engaged in War, the President conceded the battle by befriending the Enemy.
OPERATION EAGLE 1971 AND THE VIETNAM WAR INFANTRY WEAPONS AND FIELD GEAR:
A military action by Infantry is best understood by examining the weapons that are used. During Operation Eagle 1971 and the Vietnam War, the Infantry used the same kinds of Infantry weapons. We must ignore the sophisticated technology and the firepower of United States Navy and Air Force. The battle must be won on the ground. During Operation Eagle 1971 we used the same Infantry weapons, equipment, and other supplies more effectively in our battle as compared to US Armyin its combat missions against its enemy in Vietnam. We did not use helicopters as gunships or to attack the enemy in support of ground troops. I would like to share some of the photo images of the Infantry Weapons and equipment that were used in the Vietnam War and which I have seen during Operation Eagle 1971.
WAR AND PEACE – A FAILURE OF U.S. DIPLOMACY:
United States failed in Vietnam as it failed to develop a clear vision to achieve its goal of resisting and containing the expansion of Communist Power in Southeast Asia. U.S. efforts to stop the spread of Communism got derailed by Dr. Henry Kissinger who chose the option of backstabbing people who support the United States in its global mission to oppose Communism using diplomacy and military power. U.S. gave away a lot during the Paris Peace Talks basically defeating the accomplishments of its military and literally ridiculing their sacrifices. The several concessions given to the Peoples’ Republic of China to win its cooperation failed to stop the flow of military assistance to North Vietnam.
The establishment of US-China relations gave no advantage to the United States for its War in Vietnam. United States added insult to its own injuries by seeking the support of Communist China to attack India across its Himalayan frontier in the North East Frontier Agency in a vain bid to stop India in its efforts to liberate Bangladesh during 1971.
THE BALD EAGLE AND THE GOLDEN EAGLE CONNECTION :
My Unit participated in Operation Eagle during 1971-72 to gain practical experience of Infantry Combat Operations to fight against Communists in a future battle.
The Operation Eagle 1971-72 was inclined towards peace. It intended to deliver peace to the people of Bangladesh who declared their independence from Pakistan during March 1971.
The War in Vietnam is over and yet the threat of Communism still persists in Southeast Asia. To deliver peace to people of Southeast Asia, the United States must learn from its failure in Vietnam. The failure was not that of the US Army which willingly sacrificed the lives of over 58,000 of its fighting men and women. The US political leadership had failed the US military mission in Vietnam. United States must seek assistance from the people of Southeast Asia and fight its enemy on the ground and dislodge the enemy in a ground battle.
Dr. R. R. Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S.,
Service Number: MS-8466, Rank. Captain,
Branch: Army Medical Corps/Short Service Regular Commission. Designation: Medical Officer, South Column Operation Eagle 1971-72.
In my analysis, the Succession of the Dalai Lama is the exclusive Political Right of Tibetans. The primary concern is not that of Religious Freedom of Tibetans to practice their religion. The real concern is about the Political Rights of Tibetans to Self-Determination, the Right to choose their own Supreme Ruler of Tibet.
The Fundamental Right to choose the Successor of the Dalai Lama belongs to Tibetans and it does not belong to anybody else, not any government or any entity.
Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada
Special Frontier Force-Establishment No.22
Only the Tibetan system to choose Dalai Lama’s successor: US
Oct 28, 2019, | IANS
Dharamsala, Oct 28: US Ambassador at large for International Religious Freedom, Samuel D. Brownback, called on the Dalai Lama at his official palace here on Monday and favored that successor to the spiritual leader belongs to the Tibetan Buddhist system. During the two-day visit, which began on Sunday, the Ambassador met high-ranking officials of Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), including ‘Prime Minister’ Lobsang Sangay.
The Ambassador was accompanied by three members from the US State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom and two from the US Embassy in New Delhi.
The Dalai Lama, who believes in the “middle-path” policy that advocates “greater autonomy” for the people in Tibet, is viewed by the Chinese as a hostile element who is bent on splitting Tibet from China.
Speaking to CTA-run Tibet News Bureau, Brownback said the purpose of his visit is to send a clear message that “the United States government supports the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama and that the role of picking a successor to the Dalai Lama belongs to the Tibetan Buddhist system, the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan Buddhist leaders”.
“It does not belong to anybody else, not any government or any entity,” he said.
“I want to express clearly the US government supports the Dalai Lama and supports the succession of the Dalai Lama to be done by the Tibetan Buddhist leadership.”
Prior to the meeting with Sangay on Sunday, Brownback met a group of survivors of religious persecution who had recently escaped from Tibet.
In the hour-long meeting, the Ambassador asked questions to each of the survivors and listened to their accounts.
He thanked them for their courage and expressed his full support and earnest efforts towards advancing religious freedom inside Tibet, a post on the CTA website said.
“We believe in religious freedom; the United States strongly supports religious freedom. We believe people all over the world deserve this right and they should be able to practice theirs peacefully and freely. Unfortunately, Tibetans aren’t allowed to practice their faith freely in Tibet and they have to get out to India and other places to practice their faith. So I was hearing with some people who had recently left and all for the reason of wanting to practice their faith freely,” the post quoting the Ambassador added.
This is Brownback’s second visit to Dharamsala this year. Last time he called on the elderly Buddhist spiritual leader in March.
The Dalai Lama lives in exile along with some 140,000 Tibetans, over 100,000 of them in India. Over six million Tibetans live in Tibet.
The Tibetan-in-exile administration is based in this northern Indian hill town but is not recognized by any country.