TIBET EQUILIBRIUM – MAN vs NATURE
Man has been shaping face of Earth by creating political boundaries to define the extent of territory under his domination. Man uses his physical power or military force to subdue his opponents while he expands his territory. Red China describes her military conquest of foreign territory as ‘Liberation’. In Man’s History, Empires have risen and fallen reshaping political boundaries.
Nature is also at work reshaping Earth from its very beginning. Earth’s Natural History is full of remarkable events such as Continental Drift. Himalaya Mountain range came into existence due to force of collision generated by Indian Landmass thrusting against Asia. Apart from creating Himalaya Mountains, collision of Indian Plate caused uplift of Tibetan Plateau which began about 45 million years ago. This force is still acting slowly pushing Nepal towards Tibetan Plateau.
Nature causes Major and Minor ‘Extinction Events’ altering shape of Earth and the lifeforms that live on Earth. Natural History records several episodes of heavenly objects striking Earth with devastating consequences. Earth witnessed on June 30, 1908 an event called Tunguska Event caused by asteroid collision. This Event is remembered as ‘Asteroid Day’.
In my analysis, such Heavenly Strike is natural remedy for Man’s Pride and Arrogance with which Man desires domination of planet Earth.
I use the term or phrase ‘Tibet Equilibrium’ to describe Natural Balance of Power instituted by Natural Factors, Natural Mechanisms, Natural Conditions, Natural Forces that act together to restore Natural Freedom in Tibet, the Freedom that prevailed before Red China’s military conquest of Tibet.
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DEFENCE NEWS: TIBET IS CHINA’S RIGHT HAND AND LADAKH, NEPAL, SIKKIM, BHUTAN AND ARUNACHAL ARE ITS FINGERS – MAO ZEDONG
China’s legendary revolutionary leader Mao Zedong, standing in front of Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in the 1950s, talked about Tibet and the Himalayas: “Xizang (Tibet) is China’s right hand’s palm, which is detached from its five fingers — of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal (formerly NEFA). As all of these five are either occupied by, or under the influence of India, it is China’s responsibility to ‘liberate’ the five to be rejoined with Xizang (Tibet).”
Beijing and New Delhi are two capitals of two of the most populated nations of the world, with the Himalayas forming the most formidable barrier to an extensive interaction between them. The Himalayas, however, have much more to do with Hindu history, culture and the traditions of South Asia than that of China owing to its remote distance from China. Beijing owes its glorious rice culture more to the Hwang Ho and Yangtze rivers than to the Himalayan rivers of the Sindhu, Ganga and Brahmaputra.
Just like Jerusalem is the cradle of both Christianity and Judaism, and Mecca and Medina the Centre of Islam, the Himalayas and its waters have played a seminal role in the rise, growth and development of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. The Chinese owe the origin and development of their glorious civilization more to the twin non-Himalayan river valleys of the Hwang Ho and Yangtze than to the remote Himalayas, the abode of snow. The name originates from the combination of two Sanskrit words “him (snow)” and “alay (abode)”.
Let’s study the distance of the Himalayan “five fingers” from the two capitals of New Delhi and Beijing. Leh (Ladakh) is 1,258 km by road from Delhi and 3,490 km from Beijing; Kathmandu (Nepal) is 1,160 km from Delhi and 3,160 km from Beijing; From Nathu-La (Sikkim) to Delhi is 1,636 km, while to Beijing it is 2,888 km; Thimphu (Bhutan) is 1,782 km from Delhi and 2,820 km from Beijing; and lastly, from Tawang (Arunachal) Delhi is 2,315 km, while Beijing is 2,640 km from there.
Indeed, the “five fingers” of Beijing are rather too far when compared to the distance thereof from Delhi. Nevertheless, let us see things from Beijing’s point of view as well, in the light of its BRI/CPEC and SCO objectives. Several of its “economic” projects have been given different names to keep the non-Chinese guessing. That is the Chinese way, which could be to look different without being different. Why? Because the goal is always fixed. It’s the way to the acquisition of land and money, in the old Chinese tradition of kowtowing by rivals. Even when things do not exist, there is a need to make them “exist”. Almost like that of Voltaire’s logic: “Even if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him”. The belief has to prevail. If not today, in the long term and in the long run. The Chinese can go on hammering. The wall is bound to crack and crumble inevitably one day.
Ladakh is still with India, forced Chinese part-occupation notwithstanding. Nepal is independent and pursues its policy with great élan, despite its abolition of the monarchy and the tag of being a Hindu state. Sikkim joined India on its own volition in 1975, and there doesn’t seem to be any sign of a reverse gear. Bhutan too can’t be penetrated, as it is too steadfast in its approach. The proposed Chinese embassy in Thimphu is still a long way off. Arunachal Pradesh is one of the 29 states of India, and there is little to suggest that it can be anything other than that.
Therefore, the direct approach to “liberate” the “five fingers” of Xizang needs to change to an indirect one. How? By the application of “economics”. Development, investment, people-to-people contacts, profit, infrastructure, connectivity and corridor are alluring words. The Chinese aim to entice them, cajole them, as they are all landlocked terrain. All are “helpless” at the mercy of others. They need “liberation” by or under someone. Dissatisfaction and resentment is the key to their changing sides.
To begin with, a country has to have proximity to sea outlets. Five landlocked fingers cannot operate from Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. It is remote and turbulent. It has to be the Bay of Bengal, with its six ports of Kolkata, Haldia, Khulna, Chalna, Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. Nathu-La to Kolkata is 727 km, Dhaka 640 km, Chittagong 900 km.
No wonder China is anxious to open its embassy in Bhutan to balance New Delhi’s influence and to breach Siliguri’s “Chicken’s Neck” of less than 80 km to reach the shoreline of the Bay of Bengal. It does not matter what it takes to achieve the so-called economic goal. It matters little whether or not turbulence is created to breach the established polity of India and reach the beaches of West Bengal and Bangladesh. It is simply “economics”!
One of the priorities is the Sino-Bhutan border “issue”. The year 2017 has seen hectic Chinese activity in Bhutan — with very little effect though. They are trying hard in the Chumbi Valley tri-junction of Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet. The Yadong railway will also reach Kathmandu via Gyirong (Tibet). The Chinese want a railway line through Bhutan, West Bengal and Bangladesh as well. Not too soon, it appears, as tension and turbulence go on increasing in the highly vulnerable Chicken’s Neck area of India, that in turn may well contaminate all four nations in the neighborhood — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. Paradoxically, however, the adverse effect on these four nations is likely to be advantageous to China.
The Chinese hopes still revolve around Mao Zedong’s unfulfilled dreams. Hence, the renewed Chinese keenness to go to the east as well as the Northeast in Indian territory. India is the gateway to all the five (landlocked) fingers. The gate must be prized open — the sooner the better. It is the all-embracing “Chinese economics”: which Beijing sees as the only way to “liberate the “five fingers”.
TIBET AWARENESS – UNEQUAL YOKING
Red China is yoked with Tibet. To perform farm work, farmers generally use two animals of same type, size, and strength to get work done without imposing unequal burden on animals yoked together. Red China is huge, monstrous beast, and her Unequal Yoking with Tibet imposes burden called Subjection, Bondage, Servitude, Enslavement, Hardship, Trouble, Pain, and Suffering upon Tibetans.
Tibet is under the Yoke of Burden, Control, Subjugation to become subservient to Red China’s Doctrine of Neocolonialism.
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THINGS THAT SURPRISED ME ABOUT TIBET – FUN AND INTERESTING FACTS
The country at the roof of the world, was very different from what I expected. Tibet, often considered the spiritual center of the world has more Buddhist monks, stupas and gods than any other place, yet it was anything but the peaceful and calm realm I had envisioned. Not that the available online resources lie about it, but more that there is a general lack of information beyond the Dalai Lama and the Chinese-Tibetan political situation, so my mind veered towards red-robed monks and the magical image of the Potala Palace. The list of things that surprised me about Tibet is quite long, but I will attempt to highlight the most relevant, the top 17 things that most people don’t know about Tibet or that will surprise any traveler to the oft-called Shangri-la.
1. Tibet facts – Tibet is developed and it has incredible infrastructure
I visited with the utopian idea in my head that Tibet was going to be a peaceful and isolated place resembling Bhutan. But Tibet, or the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is a Chinese occupied territory that became part of China in 1950 and, as a result, for good or for bad, infrastructure has developed dramatically. Even the road that leads to the world’s highest mountain, Everest, is paved almost all the way, a far cry from the 9-14 day trek from Lukla Airport (the world’s most dangerous airport) to reach the Nepalese equivalent. In fact, we drove all the way to 5,200m to the tourist Everest Base Camp. Roads throughout the country are smooth and paved, including the Friendship Highway that links Shanghai with Kathmandu and runs for 5,900km, practically crossing Tibet.
Countless electricity lines crisscross the arid landscapes, at times, several electricity posts slashed my photographs. Even the most remote of villages have electricity and solar panels. Why? Tibet is China’s richest province, with deep reserves of gold, copper and other precious and valuable resources and infrastructure is essential to mine and exploit this natural wealth. As our train to Lhasa glided through the middle of nowhere, high up in the Tibetan Plateau, the lights of trucks carrying minerals to processing factories provided a continuous source of light in the darkest of nights. Those factories lit the horizon in sudden outbursts. Next to them, nomad villages built to accommodate the workers supporting the factories sprung as if mushrooming from the rocks and sand. There were many, and we were to see even more across Tibet.
2. Tibet facts – The issue of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama
The 14th Dalai Lama left Tibet after disagreement with the Chinese government about his successor, which made it too dangerous for him to stay and has lived in exile in Dharamsala, India, ever since. This shows his opposition to the occupation and his demands for true autonomy (not independence) for Tibet. The Chinese government recognizes Buddhism, a religion that is widely spread in the country despite communism, but nominated their own Panchen Lama, the successor to the Dalai Lama, in 1995, six years after the death of the previous Panchen Lama, following a traditional process using a golden urn that was used for the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas. Their choice did not match that of the current Dalai Lama, whose successor has been kept in an unknown location in China ever since.
The Panchen Lama nominated by the Chinese Government has been receiving education in Buddhism and Tibetan culture since his enthronement at the Panchen Lama’s seat in Xigatse. His photograph can be seen across Tibet whereas having a photo of the 14th Dalai Lama is illegal and can carry fines or imprisonment. Tibetans often claim this misalignment about who the next Dalai Lama will be as the main attempt by the Chinese to eradicate Tibetan culture and identity.
3. Tibet facts – The highest country on the planet
When I visited Bhutan I thought I was high. High on life, high on spirituality and high up in the mountains! One of the country’s nickname, “The Kingdom in the clouds”, clearly reflects its high altitude, with the capital at 2,300m and several peaks above 7,000m. Bhutan ranks as the highest country in the world when average altitudes are taken, despite some of the lowest parts are almost at sea level.
But that is just because Tibet is not officially recognized as a country by the UN because of Chinese veto, so it is just a region of China. Before Chinese occupation, Lhasa was the highest capital in the world as per the Guinness World Book of Records, but La Paz in Bolivia has taken that prize since Tibet became a part of China.
What makes Tibet’s altitude extra special is that, not only does it have the highest mountain in the world (Mount Everest), but also the highest average altitudes at 4,575m above sea level, the highest road, the highest toilet, the highest town (Whenzuan), the highest monastery and the highest train. Everything in Tibet is made of superlatives. We drove up mountain passes that are at 5,200m, we used the highest toilet in the world, located on the same mountain pass top, we took the train to Lhasa, which climbs to 4,500m and visited the world’s highest monastery, Rongbuk, at the foot of Everest Base Camp. Altitude is an undetachable synonym with Tibet.
4. Tibet facts – 40% less oxygen
Tibet’s high altitude is the cause for the traveler’s worst nightmare: Altitude sickness. Because it is so high, the pressure is lower giving the sensation that there is less oxygen. I have extensively covered the topic of altitude sickness, because we felt it and felt it badly, but what I found most interesting is that it is not possible to descend in Tibet, the lowest altitude is already a whooping 3,500m above sea level.
5. Tibet facts – Permits, permits, permits
Getting to Tibet is not particularly difficult. Travel restrictions have been lifted and you can go on a small private tour like I did with WildChina, without issues. It was a similar process to that for North Korea. You cannot travel independently, but you can pretty much visit anything as long as you are entering with a tour company. And, unlike North Korea, you can freely wander the streets or explore anything without a chaperon.
However, visiting Tibet does require a lot of planning ahead. You will need a Chinese visa first, which is required by almost all citizens and can take up to two weeks to process depending on your country of residence and which can be very costly (USD100 in Singapore). With a photocopy of that in hand, the travel agent will apply for a Tibetan permit which will be linked to your detailed itinerary. The permit can take anything from a week to 3 weeks so you should start the entire process about two months ahead to ensure everything is done on time as the processing timelines vary vastly from country to country (e.g. one of my friends took 2 weeks for the Chinese visa and 3 days for the Permit whereas I took 3 days for the visa and 3 weeks for the permit).
The permit is your passport into the Tibetan Autonomous Region and will be checked and rechecked a million times throughout the trip. Your guide will keep the permit with him or her throughout your stay. Every time you reach a new village the guide will be registering you, even for just one night, with the local Police, so your whereabouts are being monitored at all times. There were also 20 road checks through our 9 day journey and we were thoroughly scrutinized at the train station and airport before boarding. If you plan to visit Everest Base Camp, then you will need an additional permit and to go through a Military check-point at the park’s entry.
6. Tibet facts – Big Brother is watching
The controls of visitors extend to the cars as well. All cars that take tourists around the country are owned by the government and kitted with two cameras and a radio system that communicates a central office to all the drivers. The cameras are constantly monitoring the driver and making sure that he is not doing anything against the Chinese rules. Every time the speed went above the marked limit, a message came through on the radio speakers to slow down. The speakers also shared a regular amount of updates and reminders about safety on the road. It was a constant reminder that our every move was being watched.
7. Tibet facts – Cold and high, but without snow
I was expecting the landscapes to be rocky, mountainous and majestic and for the snow to cap all mountain tops but Tibetan landscapes are rather brown and grey with very little snow. In fact, although we saw some snowflakes as we traversed the highest pass, at 5,200m, the majority of the mountains were devoid of that delicate white veil that tops other mountain ranges. Our guide confirmed that it does snow very little in Tibet and that pretty much all the snow we were seeing was permanent. The glaciers, receding as a result of global warming, were also perennial. The lack of snow is caused by the high Himalayan mountains that stop the clouds from emptying their bowels and providing rain or snow.
8. Tibet facts – Tibet was not always a peaceful nation
I associated Tibet with peace, not least because the Dalai Lama has been an example of opposition to the Chinese occupation, something which got him the Nobel Peace Prize. But Tibet’s past wasn’t always as spiritual and peaceful as Buddhism advocates. Tibetan Kings fought and defended Tibet from assailants for centuries. Remnants of Medieval fortresses, city walls and castles can be seen across the country. Unlike Bhutan, who was never occupied by an international power, the English had several incursions in Tibet, as did the Mongols, Indians, Afghans, Nepali and various Chinese dynasties. So monks, and the Tibetan Kings, were a fearless army defending their territory since the 17th century until the Chinese occupation in the 1950s.
9. Tibet facts – Yak meat, yak butter, yak hair
Tibet’s high altitudes and harsh conditions make life extremely hard and yaks are the lifeline for most Tibetans. Yak meat, leaner and lighter than beef, is ever present. Yaks are also used for milk and butter and their hair is used to make rugs and clothes, even to weave the cover ups that protect the Potala Palace – delicate paintings and carvings from the sun. Even yak dung is collected and dried to be used as fuel in the winter months. However, yaks are an endangered species and most of the animals seen roaming the fields are actually a blend between yak and cow.
10. Tibet facts – Photos of the Dalai Lama are illegal
Almost everyone has a clear image in their heads of the current Dalai Lama. However, carrying or having his photo in Tibet could lead to imprisonment and punishment. None of the houses or temples we visited had any. Instead, the Panchen Lama, nominated by the Chinese Government, is to be displayed in homes and businesses. The prohibition extends to the Tibetan Flag, which does not fly anywhere in the country. Bright Chinese flags are hung on rooftop of houses, next to the colorful prayer flags.
11. Tibet facts – Shangri-la is the result of a misspelling
Tibet is often referred to as the Shangri-la. The word has no meaning in Tibetan, although La does mean mountain pass and is attached to the end of all passes in Tibet. The word was first coined by the writer of the most famous novel about Tibet, Lost Horizon, in 1933. James Hilton probably misunderstood the word Shambhala, which has a similar meaning in Tibetan Buddhism, and wrote Shangri-la instead. Since then, the word has been assimilated to a mythical place somewhere high in the mountains, a Heaven of sorts, a paradise on Earth, and is even the brand name of a luxury hotel chain whose eponymous Lhasa hotel I stayed at during my visit.
12. Tibet facts – The prostrations
I had seen some images of devout Buddhists prostrating in key Buddhist temples and landmarks but nothing could prepare me for the absolute devotion and extreme prostrations that some engage in. Some people would spend their entire day prostrating and praying, continuously kneeling down and lying flat on the floor then standing up again. Most will be dressed appropriately, with hand and knee protection to allow them to glide. At some particularly holy places, like in front of the Jokhang Monastery or the Potala Palace, some extreme devotees would prostrate in the middle of the pavement and receive donations from passers-by.
13. Tibet facts – The toilets
I cannot talk about things which surprised me about Tibet and not mention the toilets. Although there are public toilets across the cities and main road stops, they smelled so bad and were so dirty at times that we opted for the nature toilet: behind a rock (because there are no trees in the mountains). Bringing wet wipes and tissue is not enough, one needs to bring a sort of perfume to put a couple of drops under the nose to enter some of the public toilets. All of Tibet’s toilets, barring the hotels, are squat toilets consisting of a hole on the floor with a drop which may sometimes not be very long. There are no doors to the public toilets which often times will have more than one hole next to each other. You may do your thing next to someone who is doing her thing, in the open. And if that was not enough, many people miss and the toilets are never cleaned. You get the picture. This remained the main topic of discussion among my group, a source of constant jokes and laughter, as we hunted for the cleanest, least smelling holes. I will leave it there.
14. Tibet facts – Kora
Tibetans go on walking and praying pilgrimages around main landmarks and monasteries. Much like the Camino de Santiago or the trip to Mecca, only shorter and more frequent. These walks are called Kora and can be taken around any monastery. The most common one is the one in Lhasa, around the Potala Palace or the Sera Monastery. Locals pray as they walk around, many of them will spin prayer wheels like in Bhutan. Some of the Kora can take up to a full day and the elderly may repeat them every day.
15. Tibet facts – Temple smell
All temples and monasteries in Tibet have the same common smell of yak butter used in the butter lamps and fresh incense also burned across the country in houses and burners that can be found in public places.
16. Tibet facts – Paying for photographs
In Bhutan taking photos of temples and monasteries is simply not allowed. The interiors of the Buddhist buildings are usually covered from floor to ceiling with paintings and offerings in bright colors and gold and they are incredible to see and experience and provide a deep sense of spirituality. In Tibet you can photograph almost every landmark and interior as long as you pay a donation. At first we were surprised but relaxed as the money seemed more like a voluntary donation which we diligently dropped in bowls. But in some monasteries the monks would chase us for the donation, making us drop cameras for those who did not pay to avoid any photos being taken, and the initially innocuous amount started to amount to a small fortune as some temples started to ask for up to USD350 per hall for video, like in Shigatse. At USD2-4 per hall and an average of 3-5 halls worthwhile per monasteries I probably spent upwards of USD100 in photo donations, on top of the entry tickets. Considering these were religious places that were already filled with pilgrim donations (and stacks of money were stuffed inside God’s enclosures), the additional donation started to feel a bit much.
17. Tibet facts – Commercialized Everest Base Camp
I can speak for myself, who paid a handsome amount to take a helicopter to the Nepali Base Camp well before this was a commercial venture offered to tourists. But on the Tibetan side, thanks to very good infrastructure, the Base Camp has been commercialized extensively. We slept 8km from the climber’s Base Camp in a tourist tented camp which advertised free WiFi and was filled with souvenir stalls albeit it offered very basic accommodation at sub-zero temperatures without heating. The Chinese government has announced plans to build a resort, museum and helipad a few kilometers from Base Camp, in Gangkar, to offer greater comfort and drive more tourism dollars into the country, although most visitors to Tibet are still local Chinese from other provinces. Serious trekkers no longer consider Everest a hard climb since so many people are attempting and reaching the summit every year. I can tell you the acclimatization to 5,200m was very tough.
18. Tibet facts – Speed limits
We regularly saw cars stopped in the middle of the road. The Chinese authorities control speed limits in a very comical and questionable way: By putting road controls and checking how long it took you to get from one to the next. The speed limits on the road are low, about 35km/h for many roads, making the trips longer than they should take given the great infrastructure. I already discussed before that the tourism vehicles cannot surpass the speed limit and if you do, the driver gets an announcement through the radio system. But, in addition, most roads have controls. You will get a stamp on a paper with the time you crossed the previous one and the policeman will check that it took you the stipulated amount of time to cover the distance. This was not an issue for us because we were not in a rush and were making plenty of photo stops. But the locals had to stop by the side of the road to waste some time before going through controls or speed cameras.
DOOMED AMERICAN CHINA FANTASY – CIA’S UNFINISHED WAR IN ASIA
I speak of Doomed American China Fantasy in context of ‘The Cold War in Asia’ introduced by spread of Communism from Soviet Union to China.
On January 01, 1949, People’s Republic of China posed a lesser threat as compared to today. Most surprisingly, the United States refused to learn from conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Bumbling United States has yet to review fate of CIA’s Unfinished War in Asia.
DOOM DOOMA DOOMSAYER
BUMBLING Ex-CIA OFFICER CHARGED WITH SELLING SECRETS TO CHINA
A prestigious Chinese think tank provided cover for the intelligence operation that ensnared Kevin Mallory.
- By Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian is an assistant editor at Foreign Policy. She spent four years in China before joining Foreign Policy and holds a master’s degree in East Asian studies from Yale University., Elias Groll. Elias Groll is a staff writer at Foreign Policy, covering cyberspace and its conflicts and controversies. He has written for the magazine since 2012 and is a graduate of Harvard University.
June 23, 2017
Caught with a bag of cash and an electronic device used to communicate with his handlers, a former government official with years of military and intelligence experience is accused of spying for China.
Kevin Mallory of Leesburg, Virginia is charged with providing defense-related information to a foreign government and lying to federal agents.
Mallory allegedly provided several classified government documents to a Chinese contact, who initially claimed affiliation with a prestigious Shanghai think tank, in exchange for cash. Documents filed by federal prosecutors depict Mallory, an experienced Chinese-speaking former operative, as a bumbling spy who executed his treason clumsily.
Mallory’s career spanned decades and multiple government agencies. After graduating from Brigham Young University in 1981, he served as active duty military and then an Army reservist for several years. From 1987 to 2013, he worked for different government agencies and U.S. defense contractors — as well as the CIA, according to a report in the Washington Post. He held a top secret security clearance for much of that time and was posted to regions including Iraq, China, and Taiwan.
It was only this year that Mallory allegedly began to stray from the straight and narrow, according to court documents. A Chinese handler posing as an employee of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) made contact with Mallory during trips to China in March and April.
The SASS is a reputable and internationally known think tank. But it also maintains a close working relationship with the Shanghai State Security Bureau, a regional office of the Ministry of State Security, China’s intelligence arm.
In the following weeks, Mallory allegedly provided classified documents to Chinese intelligence officials in exchange for $25,000.
The FBI’s affidavit describing Mallory’s espionage activity appears to indicate that the former CIA officer tried to cover up his crimes. After he was stopped at Chicago’s O’Hare airport returning from Shanghai with $16,500 in undeclared cash in one of his bags, Mallory approached American intelligence agencies to describe his meetings in Shanghai with individuals he described as Chinese intelligence officers.
Having been caught with a payment that investigators believe was in exchange for classified government information, Mallory disclosed his contacts with the Chinese intelligence officers and may have offered his services as a double agent in order to conceal his alleged espionage on behalf of Beijing. The FBI affidavit never claims he offered to serve as a double agent, but in approaching an unspecified government agency with a communications device provided to him by the Chinese, Mallory appears to have made an overture to an American intelligence agency.
“He had a security clearance, he had apparently also worked at CIA, so he knew what he was doing,” said Peter Mattis “He had a security clearance, he had apparently also worked at CIA, so he knew what he was doing,” said Peter Mattis, a former government analyst and now a fellow at the Jamestown Foundation’s China Program.
But then Mallory made what Mattis called a “stupid mistake.”
The FBI affidavit filed in a Virginia federal court this week paints a picture of extraordinary technical incompetence by Mallory and his alleged Chinese handlers. Mallory’s Chinese contacts supplied him with a communications device — likely a smart phone — to exchange messages and allegedly transfer classified documents.
In a May 24 meeting with FBI agents, Mallory showed off the device and demonstrated how to move from a “normal” to “secure” messaging mode. When he toggled over to the secure mode, he was surprised to find that it displayed a history of his secure messages. Mallory seems to have assumed they would be deleted.
Mallory voluntarily turned the device over to the bureau for a forensic analysis. When the bureau’s technical experts dug into it, they were able to recover additional secure messages exchanged between Mallory and his Chinese contacts.
In an exchange of messages on May 3, 2017, Mallory’s handler asked why the documents had been blacked out at the top and bottom. “The black was to cross out the security classification (TOP SECRET//ORCON//,” Mallory replied. “I had to get it out without the chance of discovery. Unless read in detail, it appeared like a simple note.”
Two days later, Mallory discussed his motives with his handler: “Your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid.” Two days later, Mallory discussed his motives with his handler: “Your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid.” His handler replied: “My current object is to make sure your security and try to reimburse you.”
The FBI analysis also discovered four documents on the phone, three of which are described in court documents as government materials. One is top secret; the other two are classified as secret. The affidavit provides no hint as to what the documents contain.
Mattis told Foreign Policy that the “scope, scale and potential impact of Chinese intelligence operations” has been of primary concern to U.S. national security agencies for years.
Chinese think tanks, including SASS, often work closely with the Ministry of State Security. China’s spy arm prefers to meet sources inside China, and social science academies provide a useful front for intelligence and influence operations.
“Chinese think tanks can be used to invite someone over who is either a person of interest or a source,” said Mattis. “That person comes over and gives a talk, and they’ll be met and have meetings with the local state security element or the People’s Liberation Army.”
But some intelligence-linked Chinese think tanks also maintain a known presence in Washington. One of those is the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, which bills itself as a “comprehensive research institution” but which is also an official numbered bureau of the Ministry of State Security, functioning rather like the CIA’s Open Source Center.
The institute actively engages in the Washington think tank ecosystem and also invites U.S. officials and academics for events in Beijing. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan Washington think tank, has co-hosted numerous cybersecurity dialogues with the Chinese institute in recent years.
For more than two decades, the institute has sent a fellow to Washington, who stays for a year or two, according to Mattis. “I guess some people find value in talking with them,” he said. “I have mixed feelings on that score.”
BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images
DOOMED AMERICAN CHINA FANTASY – THE COLD WAR IN ASIA 1949 TO 2017
The Cold War in Asia is the product of Communism that spread from Europe to Asia. Nixon-Kissinger in 1971-72 initiated Policy of Doomed American China Fantasy without concern for lessons learned in Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. There is no hope and there is no future for America’s China Fantasy as Communist Party in China survives unchanged and unaffected by changing fortunes of the US Political Parties.
AMERICA’S CHINA FANTASY
Clipped from: http://prospect.org/article/americas-china-fantasy
America has been operating with the wrong paradigm for China. Day after day, U.S. officials carry out policies based upon premises about China’s future that are at best questionable and at worst downright false.
The mistake lies in the very assumption that political change — and with it, eventually, democracy — is coming to China, that China’s political system is destined for far-reaching liberalization. Yet the Bush administration hasn’t thought much about what it might mean for the United States and the rest of the world to have a repressive one-party state in China three decades from now. For while China will certainly be a richer and more powerful country in 30 years, it could still be an autocracy of one form or another. Its leadership (the Communist Party, or whatever else it calls itself in the future) may not be willing to tolerate organized political opposition any more than it does today.
That is a prospect with profound implications for the United States and the rest of the world. And it is a prospect that our current paradigm of an inevitably changing China cannot seem to envision.
The notion of a China on the road to political liberalization has taken hold in the United States because it has served certain specific interests within American society. At first, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, this idea benefited the U.S. national-security establishment. At the time, the United States was seeking close cooperation with China against the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union would have to worry simultaneously about both countries; the Pentagon wanted to make sure the Soviet Union tied down large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet border that might otherwise have been deployed in Europe. Amid the ideological struggles of the Cold War, though, cooperation with China’s Communist regime was politically touchy in Washington. And so the notion that China was in the process of opening up its political system helped smooth the way with Congress and the American public.
In the 1990s, after the Soviet collapse, the idea of a politically changing China attracted a new constituency, one even more powerful than the Pentagon: the business community. As trade and investment in China became ever more important, American companies found themselves repeatedly beset with questions about why they were doing business with such a repressive regime. The paradigm of inevitable change offered multinational corporations the answer they needed. Not only was China destined to open up its political system, but trade, the theology held, would be the key that would unlock the door. It would lead to political liberalization and to democracy, with or without the support of the Chinese leadership. Accordingly, no one outside China needs to do anything, or even think much about the subject. Why bother to protest a crackdown or urge China to allow political opposition if you know that democracy, by the inexorable laws of history, is coming anyway?
The trouble is, the entire paradigm may turn out to be wrong.
What should the U.S. strategy be for dealing with China’s Leninist regime? If you ask our established political leaders, foreign-policy experts, or sinologists what the United States should do about China, you will undoubtedly get some version or another of this approach. It is called the strategy of “integration.”
The United States, the thinking goes, should try to integrate the Chinese leadership into the international community. It should seek to help China gain admission into the world’s leading international organizations. According to this logic, the nature of the Chinese regime will change after China becomes a member of international bodies such as the World Trade Organization, which it has now joined. China’s Communist Party leadership will gradually behave more like other governments; it will become more open in dealing with the Chinese people and with the rest of the world. Richard Haas, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has written of “the existing opportunity to integrate China into a U.S.-led world order.”
This strategy of integration dates back to the Clinton administration. In 1994, President Clinton abandoned his attempt to use trade as a lever for improving human rights in China, then needed to divert attention away from this embarrassing reversal. He did not wish to concede that that he had just downgraded the cause of human rights in China; instead, he sought a new, positive-sounding description of his policy. “Integration” gradually became the label of choice, invoked by the president and his top advisers in press conference after press conference. Integration became, above all, the justification for unrestricted trade with China. “We believe it’s the best way to integrate China further into the family of nations and to secure our interests and our ideals,” declared Clinton in one typical speech.
George W. Bush and his advisers, without ever admitting they were doing so, have perpetuated most of the essentials of Clinton’s China policy, including the avowed commitment to integration. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gives a speech about China, she sooner or later calls for integrating China into the international community.
“Integration” has thus become another catchphrase like “engagement,” the earlier slogan for America’s China policy, which originated somewhat earlier, during the administration of George Bush Senior. With both words, however, the suggestion is the same: that is, with enough engagement, with sufficiently vigorous integration, the United States may succeed in altering the nature of the Chinese regime — although it is not clear exactly how this is supposed to happen. In a way, the American approach is a bit patronizing to China: It sounds as if the United States is a weary, experienced trainer bringing China to a diplomatic version of obedience school.
The fundamental problem with this strategy of integration is that it raises the obvious question: Who’s integrating whom? Is the United States now integrating China into a new international economic order based upon free-market principles? Or is China now integrating the United States into a new international political order where democracy is no longer favored, and where a government’s continuing eradication of all organized political opposition is accepted or ignored?
This is not merely a government issue. Private companies — including Internet firms like Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft — often use slogans like “engagement” and “integration” to explain why they have decided to do business in China despite Chinese rules and laws that allow continuing censorship. “I think [the Internet] is contributing to Chinese political engagement,” Bill Gates told one business gathering. Yet if Microsoft is altering its rules to accommodate China, once again the question is: Who’s changing whom?
Will it have been a success for the U.S. policy of integration if, 30 years from now, the world ends up with a Chinese regime that is still a deeply repressive one-party state but is nevertheless a member of the international community in good standing? If so, that same China will serve as a model for dictators, juntas, and other undemocratic governments throughout the world — and in all likelihood, it will be a leading supporter of these regimes. Pick a dictator anywhere today and you’ll likely find that the Chinese regime is supporting him. It has rewarded Robert Mugabe, the thug who rules Zimbabwe, with an honorary professorship, and his regime with economic aid and, reportedly, new surveillance equipment. It has been the principal backer of the military regime in Burma. And when Uzbek President Islam Karimov ordered a murderous crackdown on demonstrators in 2005, China rushed to defend him.
If China maintains its current political system over the next 30 years, then its resolute hostility to democracy will have an impact in places like Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. A permanently authoritarian China could also undermine Russia’s already diminishing commitment to democracy.
Thus, when America’s leading officials and CEOs speak so breezily of integrating China into the international community, listeners should ask: If China remains unchanged, what sort of international community will that be? Will it favor the right to dissent? Will it protect freedom of expression? Or will it simply protect free trade and the right to invest?
But wait, say the defenders of America’s existing China policy. We believe in democracy, too. There is no real disagreement here on our ultimate goals. This is all just a question of tactics. The strategy of integration (or of engagement) is designed to change China’s political system and, over the long term, to end China’s one-party state.
These arguments sound in some ways similar to claims made by the Chinese regime itself. Because Chinese Communist Party leaders don’t like to acknowledge that they intend to maintain their monopoly on power, they sometimes tell visitors that they, too, believe in democracy, that this is the ultimate goal for China, and that it is all merely a question of timing. These claims are designed for the hopelessly gullible; by its actions, day after day, the regime makes clear its tenacious hostility to the idea of political pluralism in China.
Generally, the U.S. proponents of a strategy of integration are not so cynical. To be sure, a few of them may be antidemocratic; there have always been Americans who admire, even revere, the simplicity and convenience of autocracy. However, other proponents of integration seem to believe quite sincerely that if the United States continues its current approach toward China, Chinese leaders eventually will be willing to abandon the monopoly on political power they have maintained since 1949. Yet these same proponents fail to explain how or why, given the current U.S. strategy, China’s political system will change.
The examples of reforms that they have invoked so far have served to divert attention away from the core issue of China’s one-party state. The promotion of village elections has proved to be largely unsuccessful, both because the Chinese leadership can confine this experiment exclusively to the villages and because in the villages themselves, authorities have resorted to a variety of methods, including the use of violence, to forestall democracy.
Nor is there evidence that the American promotion of the rule of law will by itself transform the political system. So long as there is no independent judiciary and China remains a one-party regime in which judges are selected by the Communist Party, promoting the rule of law won’t bring about fundamental change. Instead, it simply may lead to a more thoroughly legalized system of repression. Indeed, those lawyers in China who attempt to use the judicial system to challenge the Communist Party or to defend the rights of political dissidents have themselves been subject to persecution, including the loss of their jobs or even time in prison.
The strongest impetus for establishing the rule of law comes from the corporations and investors who are putting their money into China. They need bona fide procedures for resolving financial disputes, just as companies and investors require everywhere else in the world. It is in the interest of the Chinese regime to keep the investment dollars, euros, and yen flowing into the country, and so Chinese officials are willing to establish some judicial procedures for the foreign companies. However, the result could well be a Chinese legal system that offers special protection for foreign investors but not to ordinary Chinese individuals, much less to targets of the regime such as political dissidents or Tibetan activists.
And that raises the larger question about America’s current strategy of integration: Whom does it benefit? Above all, it enriches the elites in both China and the United States. The strategy is good for the American business community, which gets to trade with China and invest in China, and for the new class emerging in Chinese cities — the managers and entrepreneurs, many of them former party cadres or the relatives of cadres — that is getting rich from the booming trade and investment in its country. But it has not been nearly so beneficial for working-class Americans — particularly the tens of thousands who have lost their jobs in the United States as the end result of this “integration” policy.
The American people were told many years ago that bringing China into the international economic system would help change the Chinese political system. Now, American workers may well wonder whether this argument was merely a cruel hoax. Nor has the strategy of integration been such a blessing for ordinary Chinese. To be sure, China as a whole is more prosperous than it has ever been, but this new prosperity is enjoyed mostly by the urban middle class, not by the country’s overworked, underpaid factory laborers or by the hundreds of millions of peasants in the countryside.
Indeed, it is precisely because the regime knows how restive and disenchanted the Chinese people are that it refuses to open up to any form of democracy. The Chinese leaders know that they could be thrown out of office if there were free and open elections. Democracy, or even an organization calling for future democracy, is a threat to the existing political and economic order in China. That is why the regime continues to repress all forms of organized dissent and political opposition. It is also why China’s new class of managers and executives, who profit from keeping wages low, support the regime in its ongoing repression.
A few years ago, the New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof gave voice to one of the most common American misconceptions about China’s political future. Reflecting on how China had progressed and where it was headed, Kristof wrote, “[Hard-liners] knew that after the Chinese could watch Eddie Murphy, wear tight pink dresses and struggle over what to order at Starbucks, the revolution was finished. No middle class is content with more choices of coffees than of candidates on a ballot.”
Once people are eating at McDonald’s or wearing clothes from The Gap, American writers rush to proclaim that these people are becoming like us, and that their political system is therefore becoming like ours. But will the newly enriched, Starbucks-sipping, condo-buying, car-driving denizens of China’s largest cities in fact become the vanguard for democracy in China? Or is it possible that China’s middle-class elite will either fail to embrace calls for a democratic China or turn out to be a driving force in opposition to democracy?
China’s emerging urban middle class, after all, is merely a small proportion of the country’s overall population — far smaller than its counterparts in Taiwan or South Korea. There are an estimated 800 million to 900 million Chinese peasants — most of them living in rural areas, although 100 million or more are working or trying to find jobs as migrants on the margins of Chinese cities. If China were to have nationwide elections, and if peasants were to vote their own interests, then the urban middle class would lose. The margin would not be close. On an electoral map of China, the biggest cities — Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and the others — might look something like the small gold stars on the Chinese flag: They would be surrounded by a sea of red. Add together the populations of China’s 10 largest cities and you get a total of some 62 million people. That number is larger than the population of France or Britain or Italy. But it is still only about 5 percent of China’s overall population of 1.3 billion.
If you are a multinational company trying to sell consumer products, then the rapid rise in spendable income in China’s largest cities is of staggering importance. When it comes to any national elections, however, that new Chinese middle class is merely a drop in the bucket. Those in China’s urban avant-garde have every reason to fear that they would be outvoted.
China’s urban residents have an even greater reason to fear democracy: The Communist Party has not exactly been evenhanded in its treatment of urban residents vis-à-vis peasants. On the contrary: Its policies have strongly favored the cities over the countryside. This is why there has been a wave of protests in the countryside, arising out of land seizures, local taxes, disputes over village elections, and similar controversies. It is also why the Chinese regime has been, in recent years, particularly fearful of mass movements that might sweep through the countryside and undermine the Communist Party’s control. Looking at Falun Gong, the quasi-religious movement that began to take hold during the 1990s, the Chinese leadership was haunted by a specter from the past: the Taiping Rebellion, which swept out of middle China in the 19th century and shook the Qing Dynasty to its foundations.
What lies behind the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power and its continuing repression of dissent? The answer usually offered is the Communist Party itself — that the party and its more than 70 million members are clinging to their own power and privileges. This is certainly part of the answer, but not all of it. As China’s economy has thrived in recent years, strong economic and social forces have also emerged in Chinese society that will seek to protect the existing order and their own economic interests. The new middle class in Chinese cities is coming to favor the status quo nearly as much as does the Communist Party itself.
Why do we assume that what follows the Chinese Communist Party’s eventual fall will necessarily be political liberalization or democracy? One can envision other possibilities. Suppose, for example, that the party proves over the next decade to be no better at combating the country’s endemic corruption than it has been over the past decade. Public revulsion over this corruption reaches the point where the Chinese people take to the streets; leaders find they cannot depend on troops to quell these demonstrations; the Communist Party finally gives way. Even then, would the result be Chinese democracy? Not necessarily. China’s urban middle class might choose to align itself with the military and the security apparatus to support some other form of authoritarian regime, arguing that it is necessary to do so in order to keep the economy running.
The underlying premise of the U.S. integration strategy is that we can put off the question of Chinese democracy. But two or three decades from now, it may be too late. By then, China will be wealthier, and the entrenched interests opposing democracy will probably be much stronger. By then, China will be so thoroughly integrated into the world financial and diplomatic systems that, because of the country’s sheer commercial power, there will be no international support for any movement to open up China’s political system.
What should the United States do to encourage democratic change in China? A detailed list of policies can emerge only after we first rid ourselves of the delusions and the false assumptions upon which our China policy has long been based.
Above all, we have to stop taking it for granted that China is heading inevitably for political liberalization and democracy. President Bush has continued to repeat the American mantra about China, every bit as much as did his predecessors. “As China reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it cannot be closed,” Bush declared in one typical speech. Such words convey a heartwarming sense of hopefulness about China, but they do not match the reality of China itself, where doors are regularly opened by more than a crack and then closed again.
America’s political and corporate leaders also need to stop spreading the lie that trade will bring an end to China’s one-party political system. This fiction has been skillfully employed, over and over again, to help win the support of Congress and the American public for approval of trade with China. Trade is trade; its benefits and costs are in the economic sphere. It is not a magic political potion for democracy, nor has it brought an end to political repression or to the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power, and there is not the slightest reason to think it will do so in the future. In fact, it is possible that our trade with China is merely helping the autocratic regime to become richer and more powerful.
America’s current China policy amounts to an unstated bargain: We have abandoned any serious attempt to challenge China’s one-party state, and in exchange we have gotten the right to unfettered commerce with China.
What we need now, above all, are political leaders who are willing to challenge America’s stale logic and phraseology concerning China. We need politicians who will call attention to the fact that America has been carrying out a policy that benefits U.S. and Chinese business interests far more than it helps ordinary working people in either country.
The reexamination should apply to both U.S. political parties and to both poles of the ideological spectrum. On the Democratic left, we need people who will question the assumptions that it is somehow “progressive” to say that democracy doesn’t matter or that it will automatically come to China some day. Such views aren’t in the least bit progressive, liberal, or enlightened. Rather, they were developed by the Clinton administration to justify policies that would enable Bill Clinton to win corporate support. During the 1990s, there were other views concerning China within the Democratic Party — those of Nancy Pelosi, for example, and George Mitchell, who took strong stands on behalf of human rights in China. The Democrats rejected those alternative approaches a decade ago. They would do well to reexamine them now.
Within the Republican Party, we need political leaders willing to challenge the Business Roundtable mentality that has dominated the party’s thinking on China for so long. If Republicans really care about political freedom, then why should they allow U.S. policy toward China to be dominated by corporate interests while the world’s most populous country is governed by a single party that permits no political opposition? President Bush has been able to conceal his business-oriented approach to China behind a facade of hawkish rhetoric. Republicans should not allow this to happen again.
Once the United States finally recognizes that China is not moving inevitably toward democracy, we can begin to decide what the right approach should be. On the one hand, it’s possible that America may seek new measures to goad the Chinese leadership toward democratic change. America also might want to reconsider its doctrinaire adherence to free trade in dealing with China. On the other hand, it’s possible that the American people may decide that there’s absolutely nothing that the United States can or should do about a huge, permanently undemocratic, enduringly repressive China. Such an entity, a Chinese autocracy persisting into the mid-21st century, would cause large problems for U.S. policy elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, after weighing the costs and benefits of trying to push for democracy in China, the United States could opt for a policy of sheer acceptance of the existing order.
The American people are not being given such options now, however, because the choices are not being laid out. American politicians of both parties talk regularly as if liberalization and democracy are on the way in China. But what if China remains an autocracy? At the moment, that possibility seems to be outside our public discourse. We need to change that in order to figure out what we want to do.
It would be heartening if China’s leaders proceed along the lines that America’s political leaders predict. It would be wonderful if China opens up, either gradually or suddenly, to a new political system in which the country’s 1.3 billion people are given a chance to choose their own leaders. While wishing for such an outcome, however, I will not hold my breath.
James Mann, from whose new book, The China Fantasy, this article is adapted, is author-in-residence at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
DOOMED AMERICAN CHINA FANTASY – NIXON-KISSINGER BACKSTAB TIBET
In February 1972, Nixon-Kissinger Backstab Tibet to win Communist China’s Friendship. The plight of Tibetan refugees in India is the result of Doomed American China Fantasy.
DECADES AFTER FLEEING TIBET, REFUGEES STILL HAVE LIMITS ON RIGHTS IN INDIA
A Tibetan exile carries her child as she walks toward the Tsuglagkhang temple in Dharamsala, India, March 19, 2016.
DHARAMSALA / NEW DELHI —
Event organizer Lobsang Wangyal has to travel overseas often, but as a Tibetan refugee born in India, he did not have a passport and sometimes had to wait days to get the mandatory permits every time he went abroad.
So Wangyal, whose parents fled Tibet as teenagers, went to court to demand his right to an Indian passport.
In response to his petition, the Delhi High Court said authorities must abide by an earlier ruling that all Tibetans born in India between January 1950 and July 1987 are Indian citizens by birth, and can be issued passports.
The order came into effect in March, and Wangyal got his Indian passport shortly thereafter, using it to go to Thailand.
For the first time, he was spared the additional scrutiny that his documents always got from immigration officials.
“I feel like a real person now, having obtained a passport,” said Wangyal, 47, who was born in a Tibetan settlement in eastern Odisha state and now lives in the hill town Dharamsala.
Pema Kyi, a 40-year-old exile Tibetan, sells Tibetan bread by the roadside in Dharmsala, India, June 20, 2017.
“Tibetans are seen as refugees and as stateless in India. Being seen that way after having been born and lived our whole lives in India is unfair and impractical,” he said.
Tibetans have been seeking asylum in India since the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa in 1959 after a failed uprising against Chinese occupation.
The Tibetan spiritual leader has since lived mostly in Dharamsala in the northern state of Himachal Pradesh, where his supporters run a small government in exile and advocate for autonomy for Tibet by peaceful means.
More than 100,000 Tibetans live in 39 formal settlements and dozens of informal communities across India. They generally arrive via Nepal, after a perilous trek across the Himalayas.
The Indian government has funded schools to provide free education for Tibetans, and reserved seats in medical and engineering colleges. Those eligible can get voter identification cards.
But Tibetans do not have citizenship rights, which limits their access to government jobs and freedom of movement within and outside India. They cannot own land or property.
Passang Topgyal, a 38-year-old exile Tibetan, tests a Tibetan stringed musical instrument called a piwang at his instrument shop in Dharmsala, India, June 20, 2017.
In some states, they cannot get driving licenses or bank loans. Those without identity documents are at risk of harassment, arrests and deportation to China.
“The status of statelessness is demoralizing and frustrating. There’s a lot of emotional turmoil,” said Tenzin Tselha, an activist with Students for a Free Tibet, whose father served in the Indian army.
“Sometimes I eat rice and daal [lentils] more than thukpa [Tibetan noodle soup], but I never feel Indian; I am Tibetan. It drains my energy, this struggle to always prove who I am and where I am from,” she said.
Foreigners by law
India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which spells out refugee rights and state responsibilities to protect them.
Nor does it have a domestic law to protect the more than 200,000 refugees it currently hosts, including Tibetans, Sri Lankans, Afghans, Bangladeshis and Rohingyas from Myanmar. They are all considered foreigners by law.
Tibetan refugees get “enough rights and benefits,” and not everyone wants citizenship, said Sonam Norbu Dagpo, a spokesman for the Central Tibetan Administration, the government in exile.
“Even those Tibetan refugees who qualify for Indian citizenship do not apply for citizenship,” he said.
A young Tibetan exile stands backstage as she waits to perform during celebrations marking the 80th birthday of exiled Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, at Majnu Ka Tila, a Tibetan refugee camp in New Delhi, India, July 6, 2015.
While the number of refugees across the world has risen in recent years, the number of Tibetans arriving in India has fallen significantly since 2008, following a crackdown by China, which considers Tibet a renegade province.
Only 87 Tibetans registered in Dharamsala in 2015, compared with about 2,500 each year before 2008.
“India’s policy towards refugees has always been dictated by geopolitical compulsions,” said Saurabh Bhattacharjee, a professor at the National University of Juridical Sciences in Kolkata.
But beyond ensuring basic protections and civic amenities for all refugees, India must consider the status of Tibetan refugees more carefully, he said.
“Will they always remain refugees,” he said, “or should they be given some sort of permanent resident status, as they have been here for so long and have little chance of being repatriated?”
Recent court orders and the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy of 2014 promise more rights and benefits.
The policy proposes, for the first time, to give refugees welfare benefits on par with Indians, subsidies for some college courses, more job options and greater ease in getting documents.
Young Buddhist monks wait to serve cooked rice to the attendees of the Jangchup Lamrim teachings conducted by the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama (unseen) at the Gaden Jangtse Thoesam Norling Monastery in Mundgod in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, Dec. 28, 2014.
It does not address property ownership, getting government jobs, or traveling freely within and outside India.
But the issue of rights and citizenship is also an emotional one that divides the community.
“I don’t think it’s important to have citizenship rights or to have an Indian passport,” said Dorjee Tsering, 28, who works in a store in Dharamsala selling Free Tibet T-shirts and sweatshirts. “We may face some problems, but we should sacrifice a little to preserve our heritage and identity.”
But for Wangyal, who fought for a passport, more rights are necessary.
“I would like the right to own property. A little house and a small business would be good to live a decent life,” he said. “Tibetans will fight on for Free Tibet, but at the same time we have to live our lives now.”
CHINA’S TIBET POLICY – RECIPE FOR NATURAL DISASTER
Red China’s Tibet Policy is driven by Expansionist Doctrine proclaimed by Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong in 1949. China’s Neocolonialism includes Territorial Expansionism, Military Expansionism, Economic Expansionism, Political Expansionism, and Cultural Expansionism. Red China accomplishes her Mission using tools of Oppression, Repression, and Suppression to subjugate people in all occupied territories.
In my analysis, China’s Tibet Policy in Tibet and Xinjiang is Recipe for Natural Disaster. Nature designed its own plan for this geographical region and for thousands of years, the denizens of this region lived in harmony with Nature’s Plan. I claim, “Beijing Doomed,” for in my expectation, Nature has Plan for Change of Regime in Beijing.
CHINA’S ‘TIBET RECIPE’ IN XINJIANG SHOULD PUT INDIA ON ALERT
The stability of the Muslim region is vital for Beijing and its gigantic BRI project.
At the end of August 2016, Wu Yingjie takes over as party secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) from Chen Quanguo who is sent to “pacify” the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party has taken this crucial decision during the annual closed-door meeting in the summer resort of Beidaihe.
Chen replaces Zhang Chunxian as XUAR party secretary. It is indeed a promotion for Chen, given the fact that Xinjiang’s party secretaries often serve in the politburo.
His selection is linked to the “Tibet Recipe”, the way Chen managed to “pacify” the TAR. Once in Urumqi, Chen immediately started applying the formula that he used in Tibet to Xinjiang. But what is this recipe?
First, Chen transformed the Roof of the World into a vast Disneyland. In 2006, the arrival of the train on the plateau changed everything for Beijing and unfortunately for the Tibetans. Wave after wave of Chinese tourists could be poured into Tibet to experience the “Paradise on Earth” with its blue sky, pristine lakes and rivers, its luxuriant forests and deep canyons (the latter in Southern Tibet).
In 2016, 25 million tourists, mainly from the Mainland, are said to have visited the Land of Snows. For this, infrastructure needed to be developed, airports opened, four-way highways constructed, hotels and entertainment parks built; this was done in Tibet on a war-footing.
Wave after wave of Chinese tourists poured into Tibet.
In passing, the Tibetan intangible heritage had to be preserved, often with Chinese characteristics. The same formula has now to be replicated in Xinjiang.
Second, in order to “stabilize” the plateau, Chen imposed restrictions on the local population like never before. Similar policies will be used in Xinjiang. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an organization based in the US, just released a “glossary” of special slogans or “formulations” (tifa) used by the Chinese officials and the media when referring to party policies on the plateau.
HRW explains: “China’s authorities place extraordinary emphasis on the importance of ‘propaganda’ in sustaining their rule. This phenomenon is particularly evident in Tibet, where there has been a long history of human rights violations, extreme hostility towards political rights, and heavy restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information.”
“Poetic” tifas such as Social Management, Comprehensive Rectification, Preventive Control, Eliminate-Unseen-Threats, Nets-in-the-Sky-Traps-on-the-Ground or Copper-Ramparts-Iron Walls, are recurrently used. The latter one for example, translates into “an impenetrable public security defense network consisting of citizen patrols, border security posts, police check posts, surveillance systems, internet controls, identity card monitoring, travel restrictions, informant networks, and other mechanisms.”
The implementation of these tifas, which originated during Chen’s tenure in Tibet, is often dreadful… but efficient for Beijing.
Chen has taken these tifas with him to Xinjiang and started making good use of them. The “stability” of the Western province is vital for China, as it is the geographical hub for the Belt and Road Initiative: it will connect the New Silk Road (Central Asia) to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Chen now plans to bring millions of tourists to Xinjiang in order to “dilute” the Uyghur characteristics. In a “White Paper on Xinjiang” recently published by Beijing, the Communist Party hides its failure by saying: “Legitimate rights of religious organizations have been effectively safeguarded. Xinjiang has published translations of the religious classics of Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity in multiple languages,” adding 1.76 million copies of the Quran have been printed and distributed.
But on the ground the situation is different. To take just one example, Beijing has decided to collect DNA samples from all Xinjiang’s residents. This week, Xinhua reported China’s decision to dispatch 10,000 teachers to the restive XUAR and TAR “to support local education could help solve the educational problems.”
Beijing says that the main problem is the lack of eligible bilingual teachers in the regions, but will the teachers from the mainland teach the Turkish language of the Uyghurs or Mandarin? Not difficult to guess. Language, in Tibet or Xinjiang, is an instrument of assimilation.
Chen is also working hard to improve the infrastructure. Last week, Xinhua announced the construction of 10 new airports to be built in Xinjiang by 2020; further, six older airports will be renovated and expanded. It has implications for India. One of these airports will be built in Yutian (also known as Keriya), a county of Hotan Prefecture not far from the disputed Aksai Chin.
Located south of the Taklamakan desert and north of the Kunlun range, Keriya has always been a major stopover on the ancient Silk Road. In view of the proximity of the Indian border, it makes sense for China to have a new “civil” airport at Keriya, considering that there is no such thing as a “civil” airport in China, especially so close to the Indian border.
Keriya airport is designed to annually handle 1,80,000 passengers and 400 tons of cargo; it will have a 3,200-meter runway, a 3,000-square-meter terminal building and cost 104 million US dollars, says Xinhua. There is no doubt that Chen has been mandated to apply the “Tibet Recipe” in Xinjiang. Will he succeed is another question.
It is however certain that the stability of the Muslim region is vital for the Middle Kingdom and its gigantic BRI “linking” project; India needs to watch and be prepared.
(Courtesy: Mail Today)
LOVE COUNTERACTS VIOLATION OF NATURAL FREEDOM IN TIBET
Natural Science such as Physics and Chemistry describe Four Fundamental Forces and Four Fundamental Interactions. These are, 1. The Strong Nuclear Force, 2. The Weak Nuclear Force, 3. Electromagnetism, and 4. Gravitation.
I describe ‘LOVE’ as Fifth Fundamental Force to account for existence of Life on planet Earth. Love acts as Force of Compassion to sustain Life. Love also acts as Force to counteract violation of Natural Order, Natural Balance, Natural Equilibrium, and Natural Freedom.
Biology describes Biotic Interactions as Intraspecific, and Interspecific Interactions. The characteristics of Biotic Interactions are described using terms such as Mutualism, Symbiosis, Commensalism, and Parasitism. All these Biotic Interactions performing guided, sequential, purposeful, and goal-oriented actions.
People’s Republic of China or Red China is governed by political doctrine called Communism which provides rule or governance by a One-Party political structure which lays emphasis on the requirements of State rather than on Individual Liberties. Communist State plans and controls all aspects of economy apart from social, cultural, and religious aspects of all Individual State Subjects. Communist State sponsors Violence to establish tyranny or totalitarian regime. Communist Policy or Doctrine demands use of power or authority by Party and State to oppose Natural Rights and Natural Freedom entitled to citizens.
Red China, in pursuit of its State Policy of Military Expansionism, made an unprovoked attack on Tibet in 1950. Red China uses her Military Power or Force to threaten, to harm, to cause pain, to give misery, to bring misfortune, and to create trouble in the lives of Tibetans to force them live under State-sponsored Occupation, Oppression, Repression, Suppression, and Subjugation.
Natural History of Tibet reveals that Nature uplifted Tibet using massive force of Collision generated by Indian landmass northwards thrust into Asian Continent. This Natural Event created Natural Condition that sustains Natural Freedom experienced by denizens of Tibet. Red China’s military occupation of Tibet fundamentally opposes Nature’s Plan for Tibet.
Red China violated Natural Order that shapes Tibetan Existence. In my analysis, Love acting as Fundamental Force will counteract Red China’s Violation by using Force/Power/Energy that has been shaping and conditioning planet Earth over billions of years of its existence.
PINK HEARTS CAN’T CONCEAL REPRESSION IN TIBET PROPAGANDA – HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
New Campaign Aimed at Increasing Loyalty to Party, China
To many people’s ears the phrase “Four Loves” probably invokes images of a pop music act or a self-help philosophy – not an authoritarian regime’s latest campaign for political loyalty. But the Chinese Communist Party is once again deploying gentle terms to conceal its suppression of human rights.
A photo showing children from primary schools in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, “speaking [their] hearts to Grandpa [President] Xi” as part of the “Four Emphases and Four Loves” campaign.
Tibet, a region known for systemic, state-sponsored human rights violations, is now awash with posters celebrating the “Four Emphases and Four Loves.” The campaign requires people to “Love the core by emphasizing the Party’s kindness/Love the motherland by emphasizing unity/Love your home by emphasizing what you can contribute/Love your life by emphasizing knowledge.”
Translation: don’t criticize policies or officials and do show gratitude and loyalty to “the core” – the CCP and its leader Xi Jinping. The only way to “love the motherland” is to oppose anything that threatens “unity,” which certainly includes substantive criticism of the Party or the state or any discussion of independence or increased autonomy. And to be a “good citizen” is to focus one’s efforts on what you can “contribute” – but implicitly it’s up to the Party to decide what can or cannot be contributed.
It’s also never too early to start indoctrinating people in this mindset: photos from primary schools in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, show children “speaking [their] hearts to Grandpa [President] Xi.” One is captioned, “The words of the heart spelled out in…small notes.”
Campaigns for Tibetans’ hearts and minds seem almost tragic against the backdrop of repression there. In recent years authorities have reshaped the region’s economy in a manner that suits the central government and effectively excludes Tibetans from decision-making – and in the case of some nomadic communities leaves them demonstrably worse off.
Authorities remain suspicious of Tibetans’ loyalties, and have also radically expanded the security and surveillance apparatus, and methodically inserted state control into all aspects of religious practice. Meanwhile, Tibetans – and many others across China – have virtually no ability to help develop, change, or object to the policies that profoundly affect their lives.
Propaganda – no matter how treacly, and no matter how many pink hearts deployed – is unlikely to generate the kind of loyalty or respect Chinese authorities seem to want from Tibetans. Respect for Tibetans’ human rights, on the other hand, might go a long way towards that goal.