Doomed Gun of Doom Dooma – Page 2 – Whole Dude

Whole Treason – Nixon-Kissinger Vietnam Treason

Special Frontier Force condemns Nixon-Kissinger Vietnam Treason

On behalf of Special Frontier Force-Establishment 22-Vikas Regiment, I condemn Nixon-Kissinger Vietnam treason. Vietnam War was fought against the ideology of Communism and to resist its spread in Southeast Asia. United States was fighting against Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China which I often describe as The Evil Red Empire, The Red Dragon, or Red China. In Vietnam War, United States acknowledged its adversarial relations with the Communist Powers. Red China was an enemy, adversary, opponent in Vietnam War. Communist China worked in an opposite or contrary direction by encouraging and directly supporting North Vietnam’s hostility. United States utterly failed in Vietnam due to Nixon-Kissinger treason.

The word treason means betrayal of trust or faith, treachery. Nixon-Kissinger deliberately and purposefully violated the allegiance owed to United States of America and its soldiers fighting its enemy in Vietnam. The action called betrayal involves giving aid, help, and comfort to the enemy while one’s own country is actively engaged in fighting the enemy.

I am sharing with my readers an article titled ‘The Paris Peace Accords Were a Deadly Deception’ published by History News Network. The author is Ken Hughes, a leading researcher, Presidential Recording Program at Miller Center, University of Virginia. The Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 had decisively ended the Vietnam War leaving people in a state of wretchedness, misfortune, turmoil, trouble, and misery. It was a calamity that was clearly foreseen. Nixon-Kissinger have to shoulder the burden for this adverse outcome. US soldiers paid a very heavy price while Nixon-Kissinger made deals with the enemy without any concern for the Dignity, Honor, and Pride with which the men in uniform serve and defend their country. Ken Hughes has not explored Nixon-Kissinger obsession to befriend the enemy while the country was bleeding on the battlefield.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA

Special Frontier Force-Establishment 22-Vikas Regiment

History News Network | The Paris “Peace” Accords Were a Deadly Deception

The Paris “Peace” Accords Were a Deadly Deception

tags: Vietnam, Richard Nixon, Vietnam War, Ken Hughes, Henry Kissinger by Ken Hughes 1-31-13

SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE CONDEMNS NIXON-KISSINGER VIETNAM TREASON : KEN HUGHES , RESEARCHER , MILLER CENTER , UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA . — SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE CONDEMNS NIXON-KISSINGER VIETNAM TREASON : KEN HUGHES , RESEARCH SPECIALIST, MILLER CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA .

Ken Hughes is a research specialist with the University of Virginia’s Miller Center.

“The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” signed January 27, 1973, never looked like it would live up to its name. Four decades later it stands exposed as a deliberate fraud.

The president of South Vietnam, in whose defense more than 50,000 Americans gave their lives, wept upon hearing President Richard Nixon’s proposed settlement terms. Hanoi would release American prisoners of war and agree that the South could choose its government by free elections, but the accords threw the voting process to a commission that could act only by unanimity — all but impossible to achieve among Communists and anti-Communists who’d spent years shooting out their differences. Worse, Nixon would leave North Vietnamese troops occupying and controlling much of the South, while withdrawing all remaining American ground forces.

“It is only an agonizing solution,” said President Nguyen Van Thieu, “and sooner or later the government will crumble.” National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger reported Thieu’s response to Nixon on October 6, 1972, adding, “I also think that Thieu is right, that our terms will eventually destroy him.”

Kissinger’s damning admission comes from the single most comprehensive and accurate record of a presidency there’s ever been or likely will be: Nixon’s secret taping system. Voice-activated recorders wired to microphones hidden in the Oval Office and elsewhere clicked on whenever they detected a sound between February 16, 1971, and July 12, 1973, a time when Nixon not only negotiated the Paris “Peace” Accords and withdrew from Vietnam, but became the first American president to visit China and Moscow, signed the first nuclear arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, and won the biggest Republican presidential landslide ever in an election that realigned American politics for the rest of the Cold War.

Since Nixon’s secret tapes coincide with his most acclaimed accomplishments, loyalists thought that when finally released they would reveal a foreign policy genius at work, offsetting the sordid image of the unindicted co-conspirator that emerged from the excerpts played in court as criminal evidence during the Watergate trials of the 1970s. They should have known there was a Nixon reason fought to keep his tapes from the American people until his death in 1994. Since then, the government has declassified 2,636 hours.

These tapes expose far worse abuses of power than the special prosecutors ever found. After all, as the saying goes, no one died in Watergate. As commander in chief, however, Nixon sacrificed the lives of American soldiers to further his electoral ends.

I’ve spent more than a decade studying the tapes with the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, but the contrast between the public image Nixon created and the reality he secretly recorded still loosens my jaw.

As schoolchildren are taught, Nixon promised America “peace with honor” via a strategy of “Vietnamization” and negotiation. Vietnamization, he said, would train and equip the South Vietnamese to defend themselves without American troops. He realized it wouldn’t. “South Vietnam probably can never even survive anyway,” the president said on tape. This was no mere passing doubt. On his first full day in office, he’d asked military, diplomatic and intelligence officials how soon the South would be able to handle the Communists on its own. The answer was unanimous: never. The Joint Chiefs, CIA, Pentagon, State Department, and the U.S. military commander in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams, all agreed that Saigon, “even when fully modernized,” would not survive “without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and major ground forces.” (Emphasis added.)

Nixon faced a stark choice: continue sending Americans to fight and die in South Vietnam’s defense for the foreseeable future, or bring the troops home knowing that without them Saigon would ultimately fall. There was no way he could sell either option — endless war or withdrawal followed by defeat — as the “peace with honor” he’d promised. So he lied. “The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization,” he said — despite his advisers’ unanimous consensus (which remained classified) and his own private assessment.

To make Vietnamization look successful, he spaced withdrawal out across four years, gradually reducing the number of American soldiers in Vietnam from over 500,000 in January 1969 to less than 50,000 by Election Day 1972. Throughout those four years, he made many nationally televised speeches to announce partial troop withdrawals, claiming each one proved Vietnamization was working. Always he left enough Americans fighting and dying to conceal the fact that Vietnamization never really would work. In this way, the president made slow retreat look like steady progress.

Liberals like Senator George S. McGovern, the South Dakota Democrat, did try to end the war faster. McGovern’s proposal that Congress force Nixon to bring the troops home by the end of 1971 gained the support of more than 60 percent of Americans. History has confirmed the majority’s judgment. A withdrawal deadline was the only way to stop the president from prolonging the war for political purposes. But Nixon was able to kill McGovern’s bill by a simple expedient. He said it would lead to Communist victory. He didn’t mention that his own approach would do the same. The difference was that Nixon’s way would (1) postpone Saigon’s fall until after Election Day, so voters wouldn’t be able to hold him accountable and (2) add another thirteen months of casualties, including 792 American dead.

To be fair, on one occasion Nixon sounded willing to abandon his political timetable in return for the release of American prisoners of war, who routinely endured torture by their North Vietnamese jailers. “If they’ll make that kind of a deal, we’ll make that any time they’re ready,” Nixon said on March 19, 1971, more than a year before the election. “Well, we’ve got to get enough time to get out,” Kissinger said. “We can’t have it knocked over brutally — to put it brutally, before the election.” “That’s right,” Nixon said. The POWs, like American soldiers in Vietnam, had to wait on Nixon’s political timetable before they could come home — the ones who survived long enough to.

Publicly, Nixon insisted that he needed to keep American troops in Vietnam to pressure Hanoi to free the prisoners. Privately, he acknowledged the opposite was true: The North would only release the POWs when he agreed to withdraw all American ground forces. Prolonging the war meant prolonging the POWs’ captivity. A senator once asked how 50,000 soldiers would be enough to persuade Hanoi to free the POWs when 500,000 did not. “Of course, I couldn’t say to him, ‘Look, when we get down to 50,000, then we’ll make a straight-out trade — 50,000 for the prisoner of wars — and they’ll do it in a minute ’cause they want to get our ass out of there.” “That’s right,” Kissinger said. Nixon laughed. “You know? Jesus!” The president claimed it took great political courage to continue waging an unpopular war, but his tapes and declassified documents reveal the cold political calculation underlying his decision to add for more years to the war.

Negotiations, like Vietnamization, served Nixon’s political ends. “We want a decent interval,” Kissinger scribbled in the margin of the briefing book for his secret trip to China in July 1971. “You have our assurance.” For decades Kissinger has denied making a “decent interval” deal, one that would merely put a year or two between Nixon’s final troop withdrawal and Saigon’s final collapse. Kissinger’s denials have collapsed under the weight of his own words caught on Nixon’s tapes and transcribed in memos by NSC aides to document negotiations with foreign leaders. During this initial encounter with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger outlined Nixon’s requirements for a Vietnam settlement. Peace wasn’t one of them. Nixon did need the POWs, total American withdrawal, and a ceasefire for “say eighteen months.” After that, if the Communists overthrew the South Vietnamese government, “we will not intervene.” In other words, Hanoi didn’t have to abandon its plans to conquer the South, just hold off on them for a year or two.

The Soviet Union received the same assurances. During a closed-door session with Nixon during the 1972 Moscow Summit, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said, “Dr. Kissinger told me that if there was a peaceful settlement in Vietnam you would be agreeable to the Vietnamese doing whatever they want, having what they want after a period of time, say eighteen months. If that is indeed true, and if the Vietnamese knew this, and it was true, they would be sympathetic on that basis.” This wasn’t just some clever negotiating ploy on Nixon and Kissinger’s part to trick the Communists into making a deal.

They discussed their strategy in the privacy of the Oval Office. “We’ve got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two,” Kissinger said on Aug. 3, 1972. “After a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater,” and “no one will give a damn.” The “decent interval” served an all-important political purpose. If Saigon fell immediately after Nixon withdrew the last American troops, his failure would have been too obvious. Americans would have seen that he’d added four years to the war and still managed to lose. “Domestically in the long run it won’t help us all that much because our opponents will say we should’ve done it three years ago,” Kissinger said. He was right about that. Few Americans, liberals or conservatives, Democrats or Republicans, would have been willing to send their children to die for a “decent interval.”

Politics dominated the president’s military moves. In his first year in office, the Republican National Committee commissioned a secret poll that identified the most popular way to end the war. Pressing on until victory got just 37 percent support; “agreeing to anything to end the war” was even less popular at 30 percent. But a massive 66 percent favored bombing and blockading the North to make Hanoi agree to a compromise settlement with free elections for the South. Those polled said they would support the bombing and blockade for six months. So on May 8, 1972, exactly six months minus one day before the election, President Nixon went on national television and announced that he would bomb the North and mine its harbors. It’s all in the timing. Nixon claimed the escalation would cut off supplies from the North to its armies in the South. It didn’t. That summer the CIA estimated that Hanoi was still managing to infiltrate 3,000 tons of war material into South Vietnam every day — 300 tons more than was needed. Although the bombing and mining proved to be strategic failures, they were great political successes. Polls showed a large majority approved. No surprise — the strategic failure of the bombing and mining remained classified. When the North accepted Nixon’s settlement terms shortly before Election Day, it looked like Nixon’s military move had brought the enemy to heel. It hadn’t.

Hanoi took Nixon’s deal for the same reason Saigon refused it. Both sides realized it would lead to a Communist takeover of the South — as did Nixon and Kissinger. The president managed to turn losing a war into a winning political issue.

In his last campaign speech, nationally broadcast the night before the election, Nixon urged voters “to have in mind tomorrow one overriding issue, and that is the issue of peace — peace in Vietnam and peace in the world at large for a generation to come.” The president boasted of a negotiating “breakthrough,” which is one thing to call a deal that is a roadmap to victory for the enemy and a death sentence for an ally. “We have agreed that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right to determine their own future without having a Communist government or a coalition government imposed upon them against their will.” He made no mention of the secret assurances he’d given China and the Soviets that the North could impose a Communist government on the South without fear of U.S. intervention as long as it waited a “decent interval” of a year or two. “There are still some details that I am insisting be worked out and nailed down because I want this not to be a temporary peace. I want, and I know you want, it to be a lasting peace.” No matter what anyone wanted, Nixon and Kissinger had been negotiating a temporary peace for more than a year. “By your votes, you can send a message to those with whom we are negotiating, and to the leaders of the world, that you back the president of the United States in his insistence that we in the United States seek peace with honor and never peace with surrender.” That last phrase, “peace with surrender,” was meant as a crack at McGovern, then the Democratic presidential nominee, but it aptly summarizes Nixon’s true strategy.

What is a “decent interval” other than slow, secret surrender? But Americans didn’t know what their president was really doing. On Election Day, Nixon won 60.7 percent of the vote, more than any other Republican president in history. The price of political victory included the lives of more than 20,000 American soldiers who died in the four years it took Nixon to create the illusion of “peace with honor” and conceal the reality of defeat with deceit.

Afterwards, Nixon blamed liberals for the consequences of his actions. While the fall of Saigon was built into his “decent interval” exit strategy, Nixon accused Congress of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. One line of attack was to blast Congress for cutting foreign aid to Saigon. It’s true lawmakers gave South Vietnam less than Nixon and, later, President Gerald R. Ford requested. But lawmakers could have doubled or tripled aid to Saigon, and it still would have collapsed under Nixon’s settlement terms. As the JCS, Pentagon, CIA, State Department and General Abrams had all pointed out to Nixon shortly after he took office, the South Vietnamese couldn’t handle the Communists without the combat support of major U.S. ground forces. Nixon had withdrawn all American troops under the terms of the Paris Accords. That was Hanoi’s price for freeing American POWs, and Nixon paid it (after he was safely re-elected and could afford to let Saigon fall).

Without U.S. ground forces, Saigon was doomed, even if by some miracle it had received unlimited American aid. Complaining about aid cuts allowed Nixon to evade the truth about his exit strategy. Rather than negotiate a safe exodus for the South Vietnamese who had fought on the American side of the war, he left them to either die in “decent interval” combat or live under Communist rule.

Yes, Congress could have thrown more money at the problem, but Nixon knew that wouldn’t solve it. In No More Vietnams, the ex-president’s 1985 work of revisionist personal history, he castigated Congress for voting on June 29, 1973 (three months after American soldiers and POWs had come home) to ban further American combat in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia: “This defeat stripped me of the authority to enforce the peace agreement in Vietnam — and gave Hanoi’s leaders a free hand against South Vietnam.” While Nixon termed the vote a “defeat” for him, Congress approved the combat ban only in direct response to a message from the president through Ford, then the House Minority Leader, promising Nixon would sign it into law. He didn’t have to. Earlier that same week, the House had sustained Nixon’s veto of a less sweeping bill that would have prohibited U.S. military action in Laos and Cambodia only. The bill’s supporters knew they lacked the votes to overturn a veto. They said so on the House floor. Lawmakers were so incredulous when Ford announced Nixon’s agreement to a combat ban for all of Indochina, including Vietnam, that he had to leave the House floor and telephone the president to confirm that he got the story straight. “I just finished talking with the president himself for approximately ten minutes,” Ford told his colleagues, “and he assured me personally that everything I said on the floor of the House is a commitment by him.” Only then did conservative supporters of Nixon and the war join liberals and moderates in voting to prohibit the use of American military power in Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam. This wasn’t a “defeat” for Nixon, but a smooth legislative maneuver.

As memories faded, Nixon would claim that he coulda woulda shoulda intervened with American airpower to save South Vietnam, if only Congress hadn’t tied his hands. The secret assurances he gave China and the Soviets that he would not intervene remained classified until long after he was dead.

Even today, Nixon’s real Vietnam exit strategy remains virtually unknown to the public, although scholars have been writing about it for years. Jeffrey Kimball has published two landmark works on the subject, Nixon’s Vietnam War and The Vietnam War Files, showing how Nixon engineered his “decent interval.” Even Jeremi Suri, whose Henry Kissinger and the American Century garnered praise from Nixon loyalists as well as critics, wrote, “By 1971 he and Nixon would accept a ‘decent interval’ between U.S. disengagement and a North Vietnamese takeover of the [S]outh.”

(I turned my own research on the subject into educational videos used in classrooms and anywhere else people want to hear Nixon and Kissinger in their own words.) The facts are out. Yet Nixon’s stabbed-in-the-back myth lives on.

When politicians and pundits debate how and when to exit Afghanistan (as they earlier did Iraq) they cite the false history of Nixon’s “success” at training the South Vietnamese to defend their government and at negotiating with warring parties to settle their differences through free elections — two things Nixon never really managed to do. If the Nixon tapes are, in Bob Woodward’s witty phrase, the gift that keeps on giving, his backstabbing myth is the gift that keeps on taking — American lives, America’s fortunes, and the honor of politicians overseeing wars they can’t win and are afraid to end (at least until after they’re re-elected). It’s one more reason Iraq and Afghanistan eclipsed Vietnam as America’s longest wars.

The fortieth anniversary of the fraudulent Paris “Peace” Accords came, by coincidence, in the same month as the hundredth anniversary of Nixon’s birth. It’s high time for us to free our minds and politics from his deadly legacy.

The word treason means betrayal of trust or faith, treachery. Nixon-Kissinger deliberately and purposefully violated the allegiance owed to United States of America and its soldiers fighting its enemy in Vietnam. The action called betrayal involves giving aid, help, and comfort to the enemy while one’s own country is actively engaged in fighting the enemy.

Whole Crusade – The Call for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : OCTOBER 19, 1973. THIS ARTICLE ACCORDS A SPECIAL RECOGNITION TO DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER FOR HIS ACTIONS THAT SHAPED US-TIBET RELATIONS FROM 1969 TO 1977 . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: OCTOBER 19, 1973. THIS ARTICLE ACCORDS A SPECIAL RECOGNITION TO DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER FOR HIS ACTIONS THAT SHAPED US-TIBET RELATIONS FROM 1969 TO 1977.

On behalf of Special Frontier Force (#SpecialFrontierForce), Establishment 22 (#Establishment22), and Vikas Regiment I acknowledge the role of Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger as that of #WholeVillain, WholeVillain, and Whole Villain in the history of the US-Tibet relations. I ask my readers to give special attention to some of the aspects of US-Tibet relations. These are:

1. From 1911 to 1950, for about 39-years, Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation. However, Tibet chose a political policy called ‘Isolationism’ and limited its interactions with foreign powers. Tibet had diplomatic relations with a few of its immediate neighbors like India, Nepal, and China. For Tibet had no formal diplomatic relationships with the United States, their relations always existed under the shadow of US-India relations. It should not be of any surprise for both India, and Tibet face a common external enemy.

2. People’s Republic of China as a national entity came into existence on October 01, 1949 following the Communist October Revolution that seized political power in China after defeating the nationalists or Kuomintang who fled mainland China to establish Republic of China popularly known as Taiwan.

3. The security threat posed by People’s Republic of China is the driving force that still shapes the US-India-Tibet relations. After Communist China’s illegal invasion and military occupation of Tibet since 1950s, the history of the US-India-Tibet relations is shaped entirely with the sole purpose of resisting China’s military occupation of Tibet.

4. During the long course of 66-years, the US-India-Tibet relations are primarily based on the principles on which the United States declared its independence from its rule by Great Britain. In the words used by US President Eisenhower, the US-India-Tibet relations represent a “Crusade for Peace through Freedom” in Occupied Tibet.

5. I am a witness to the history of US-India-Tibet relations on account of my affiliation with a military organization called Special Frontier Force (#SpecialFrontierForce) or Establishment 22 (#Establishment22) or Vikas Regiment. I have no particular need to cite any government documents to support my statements. However, I have to acknowledge the vastly superior intelligence capabilities of People’s Republic of China which gave it a clear insight about the US-India-Tibet relations. China expressed its displeasure by attacking India along its Himalayan Frontier during October-November 1962. The US-India-Tibet relations survived and in this article I give special recognition to diabolic actions of Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger, PhD from 1968 to 1977 with emphasis on his illegal/unconstitutional actions during 1969 to 1972.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : MARCH 17, 2015 . GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE IN PEKING(BEIJING). DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING . I AM ASKING MY READERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FACE OF #WHOLEVILLAIN IN HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: MARCH 17, 2015. THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE IN PEKING (BEIJING). DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING . I AM ASKING MY READERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FACE OF WHOLE VILLAIN IN THE HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS .

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : MARCH 17, 2015 . GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, PEKING(BEIJING) . DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING . I ASK MY READERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FACE OF #WHOLEVILLAIN IN HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: MARCH 17, 2015. THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE IN PEKING (BEIJING). DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING. I ASK MY READERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FACE OF WHOLE VILLAIN IN THE HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS .

Dr. Henry Kissinger is given due credit for initiating diplomatic relations between the United States and People’s Republic of China. I am asking my readers to recognize the faces of those Chinese leaders and the military dictator of Pakistan whom he befriended. Dr. Kissinger was appointed Assistant National Security Affairs in December 1968 and worked as National Security Adviser from 1969. During the years 1969 to September 1973, Kissinger had no constitutional power or authority to meet or engage foreign leaders and set the direction for the US foreign policy.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : 37TH US PRESIDENT RICHARD M NIXON WITH DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER . TELL ME THE NAMES OF YOUR FRIENDS, I'LL TELL WHO YOU ARE . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: 37TH US PRESIDENT RICHARD M NIXON WITH DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER. TELL ME THE NAMES OF YOUR FRIENDS, I’LL TELL WHO YOU ARE.

“Tell Me The Names of Your Friends, I’ll Tell Who You Are.”

Dr Henry Alfred Kissinger PhD who served as National Security Adviser from 1969 to 1975 selected People’s Republic of China’s Communist Party leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou En-Lai to befriend China and to begin trade and commerce relations between these two countries.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : WHO IS DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER PHD ??? TELL ME THE NAMES OF HIS FRIENDS, I'LL TELL YOU WHO HE IS . — **#WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: WHO IS DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER PHD? TELL ME THE NAMES OF HIS FRIENDS, I’LL TELL YOU WHO HE IS.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER IN HIS BOOK "ON CHINA" FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR HIS DIABOLIC, VILLAINOUS ACTIONS THAT RECKLESSLY UNDERMINED HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — **#WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: WHO IS DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER PHD? TELL ME THE NAMES OF HIS FRIENDS, I’LL TELL YOU WHO HE IS.**

Dr Henry Alfred Kissinger in his book “On China” failed to account for his own diabolic, villainous actions that recklessly undermined history of the US-India-Tibet relations.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : THE STATUE OF LIBERTY SYMBOLIZES THE VALUES THAT GUIDE AND SHAPE THE US FOREIGN POLICY . THE US - TIBET - INDIA RELATIONS AIM AT RESTORING FREEDOM IN OCCUPIED TIBET . THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS ESTABLISHED SOON AFTER COMMUNIST CHINA'S INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF TIBET IN 1950. — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: THE STATUE OF LIBERTY SYMBOLIZES THE VALUES THAT GUIDE AND SHAPE THE US FOREIGN POLICY. THE US -TIBET-INDIA RELATIONS AIM AT RESTORING FREEDOM IN OCCUPIED TIBET. THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS ESTABLISHED SOON AFTER COMMUNIST CHINA’S INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF TIBET IN 1950.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : I ASK MY READERS TO REFLECT UPON THE VALUES THAT GUIDED THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE ITS INDEPENDENCE . THE SAME VALUES SHAPED THE US FOREIGN POLICY WHEN IT COUNTERACTED THE THREAT POSED BY COMMUNISM . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: I ASK MY READERS TO REFLECT UPON THE VALUES THAT GUIDED THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE ITS INDEPENDENCE. THE SAME VALUES SHAPED THE US FOREIGN POLICY WHEN IT COUNTERACTED THE THREAT POSED BY COMMUNISM.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : CRUSADE FOR PEACE THROUGH FREEDOM . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: CRUSADE FOR PEACE THROUGH FREEDOM .**

The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet:

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : BIRTH OF THE RED DRAGON . OCTOBER 01, 1949 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: THE BIRTH OF THE RED DRAGON. OCTOBER 01, 1949.**

I ask my readers to explore the history of the US-India-Tibet relations formulated on the principles of Freedom and Democracy from 1949 by 33rd US President Harry S Truman (1949-1952). Dwight David Eisenhower, 34th President of the US (1953-1961) continued President Truman’s foreign policy of containing Communism. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th President of the US (1961-1963) and Lyndon Baines Johnson, 36th President of the US (1963-1969) continued to checkmate Communist Cold War strategy. To gain a correct historical perspective, I have to mention that Richard Milhous Nixon served as Vice President (1953-1956, & 1957-1960) under President Eisenhower and was intimately involved in implementing President Eisenhower’s policy of containing Communism in Southeast Asia. I am pleased to share some of these photo images that help me to recapitulate the historical ties between the United States, India, and Tibet. Because of the silence and secrecy imposed by Cold War Era, the connections between these three nations are often misunderstood.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : FORMER CIA OFFICIALS KENNETH KNAUS AND JOHN GREANEY SHARED THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS . — HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: FORMER CIA OFFICIALS KENNETH KNAUS AND JOHN GREANEY SHARED THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : BRUCE WALKER , FORMER OFFICIAL OF CIA . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: BRUCE WALKER , FORMER OFFICIAL OF CIA. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : OCTOBER 11, 1949 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: OCTOBER 11, 1949. The Indian Prime Minister visit to the USA.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: OCTOBER 11, 1949. The Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the USA.**

The History of The US-India-Tibet Relations: The US President Eisenhower with the US Secretary of State. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : DECEMBER 16, 1956 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: DECEMBER 16, 1956. The Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the USA. Both India and the US desired for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

**#WHOLEVILLAIN Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows about the Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN - APRIL 1958 — The history of the US-India-Tibet Relations. #WHOLEVILLAIN – APRIL 1958. Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows about the Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.

#WHOLEVILLAIN 17 NOVEMBER 1954. — #WHOLEVILLAIN Whole Villain. 17 NOVEMBER 1954. Vice President Nixon with the Vice President of India. Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows about the Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : SEPTEMBER 1957 . PEKING . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER 1957. PEKING. Indian Vice President’s visit to Peking**. Initially, both India and Tibet believed the assurances offered by Communist China and desired a peaceful resolution of Tibet’s Occupation.

History of the US-Tibet Relations-Kasturi-Sarvepalli-Eisenhower-and-Nixon-1960 — The history of the US-India-Tibet relations.#WHOLEVILLAIN – 1960. Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows the US policy of the Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : DECEMBER 09, 1959. — HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: DECEMBER 09, 1959. Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet. India was a free country and the call was for Freedom in Occupied Tibet. The US President’s visit to India.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - DECEMBER 10, 1959 — **History of the US-India-Tibet Relations – DECEMBER 10, 1959. Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet. The US President’s visit to India.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN - NIXON EISENHOWER JUSTICE WARREN — #WHOLEVILLAIN – NIXON, EISENHOWER, AND JUSTICE WARREN. Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows the US policy, Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : MARCH 31, 1959 . — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama arrived in India on March 31, 1959 seeking political asylum as Communist China persisted with its brutal occupation of Tibet.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : LIFE IN EXILE . — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama arrived in India on March 31, 1959 seeking political asylum as Communist China persisted with its brutal occupation of Tibet.

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : SEPTEMBER 04, 1959 . — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama arrived in India on March 31, 1959 seeking political asylum as Communist China persisted with its brutal occupation of Tibet. SEPTEMBER 04, 1959, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and Ms. Indira Gandhi, daughter of the Indian Prime Minister. .

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS ARE ALWAYS A REFLECTION OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS ARE ALWAYS A REFLECTION OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : THIS PHOTO IMAGE OF KENNETH KNAUS OF CIA WITH HIS HOLINESS THE 14TH DALAI LAMA SPEAKS OF HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS: THIS PHOTO IMAGE OF KENNETH KNAUS OF CIA WITH HIS HOLINESS THE 14TH DALAI LAMA SPEAKS OF HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.

#WHOLEVILLAIN 1960 — **#WHOLEVILLAIN Whole Villain 1960. Nixon served as the US Vice President for two terms during the presidency of Eisenhower. He knows about the Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : APRIL 22, 1961. CAMP DAVID, MARYLAND . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: APRIL 22, 1961. CAMP DAVID, MARYLAND. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : SEPTEMBER 1961 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER 1961. The Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the US, The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : SEPTEMBER 07, 1961 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER 07, 1961. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : NOVEMBER 07, 1961. — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: NOVEMBER 07, 1961. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : SEPTEMBER 09, 1961 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER 09, 1961. The Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : CHINA-INDIA WAR OF OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1962 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: CHINA-INDIA WAR OF OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1962. China retaliated against the US-India-Tibet policy of Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet.**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : THE 1962 INDIA - CHINA WAR FOR ALL PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IS THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS WHICH REMAIN SHROUDED BY SILENCE AND SECRECY IMPOSED BY COLD WAR ERA DIPLOMACY . — HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: THE 1962 INDIA – CHINA WAR FOR ALL PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IS THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS WHICH REMAIN SHROUDED BY SILENCE AND SECRECY IMPOSED BY COLD WAR ERA DIPLOMACY.

#WHOLEVILLAIN JUNE 03 1963 — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The policy of Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet remains unchanged after the China-India War of 1962. JUNE 03, 1963, the Indian President’s visit to the United States.

HISTORY OF US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : JUNE 04, 1963. — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The policy of Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet remains unchanged after the China-India War of 1962. JUNE 04, 1963, the Indian President’s visit to the United States.

HISTORY OF US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : JUNE 03/04, 1963 . — The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The policy of Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet remains unchanged after the China-India War of 1962. JUNE 03/04, 1963, the Indian President’s visit to the United States.

HISTORY OF US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : 1964 . NEW DELHI . — HISTORY OF US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: 1964. NEW DELHI. Indian Prime Minister with His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama. The US-India-Tibet policy of Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet persisted after the 1962 China-India War.

America’s 1971 Opening to Peking (Beijing):

#WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : OCTOBER 24, 1970. PRESIDENT NIXON BEFRIENDED PAKISTAN'S MILITARY DICTATOR GENERAL AGHA YAHYA KHAN IGNORING HIS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY , THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN EAST PAKISTAN . — #WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: OCTOBER 24, 1970. PRESIDENT NIXON BEFRIENDED PAKISTAN’S MILITARY DICTATOR GENERAL AGHA YAHYA KHAN IGNORING HIS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN EAST PAKISTAN.

#WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : — **#WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: Dr Henry Kissinger with Pakistan’s Military Dictator. Tell me who your friends are, I’ll tell you who you are.**

#WHOLEVILLAIN AUGUST 10, 1971

#WHOLEVILLAIN JULY 09 - 11 1971 — #WHOLEVILLAIN JULY 09-11, 1971. The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy

#WHOLEVILLAIN JULY 1971 — #WHOLEVILLAIN Whole Villain. JULY 1971. The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy

**THE ORIGINAL SIN: The misuse and abuse of political power. Dr. Henry Kissinger had lacked Constitutional Power to conduct secret diplomacy on behalf of the people of the United States.** **The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy**

THE CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT BY LAW: What is the source of Power which Dr. Henry Kissinger may have used to usurp the role of the Secretary of State while he was employed at the National Security Council from 1968 to 1973??? — THE CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT BY LAW: What is the source of Power which Dr. Henry Kissinger may have used to usurp the role of the Secretary of State while he was at the National Security Council from 1968 to 1973? **The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy**

#WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER MRS. INDIRA GANDHI MADE A FUTILE TRIP TO WASHINGTON D.C. ON NOVEMBER 03, 1971 TO GET THE US SUPPORT TO STOP GENOCIDE IN EAST PAKISTAN . — #WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : INDIA’S PRIME MINISTER MRS. INDIRA GANDHI MADE A FUTILE TRIP TO WASHINGTON D.C. ON NOVEMBER 03, 1971 TO GET THE US SUPPORT TO STOP GENOCIDE IN EAST PAKISTAN .

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH ON DECEMBER 16, 1971 . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS: THE LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH ON DECEMBER 16, 1971. India and Tibet worked together in support of this Liberation while the US opposed the Liberation**

The actions taken by Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger prior to September 22, 1973 to foment relations between United States and Communist China by conducting secret visits to Peking and by holding secret negotiations with the Head of State and Prime Minister of Communist China are illegal, and unconstitutional. These actions have undermined the trust placed in the office of the Secretary of State and reveal Dr. Kissinger’s mockery of the United States Constitution.

Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger takes credit for the relations between the United States and Communist China that he had helped to shape following his secret visit to Peking (Beijing) during 1971. Dr. Kissinger published the book, “On China” on May 17, 2011 and most recently this book got reviewed by N. Narasimhan, the former Chief of India’s External Intelligence Agency. I am publishing the guest column that has appeared in Southasiaanalysis.org paper dated 31 December, 2011. Both Dr. Kissinger and N. Narasimhan fail to address a fundamental question about the legitimacy of the actions taken during 1971-72 that paved the way for normalization of U.S. – China relationship. Dr. Kissinger’s mischief began with his appointment as Assistant for National Security Affairs in December 1968. While working on behalf of National Security Council, Dr. Kissinger conducted secret negotiations with Heads of State and Prime Ministers without participation of Mr. William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger was sworn in as Secretary of State on September 22, 1973. Dr. Kissinger had grossly misused his position as an adviser and his actions during 1971-1973 prior to his appointment as Secretary of State were illegal and unconstitutional. The United States Constitution demands that the U.S. Administration is held fully accountable for all of its actions, and the U.S. Congress acts on behalf of the people to demand that public accountability. The actions of Dr. Kissinger during 1971-72 were a clear violation of trust placed in the office of the Secretary of State. For Constitution is the source of Power, it has provisions to check the use of power. The abuse of power is accomplished by separation of powers. A system of checks and balances limits the power of each branch of the Government and permits the Law of the Constitution to be applied when its officials usurp powers not granted by the Constitution or otherwise act unconstitutionally. Dr. Kissinger was not vested with powers to conduct secret diplomatic negotiations with officials of foreign governments while he was at National Security Council.

#WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLEVILLAIN - WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS : DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WON THE 1973 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR MAKING A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM . IT WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY UTTER DISASTER . US ARMY WAS BETRAYED . SAIGON WAS CAPTURED BY NORTH VIETNAM . — #WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLEVILLAIN – WHOLE VILLAIN – HISTORY OF THE US-TIBET RELATIONS: DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER WON THE 1973 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR MAKING A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM. IT WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY UTTER DISASTER. THE US ARMY WAS BETRAYED. SAIGON WAS CAPTURED BY NORTH VIETNAM .

#WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN - HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS : A HISTORICAL FALL FROM GRACE . PRESIDENT RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON RESIGNED ON AUGUST 09, 1974 . — #WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLEVILLAIN WHOLE VILLAIN: A HISTORICAL FALL FROM GRACE. PRESIDENT RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON RESIGNED ON AUGUST 09, 1974.The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy

#WHOLEVILLAIN APRIL 29, 1975 FALL OF SAIGON — **The history of the US-India-Tibet relations. The legacy of Dr. Henry Kissinger #WHOLEVILLAIN Whole Villain, APRIL 29, 1975 FALL OF SAIGON**

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS :THE LEGACY OF DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER . — THE LEGACY OF DR HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER. The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy

The Living Tibetan Spirits:

HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS SINCE 1949 . THERE IS HOPE FOR FUTURE AND THERE IS HOPE FOR VICTORY IN THE CRUSADE FOR PEACE THROUGH FREEDOM . — **HISTORY OF THE US-INDIA-TIBET RELATIONS SINCE 1949. THERE IS HOPE FOR FUTURE AND THERE IS HOPE FOR VICTORY IN THE CRUSADE FOR PEACE THROUGH FREEDOM IN OCCUPIED TIBET .**

I speak on behalf of the Living Tibetan Spirits, the spirits of the young Tibetan men who live in my consciousness. Myself, and the Living Tibetan Spirits feel dismayed by Dr. Kissinger’s book “On China”, and its review by the former chief of India’s External Intelligence Agency. Both of them fail to speak about the United States-Tibet relations that established the multinational defense pact or alliance called Establishment Number. 22 (1962) and later named as Special Frontier Force (1966) to secure Freedom, Liberty, and Democracy in the occupied Land of Tibet. There was a basic and fundamental understanding between the people of Tibet and the United States to defend the Freedom of Tibet. Dr. Kissinger has caused a breach of trust between these two parties which have agreed to work together to defend the rights of Tibetan people to regain their lost freedom. The ideological rift between the US and Communist China is as wide as it was during 1949. The US-India-Tibet Relations survived the test of times and there is hope for a better future. There is hope for victory in the ‘Crusade for Peace through Freedom in Occupied Tibet’.

Rudra N. Rebbapragada,

Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.

Service Information:
Service Number: MS-8466/MR-03277K; Rank: Major; Branch: Army Medical Corps/Short Service Regular Commission/Direct Permanent Commission (1969-1984);
Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle (1971-72),
Headquarters Establishment No. 22 C/O 56 APO (1971-74),
Directorate General of Security,
Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force,
East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram,
New Delhi – 110 022

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4837.html
Dr.Henry Kissinger’s Book “ON CHINA” – An Indian Perspective

Guest Column: By N. Narasimhan 31/12/2011

“ Relations Between Great Powers cannot b sustained by inertia, commerce or mere sentiments” Aaron Freidburg in New Republic, August 4, 2011.

That this Book is unique in many ways is quite obvious. Not just because of the Statistics. that Dr.Kissinger has counted having made about 50 trips to Beijing and the sheer mental and physical stamina on display. Hypothetically, someone can beat that in numerical terms. Or can conceivably even carry out missions of comparable importance in future. But there is not even a “ghostly” chance of any one replicating the meetings he has had with Mao, Deng, and the successor Chairmen of CPC/CMC/PRC; or the meticulous manner he has kept a record of these and shared them with the world.

For good or bad, this review will be understandably in the nature of lessons to be learnt, in the light of where we are now, our system and other deficiencies, and that have contributed calling for remedial action with urgency, to safeguard long and continually being neglected vital national interests.

India – China Border Dispute and War:

The India – China border war of 1962 has been covered here more in the perspective of a major illustration of Dr.K’s basic thesis on China’s “exceptionalism” and “singularity”, as characteristic style of statecraft distilled in which principles of “deterrent co-existence”, and “offensive-deterrence”(being defined as “luring in the opponents and then dealing them a sharp and stunning blow”) are important components.

Parenthetically, the India – China Border War has also been given dubious pride of place, as a dramatic opening prop for the Prologue with which Dr.K has begun the book ! Not being a critical element to his main purpose of the Book, in Dr.K’s broad brush treatment of the history and actual developments preceding the October – November 1962 Chinese attack on India, the facts are smudgy and a number of crucial issues have been glossed over. In fact, there are arguably many historic inaccuracies.

The Chinese Attack was a well planned meticulous attack
This Book has done yeoman service to the Indian cause by conclusively demonstrating that the Chinese attack was a well planned and meticulously executed “malice aforethought”, which was personally handled by Mao himself. The quotes attributed to Mao in this Section almost all have been sourced from an article by one John K.Garver.

Some of Dr.K’s assessments of Chinese working and decision-making style described in this Section, which get repeated often in different forms, throughout the Book are worth reproduction for ready perusal.

“It was not yet an order for military confrontation; rather a kind of alert to prepare a strategic plan. As such, it triggered the familiar Chinese style of dealing with strategic decisions: thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid conclusion“.
(Page 188, Chapter 7 – from an account of Mao’s meeting with Chinese Military Commanders in 1962)

Dr.K goes on to mention two specific points which demonstrated the comprehensive way in which Chinese policy was being planned. The Chinese leaders were concerned that the U.S might use the Sino – Indian conflict they were preparing for to unleash Taiwan against the Mainland. Also the U.S may start some mischief in Indo – China, in the developments of the then current edition of the Vietnam War, and use it for an American attack on Southern China through Laos.

They used a simple subterfuge to obtain quick reassurance on the first point. At the routine Ambassador level meetings then under way at far away Warsaw, they got the U.S. Representative to deny any American intention of armed action in Taiwan by making a false allegation that the U.S. had amassed troops for this purpose, and getting it refuted by him. Remarkable in itself, Dr.K also highlights this to additionally emphasize the difference between a comprehensive approach to policy making (Chinese model) and a segmented one (by others).

Then Chinese Ambassador Wang Bingnan at Warsaw had claimed in his Memoirs that this information played a very “big role” in Beijing’s final decision to proceed with the operations in the Himalayas. (Page-189, Chapter -7).

The role of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev and the Cuban missile crisis finds a mention in this Section, with references to Soviet flip-flops. But Dr.K does not make a specific point that the then raging Sino – Soviet ideological war may have played any significant role in the Chinese decisions and actions leading to the 1962 war – the point (the cruciality of the Soviet/Russian factor and role) he has made in every other of the three major comparable international conflicts/crises he has elaborated on, namely, the Korean war, the Taiwan Straits crises and the third Vietnam war (“We touched the Tiger’s buttocks”), to exemplify China’s use of armed action as a policy tool in its international relations. (Page-340, Chapter-13).

It needs to be noted though that Dr.K has graphically/gleefully, but briefly, described, in different places, caustic /acerbic exchanges between the Chinese and Soviet leaders and their publications, to show China’s irritation and indignation at different aspects of Indo-Soviet relations. But not as significant factor in China launching the Border War.
The so-called 1961 “Indian Forward Policy/Nehru’s Forward Policy” gets mention, as occasion to quote Mao epigrammatically telling the Central Military Commission (CMC) and top leaders, “a person sleeping in comfortable bed is not easily roused by someone else’s snoring”. (Page 187, Chapter 7). (What or whom, did he have in mind in this allusion?!)

Tibet, Tripartite Agreement and Neville Maxwell’s Thesis”

Neville Maxwell who had made much of this “Forward Policy” as the main reason for “India’s China War”, in his eponymous Book sponsored by the PRC, (he was a State guest in Beijing writing the Book) gets a small foot note reference (Serial # 7, Page-545, Notes), in the early tracing of the history of the Simla Tripartite negotiations leading to the McMahon Line Agreement (1914), to quote the Emperor’s then Representatives in Calcutta, Lu Hsing – Chi on the Middle Kingdom’s positive attitude to the Simla Meeting; “We must exert muscles to the utmost during this Conference”, (Page-186, Chapter 7)

Dr.K, however fails to note that the main reason for the then Chinese Central Government’s refusal to fully “sign” the Tripartite Agreement was their non acceptance of the border between “Inner” (Sichuan and Yunnan provinces) and “Outer” (present Autonomous Region area) Tibet, and not the India – Tibet segment of the Line, while he elaborates on the significance/ difference in Diplomatic Practice between “initialling” and “signing” an International Agreement.

Though mentioning Tibet in the context of the evolution the McMahon Line aspect of the border dispute, Dr.K briefly refers to HH the Dalai Lama (DL) taking asylum in India in 1959 in this Section, only to the extent of China beginning “to treat the issue of demarcation line increasingly in strategic terms”, not as a significant trigger for the Border War China launched three and a half years later. (Page 187, Chapter 7).

There is an amazing passage of brutal frankness, in a book replete with breath-taking dialogue scripts, on the 1959 Tibetan Revolt and the D.L’s escape – a verbatim record of a macabre exchange between Mao and Khrushchev during the latter’s visit to Beijing in October, 1959, that has to be highlighted . (Page-171, Chapter-6)

Three Mao quotes given by Dr.K in this Section on India – China 1962 War are worth reproducing, as they unambiguously establish the “malice aforethought” of Mao to unleash the War on India, as supplementary Diplomacy, with meticulous preparedness.
(i)“You (perhaps referring Nehru) wave a gun, and I will wave a gun. We will stand face to face and can each practice our courage.” Mao defined it as policy of “armed coexistence” (to the CMC – page 188, Chapter-7).
(ii) “Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation”. (to the CMC – Page 188, Chapter-7)
(iii) “We fought a war with old Chiang (Kai-shek). We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of these did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don’t have fear. We cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province……Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity”.(In early October 1962 – “to assembled Chinese leaders to announce the final decision, which was for war” – Page 190, Chapter-7)

Other Aspects of Indian Interest

It is somewhat disappointing for the Indian observer that Dr.K. had not found time and space to cover China – Pakistan relations despite their having been found to be crucial in U.S – China bilateral talks, and had apparently been dealt with as such at top leadership meetings, from two important perspectives, namely, nuclear/missile proliferation and international terrorism, during the Clinton and George W.Bush, Presidencies.(On Terrorism, Dr.K evocatively describes China as an “agnostic bystander” – till America’s “9/11”)

However, all that he has to say on the bilateral, collusive violations of international agreements and commitments on nuclear and missile non proliferation areas by the two “rogue” friends of the U.S. is :–

“Finally, the experience with the “Private” proliferation network of apparently friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya, and Iran demonstrates the vast consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear weapons, even when the proliferating country does not meet the formal criteria of a rogue state.” (Page-496 – Chapter-18).

The following passage from Huang Hua’s harangue to Brzezinski in the segment relating to the third Vietnam War (page 352, Chapter 13) has something India can ponder over, in the light of its so far ineffective responses to Pakistan’s long persisting Low Intensity War strategy, to expose the fallacious perceptions it is based on.
“As for the argument that the Soviet Union would not dare to use conventional arms for fear of nuclear attack from the West, this is only wishful thinking. To base a strategic stance on this thinking is not only dangerous but also unreliable”. (citation # 15, page 352, Chapter 13 and page 555 of Notes ).

The suggestion is that India needs to drastically change the ambiance of bilateral equations in Subcontinent, and gain “strategic space and strategic autonomy”, by appropriate actions and responses to periodic provocations by Pakistan, so that its “all weather friend” China, as ever pragmatic, finds it prudent to read the wisdom of the above quote to its permanently parasitic neighbour – with two small changes, inserting “India” in place of “Soviet Union” and “you” in place of “the West”, as highlighted in passage above.

Four major Historic Occurrences in US-China Relations: Principled?

These figure repeatedly in the context of the four major historic occurrences, marking the evolution of U.S – China bilateral relations, post October 1949, namely; the triangle of U.S – Soviet Union – China, Cold War era and beyond, the tortuous negotiations over Taiwan, the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as the domestic convulsions engineered by Mao in revolutionary zeal.

Behind the facade of fiery militancy bordering on nuclear war mongering/of “principled” ideological firmness/political toughness/historic Civilizational patience, drawing inspiration from Confucius, Sun Tzu, and so on, the PRC leadership is capable of extreme elasticity and pliability, surpassing the marvels witnessed in the fantastic physical contortions of the famed Chinese Circus Gymnasts.

The only principle of their “Principled stand” is pragmatic achievement of the desired goal, by hook or crook, which may be battle for survival against, or keeping at bay, the Polar Bear time and again, checkmate the U.S. Imperialism in Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and of late, the East Pacific, or determined pursuit of pulling the country out of backwardness, poverty, towards economic domination of the world.

It looks like the hoary Middle Kingdom Statecraft culture held the concept of “consistency” at arm’s length and use of the ideograph to depict this. Or that it had been banned along the way by Emperor Chin Shi Huang Di, with the writings of Confucius and other Chinese wise men.

Dr.K’s dramatic, ‘blow – by – blow’ account of how the Chinese Leadership desperately sought to settle the crisis precipitated by Fang Lizhi, (China’s Andrei Sakhrov sans the Noble and perhaps the Hydrogen bomb), suddenly seeking refuge in the US Embassy in Beijing with his wife on June 4 1989, fearing the worst to his safety following the Tiananmen (TAM) crack down, is a vivid, “no-holds-barred” play out of most of the above “Chinese characteristics” (pages 428-432, Chapter 15). It is also the high point of the trust Chinese Leaders had in Dr.K and his (brain) power to deliver them from the most awkward of situations (they were many) when he specially undertook this mission (November 1989) as a non official. The passage “At this point Deng got up from his seat and unscrewed the phones between his seat and mine as a symbol that he wanted to talk privately” (page 430) and what followed to a happy, face-saving package deal end, epitomizes the quintessential spirit and substance of Dr.K’s Book, on himself, China, and all in between. Point to note:- When the chips are down, there is no scale to measure the depth of a Chinese climb down.

The Chinese Leadership of all generations practices with consummate success all verbal and physical feints, duplicity, outright lies, wrapped in deliberate studied ambiguity, grandstanding calls for World Revolutions against Imperialism, Revisionism, Hegemonism, Brinkmanship in readiness to risk nuclear war annihilation, as a tool of blackmail, and so on, to achieve well planned, meticulously executed, long-range objectives of domination, even from an intrinsically weak position – Wei Qi style.

The “Chinese characteristics”- the world should take note of:

The known history of the 1962 India-China Border War, and the “unknown” developments in this area of the past three decades since the resumption of the dialogue between the two countries, post the 1962 War hiatus, (dealt with in detail elsewhere in this Paper), are the close-to-home, hurtful, demonstration of these “Chinese Characteristics”.

Most of the time they have succeeded in pulling the wool over the eyes of “friends” as well as “foes” at the given point of time. (many times the same entity is simultaneously invested with both the roles and dealt with).

PRC’s ‘cohort’-ing with impunity with “rogue”countries and their discredited leaders, shunned by most the world at a given point of time, like those of Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia, Myanmar and many despots of later America, inter alias for crass material benefits like access to oil and other commodities, or for diplomatic purposes, uniquely sets them apart as unafraid of isolation or widespread unpopularity. Eventually they have the last laugh.

There have been, inevitably, a few misfires and failures, in this approach, and the PRC has taken the tumble, at times grievous hurt, on the chin, and continued to march forward.

Now the Chinese involvement with Col. Gaddafi in Libya and the temporary set-back in their oil fortunes there are the latest illustration. Their cozy relationship with Bangladesh after a short interregnum, despite their support to the hilt to Pakistani suppression in the East, prior to and during 1981 war, is another classic of adroit, nimble footwork, turning 180 degrees, sans any qualms.

All along, the Chinese Leadership has demonstrated extraordinary capacity to mobilize resources, man power, material and what have you, on a stupendous scale, and concentrate these to tackle the tasks on hand, be it the Korean War, Taiwan Straits crises, border show downs with the Soviets in Siberia, or the ill-conceived, force-marching of the country to instant economic Utopia, through the Great Leap Forward steroid administration, the Societal Purification and perpetual Revolution sought in the GPCR and dazzling achievements in putting up modern Infrastructure show pieces or disconcerting cyber attacks on strategic assets of countries all over the world with uncanny ease which can poise them to the role of Hitler of the future e-universe.

Aggressive Postures of Chinese Diplomacy:

To illustrate (one of many) the confidence and aggressive facet of Chinese diplomacy, even when in a hole of relative weakness, Dr.K cites detailed accounts of meetings of not only Deng, but also of second tier leaders like Foreign Minister Huang Hua, where they passionately hector his successor NSA, Zbig. Brzezinski, on the wrong line of policy and approach, in their view, adopted by the U.S towards the Soviet Union, (in the backdrop of the 3rd Vietnam War) which, inter alias allowed the Soviets various concessions in areas of trade and technology, instead of putting military pressure on it, that would rebound to haunt the U.S. through competition and challenge in future (Page 351- 353 Chapter 13).

It is ironic that, now, the shoe is on the other foot. The accommodative policy adopted by the U.S towards China in the past two decades, 1990-2010, in trade and technology transfer areas, have made China a major challenge to U.S, while the Soviet Union had withered away.
Throughout the Book Dr.K gives invaluable insights into the PRC and CPC inner working, and thought – cum – decision-making processes at the highest levels from extensively researched authentic records, mostly of U.S provenance, but also plenty of Chinese and Soviet origin. It is felt that China watching scholars and diplomats will reap adequate dividends if they strive to access similar archival records of Albania, under Enver Hoxha / Mehmet Shehu the only country which PRC/CPC had kept close relations with during its decades of “revolutionary” isolation, including the domestically turbulent GPCR years, when it strove to be the center / leader of World Revolution and Communist Orthodoxy. In particular, significant keys to the mystery of Lin Piao’s death and the rise and fall of the Gang of Four may be available here.

“Insistent Posture” of the Chinese:

The most important take for me personally from Dr.K’s Book, in dealing with China is the phrase “Insistent Posture” (IP). This occurs obscurely (Page 508) in the last brilliant Chapter-18, “The New Millennium”, in the context of Dr.K comprehensively analyzing a December, 2010 seminal, authoritative Statement on PRC Foreign Policy by State Councillor Dai Bingguo in its multifaceted aspects. It has apparently been used by the “Triumphalist” school in the ongoing “The National Destiny Debate”, exemplified by two very popular, “deeply nationalistic” Books, “China is Unhappy”, a 2009 collection of essays, and “China Dream” a 2010 publication by PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, both of which advocate that China should stand up and follow aggressive measures “to become the number one in the world”. One ostensible purpose of Dai Bingguo is to distance the PRC leadership from this popular, almost militarist posture, carry conviction with and reassure the world about the bonafides of the Official policy, namely, “peaceful rise” – since revised to “peaceful development” – and “harmonious world”. (Pages 504 onwards, Chapter-18).

All the above three offerings have been expertly summarized and analyzed by Dr.K, with appreciable objectivity and thoroughness, as well as realism of an American strategic thinker. Hence, one should refrain from seeking to gild the lily, as it were, but recommend that this Chapter should be read in full, along with the succeeding, equally brilliant, “Epilogue”, where, after drawing parallel from the developments leading to World War-I, with the help of a U.K. diplomatic study, “The Crowe Memorandum”, he weighs in, ever so gently, in favour of a non-confrontationist development of U.S – China relations, in future, in the face of real, strong, inevitable challenges.

I have plumbed that “Insistent Posture” should be the watch word hereafter which should guide India’s approach to all aspects of bilateral relations with the PRC.

Obiter on India – China relations The Indian Public Should be taken into Confidence:

The nitty-gritty of the post Nehru era India – China border dispute negotiations have been marked by near total secrecy. This has been plainly proven to be purposeless, self-defeating, counterproductive, and arguably much worse. This has given rise to lot of unhealthy speculation about various proposals proffered by either side.

One of these is a “swap”, attributed to different Chinese Leaders including Mao, Chou, Deng, at different points of time. In essence this amounted to a Chinese offer that they would allow India to keep the disputed area in the Eastern sector, in return for India’s acceptance of the Chinese claims in the Western (Ladakh) sector.

Dr.K’s Book refers to this Swap in suitably authentic tone, as having been offered by Chou Enlai, and its non acceptance by India, without however any specific official level citation at this point (page 187, Chapter 7). Other references allude to this subject else were in the Book in general terms, basing on the secondary source, Mr John Garver.

Ambassador C.V.Ranganathan Book, “India and China, The Way Ahead”, second edition, 2004, (herein after referred to as “CVR – ICWA”), gives strong credence to this thesis, with a detailed narrative of the 1979 talks in Beijing between Deng and the visiting then Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Vajpayee, wherein the Swap had figured (Pages 166 – 168, CVR – ICWA). No documentary authority has however been cited. The narrative also shies away from authoritatively spelling out details of the Swap. It however avers that India rejected the PRC proposals on Constitutional legal, technical grounds, again without citing any authority.

“CVR – ICWA” nevertheless speculates that difficulties envisaged in “selling” any line of territorial compromise to the Indian public to settle the Border issue would be electoral hot potato. Does this mean that India just kept mum without any response, beyond, “Sorry we cannot accept this for domestic political reasons”?. Or they discussed their problems with their counterparts, in whatever fashion, but had chosen to hide it from the Indian public?

Whichever way, even if essentially correct, this premise is a totally fallacious, escapist, if not a “cop-out”, showing poor appreciation and judgement of the dynamics of India’s domestic polity.

India’s relations with the PRC is one area which can be safely postulated as extrinsic to, and fairly well insulated from the vagaries of domestic electoral politics, which can be safely kept that way unless violently mishandled.

Whatever the assessed obstacles, these will not go away with time, but only assume more dangerous dimensions, eventually bringing greater grief to the country, through the tactics of “seeping aggression” being successfully pursued by the PRC, through more frequent, enlarging, and growingly emphatic references to their claims to Tawang and “South Tibet”, which had not been seen till recently.

Recently, there was an article in Chinese media in which the author discussed in detail the relative merits of China handing over to India areas claimed by it in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh), in return for India agreeing to China’s retention of the area under its occupation in the Ladakh Sector (Aksai Chin).

Probably for the first time, this author claimed at length that Chairman Mao had himself convincingly advanced in detail (obviously before his death) the strategic advantages of China retaining Aksai Chin, compared to lesser purchase in keeping Arunachal Pradesh. This seemed to indicate the existence of an ongoing debate, or its recrudescence, on the subject within China and a serious attempt being made by some section of the leadership to gain wider acceptance among the country’s population for this move, in the face of internal opposition.

This clearly calls for India to have a goal and a strategy to take advantage of such debates in China by appropriate, adroit modifications in negotiating positions / postures.

India Should produce a White paper on Border Negotiations:

In view of these developments, it is time that Government of India sets all speculation on this at rest without further delay, with an authentic, comprehensive report on Border negotiations held so far since 1963-1964, on the lines of the White Papers published prior to 1963 events. Simultaneously, Government of India should make public every aspect of what all has transpired in bilateral negotiations between the two countries covering all subjects, beyond the Border Dispute too.

The paradox and contrast with Government of India in keeping its “Aam Admi”( general public ) in total darkness on momentous external relations issues affecting national security, thereby denying itself the strength and support of the masses, needs to be taken note of and corrected.

Issue of River Waters:

There is a special urgency to do this immediately in respect of negotiations on the exploitation of waters of international rivers flowing out of Tibet for which both the Governments have constituted the “India – China Expert Level Mechanism on Trans – Border Rivers” which holds annual meetings.

The potential long-term adverse effects of the River Waters issue are much more damaging to the future of the Nation and its population, than even the dispute over Border territorial claims, whose (mis) handling over the years has proved dangerous enough to National security. The absence so far of any meaningful detailed disclosures on this subject, covering Government of India’s attitude and actions, if any, as well as PRC’s responses, if any, evoke an eerie, nightmarish feeling of replay of the Border dispute tragedy of the 1954 – 1962 vintage.

In the absence of more detailed information, the PM’s recent statement on the River Waters, in the current Parliament Session, gives the impression that Government of India may be following a wrong course of action intending to domestically down play the problems with the PRC, in the misplaced assessment that this is either necessary, or will lead to maintaining over all, friction – free, “friendly” relations with the PRC. If so, there has been a culpable failure to learn the lessons from the tragic experiences of Mr.Nehru which led to his refusal to a January, 7 1963 oral message of Chou Enlai requesting to meet personally and discuss the six (Non-Aligned Movement) nation Colombo proposals, with the observation “matters are gone too far and the people of India could not be persuaded to accept Chinese ‘bluff and nonsense’ any more”. (Pages 99 – 101 of India’s CDA in Beijing, Dr.P.K.Banerjee Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India).

White papers published by Government of India on the 1962 War graphically show the background for Mr.Nehru’s above frustration. That it is fatal to second guess PRC’s intentions and meanings from their cleverly ambiguous statements, especially from a self-induced, preconceived naive mind-set, resulting in make-believe or wishful interpretations of what one wants to see and hear, rather than nailing the PRC in writing on what they had specifically intended or wanted say.

Two letters exchanged between the two Prime Ministers, one of Mr Nehru dated May, 22, 1959 where he sought it interpret Chou Enlai on having accepted the McMahon Line during his visit to India in January, 1957 (letter written after a lapse of two years after the visit!) and Chou Enlai’s flat contradiction of the same in his reply dated September, 8, 1959 are prime examples of the failure to adopt the methodology of “Insistent Posture” (refer Para 73).

An extract of Diplomatic Note dated 31 May 1962 by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Indian Embassy in Beijing at Appendix – II is another shining illustration of the dangers of the preconceived mind-set in dealing with the PRC (Page-142, CVR – ICWA).

There was no Dr.K in the 1950s to wise up the world with experience to share in dealing with latter-day Middle Kingdom Mandarins who have carried the same Imperial DNA for millennia, mutated for good measure with dyed – in – the wool , Marxist – Leninist Revolutionary ambitions.

Government of India will be well advised even now to go over with fine tooth comb what all have been officially exchanged with the PRC, on the subject of River Waters, what replies the PRC had given in writing, including the record of exchanges at annual meetings of Experts. ( hopefully they are comprehensive.

The Concept of “Line of Actual Control”:

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a crucial concept, which unfortunately has remained only that, for decades now, in India – China Border negotiations. The PRC has successfully evaded giving any meaningful idea of their version of this LAC, in spite of undertaking to do so in solemn bilateral undertakings in Agreements signed by Heads of States and Governments of the two countries periodically. Absence “Insistent Posture” on Government of India’s part, the PRC has merrily gotten away without giving any concrete description of the LAC, so that they can draw it any time in future South of Tawang and tell Government of India that they have never said anything contradictory before officially and they cannot be proven wrong. And they will get Neville Maxwells of 21st century (perhaps some Indians too!) to paint them as paragons of all Celestial virtues, attributed to Confucius, Sun Tzu etc.

Singularity and Exceptionalism:

Dr.K devotes time and space in the Book to highlight China’s “Singularity” and “Exceptionalism”. One salient aspect emphasized is the great influence of China’s ancient Civilizational history, Culture, and writings of Philosophers like Confucius, Sun Tzu as the bedrock and guiding force throughout the many millennia, to the cataclysmic contemporary developments of 20th/21st Century, and the strength and sustenance Mao and his successors had drawn from this, to the extent of even using the same ancient elliptical, allegoric, epigrammatic, vague circumlocutory verbiage to hide and fudge, so as to thrive and succeed.

India too has a great History:

India has also been blessed with ancient history and civilization and great philosophers and thinkers whose teachings had served generations of Rulers and the Ruled for millennia. Except that in Indian case there seems to be a disastrous break in the past couple of centuries under British colonialism, and contemporary Rulers seem unaware of and unwilling to draw strength, sustenance and guidance from their Heritage, in meaningful, practical ways.
This is an important point to ponder over while learning from the successful Chinese experience, so rivetingly told in the Book by the master practitioner of International Diplomacy.
Another noteworthy/mentionable fact is that the PRC has been most successful in educating and sensitizing the entire country without significant distinction among populations in rural and urban areas, on the major aspects of its Foreign Policies and external relations with important countries at any given point of time, (dealt with in the Book), both in broad strategic long-term perspective and nuances, as well as immediate tactical moves, as situations develop, so as to be able to demonstrate massive support on the street, especially when it concerns countries like Japan, Soviet Union, Vietnam and the U.S.

Even allowing for the differences in the systems of government, control over media etc., this gulf is a major, self-inflicted failure which is regrettably and totally unjustified.
(The writer is a former chief of India’s External Intelligence Agency)

Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic initiatives had totally failed the US Policy in Southeast Asia. Communist China remains a huge military threat in this region and United States had failed in its mission to curb the expansion of Communist Power. — Dr. Kissinger’s diplomatic initiatives totally failed the US Policy in Southeast Asia. Communist China remains a huge military threat in this region and the United States failed in its mission to curb the expansion of Communist Power. **The History of the US-India-Tibet Relations. The problem of Freedom in Occupied Tibet was placed on the Back Burner while Nixon-Kissinger changed the Course of the US Policy**

Whole Strategy – The “Correct” Way to Freedom in Tibet

Tibet Awareness – The “Correct” Way to Freedom in Tibet

**Whole Strategy – The Correct Way to Freedom in Tibet. The Great Problem of Tibet is left on The Back Burner for several decades. How to move forward?**

Red China rejects Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” for Tibet. The global community of nations are not yet ready to take military action to evict the Occupier of Tibet. The problem of the spread of Communism to Asia remains unsolved. The Wars in Korea and Vietnam have concluded without defeating the Enemy to Freedom and Democracy in Asia. I coined the phrase Unfinished Korea-Vietnam War as the Cold War in Asia stubbornly persists without any sign of a new initiative. Now, there is no more ‘Middle Way for Tibet. I am inviting all Tibetans to find the One and the only One “Correct” Way for Tibet, a true and real Way to Freedom. As Doomsayer of Doom Dooma I predict Red China’s sudden, unexpected, unavoidable downfall that will lead to utter ruin of her political, economic, and military power.

**Whole Strategy – The Correct Way to Freedom in Tibet. The Great Problem of Tibet is left on The Back Burner for several decades. How to move forward? Freedom in Tibet is just a Stone’s Throw Away.**

I am seeking the application of ‘Compassion’ as a physical force to uplift Red Army from Tibet without giving them pain or suffering.

TIBET AWARENESS - THE "CORRECT" WAY TO FREEDOM. I AM SEEKING APPLICATION OF COMPASSION AS A PHYSICAL FORCE TO UPLIFT RED ARMY FROM TIBET WITHOUT CAUSING PAIN OR SUFFERING. — **TIBET AWARENESS – THE “CORRECT” WAY TO FREEDOM. I AM SEEKING APPLICATION OF COMPASSION AS A PHYSICAL FORCE TO UPLIFT RED ARMY FROM TIBET WITHOUT CAUSING PAIN OR SUFFERING.**

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA
Special Frontier Force-Establishment 22-Vikas Regiment

TIBET AWARENESS - THE "CORRECT" WAY TO FREEDOM. RED CHINA HAS AGAIN REJECTED DALAI LAMA'S "MIDDLE WAY" FOR TIBET. — Whole Strategy – The Correct Way to Freedom in Tibet. The Great Problem of Tibet is left on The Back Burner for several decades. How to move forward? I am seeking the application of ‘Compassion’ as a physical force to uplift Red Army from Tibet without giving them pain or suffering.

VOA

China Repeats Rejection of Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Way’ for Tibet

Tibetans play their traditional musical instruments to commemorate Serf Liberation Day in Nyingchi Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, March 27, 2014.

YESHI DORIE

March 28, 2014 3:01 PM

China has marked the 55th anniversary of the dismantling of Tibet’s government in Lhasa with another explicit rejection of the so-called “middle way” approach of the Dalai Lama that emphasizes autonomy for the region.

In the televised speech Thursday on state-run Tibet TV, the chairman of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region [TAR], Losang Gyaltsen, said the Dalai Lama’s approach is “a camouflaged approach” that seeks Tibet’s independence.

“Tibet cannot be independent, neither can it be a semi-independence or disguised independence,” Gyaltsen said, standing next to China’s national flag.

He added that China’s fight against a “Western enemy force” and the “Dalai Clique” is an important political fight for unity versus separation, democracy versus authoritarianism, and progress versus backwardness.

Kunga Tashi, who works in New York for the exiled Tibetan government, said the statement shows that Chinese leaders are unwilling to compromise to solve the Tibetan problem.

“The middle way approach agrees with the principle [demand] of China,” he said. “We say we are not separating from China, if we get a meaningful autonomy.”

In addition to the speech Thursday, Chinese officials carried out a campaign this week to highlight how much they say conditions have improved in Tibet since China took over.

Beijing frequently cites improved living standards in the region when defending its rule. Tibetan exile MP Kalsang Gyaltsen Bapa said the comparison of old and modern societies is just an excuse.

“China has no historical and legal support to occupy Tibet,” Bapa told VOA Tibetan service, speaking in Tibetan. “So they need to say old Tibet was dark and backward, and they came to develop Tibet. Such policy was used by other colonizers.”

The anniversary, which China calls “Serf Liberation Day,” marks Beijing’s 1959 dismantling of Tibet’s government in Lhasa shortly after the Dalai Lama fled into exile. The date, however, has been officially commemorated only since 2009.

This report was produced in collaboration with the VOA Tibetan service.

Comments

by: Stepson from: Belg March 30, 2014 3:02 PM

“Tibet is inherently belongs to China, also can be traced back to the tang dynasty ago.” Who said it and how much truth in it? I think there are no similarities b/w Chinese N Tibetans! They are two different races, culture, language and political history. Middle way purpose by the Dalai Lama is very realistic solution for both China and Tibet.

by: Anonymous March 30, 2014 5:41 AM

Dalai Lama masterminded the massacre of Buddhist monks in Tibet years ago to stop other culture and religion from existing in Tibet.

In Response

by: Dawa from: Canada April 04, 2014 5:29 PM

Nonsense, you are barking like a hungry street dogs, no one will heed to your stupid and foolish comments. Why not you say that in 1989 CCP massacred thousands of young Chinese students at Tiananmen square, forget of millions murdered by Mao-Tsetung. You are nothing more than a puppet of CCP of PRC. Shame on a stooge like you,

In Response

by: Wangchuk from: NY April 03, 2014 1:22 PM

Notice how this anonymous poster provides no evidence or even specific facts regarding this outlandish accusation against the Dalai Lama. What we do know is that the CCP is responsible for oppression of Tibetan monk and nuns since the 1950s. Nearly all of Tibet’s 6,000 monasteries were destroyed by the CCP and those that have been rebuilt were largely paid for by local donations.

by: RS from: Thailand March 30, 2014 12:23 AM

The day will come when nations of the world ,especially Asians, will unite and overturn paper tiger China. What has been illegally stolen, as Tibet and land from the Uighur’s, will go back to its rightful owners. China is corrupted and polluted to the core. Millions are dying from pollution and nothing is being done. The money factor is much more important than saving their own lives. China wants to brush aside the US and the Western world and take over, but in the end, it is a snake biting its own tail. China should never had copied Western capitalism. Had China been more eco-oriented, the world would have praised its true values, and perhaps would have imitated its leadership, but who wants China now? Only greedy world corporations deviating their national interests and benefitting their own pockets. Yes, money comes first and citizens last.

In Response

by: Tibman from: Tibet April 03, 2014 7:45 PM

Absolutely, well said RS, I agree with your points 101% and thanks for standing in solidarity with us. Tibet will be FREE!

by: Jane from: china March 29, 2014 8:41 PM

In the history of Tibet is inherently belongs to China, also can be traced back to the tang dynasty ago, my side of the Tibetan compatriots have been artificially in Chinese.The dalai lama’s middle way there is no so-called really representative of the ideas of the masses.Only in people with real voice.Reminds me of the people often say that reports often distorted the facts.

In Response

by: Wangchuk from: NY April 03, 2014 1:23 PM

According to the PRC, China’s claim to Tibet goes back to the Yuan Dynasty so you didn’t pay attention too well in CCP class. There simply is no historical evidence that Tibet was an integral part of China prior to 1951.

In Response

by: Sun from: Taipei March 30, 2014 2:31 AM

Chinese in mainland are too arrogant to be aware of that all other countries in the world are at the side of Tibet. Chinese Government (PRC) will collapse soon due to the blast of its intentionally created Bubble Economy or no responsibility for air pollution.

by: Вася March 29, 2014 5:39 PM

And what’s so bad about Tibet’s independence? It’s surely better for Tibet to be independent of a cesspool called “China”.

In Response

by: Jonathan Huang from: Canada March 29, 2014 7:55 PM

Then why the west is against the Crimea’s referendum? You are a fool if you believe the west media!
We Chinese will fight for our territory integrity! Those Tibetans who don’t love China, you should go away, go to democratic India, to see if you can have a better life.

by: Jonathan Huang from: Canada March 29, 2014 11:53 AM

Dalai was a slave master and he still wants to regain his position. But Tibet doesn’t want to be slavery again!
If you think comparison between old Tibet and new Tibet is unfair, then compare those Tibetans live in democratic India and those live in dictatorship China, who is living on a better life standard?

In Response

by: Dawa from: Canada April 08, 2014 12:16 PM

J. Huang, do you know what human life is all about other than having better living standard? If you only care about better living standard than you are nothing more than an absurd, why? even animals living in zoo with all the facilities doesn’t want to live in zoo, why? because they don’t have freedom of their own with all aspects of their way of living, i.e. running in wild, breathing in fresh air in wide open space, free to play and to mate with their own desire etc. So, can you remain happy in zoo with all the good foods, drinks and with all the good facilities like those wild animals in zoo? Can you live without freedom?

In Response

by: Tibman from: Tibet April 04, 2014 5:15 PM

If you believe in CCP’s fabricated story, you are nothing more than a blind stooge. His Holiness the Dalai Lama is the most revered, most loved and respected personality in this world, those who revere him are not a blind and stupid like yourself, they use their own intellect to find the truth by analyzing and with reasoning, and once they find the truth and purity than they believe in that, but for a foolish people like you, chairman Mao becomes God like after murdering 45 millions of Chinese, you don’t know how much suffering he created in China, Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang, it is because with a support from a ignorant and blind nationalist like yourself others who are who supported Mao and CCP in power. If you have such strong nationalist feeling of PRC, why you are living in Canada, why you have to use English name “Jonathan” as your first name? this shows that you are just an opportunist stooge and you don’t know nothing about freedom, justice, humanity and truth on Tibetan issue, for you everything counts on money and materialistic satisfactory, poor you! which is why people like you still remain like puppet, and your poor mentality is dragging your children and grand children to become a slave of CCP, I feel pity on you making such stupid comments on HHDL and non-violent Tibetans.

In Response

by: Wangchuk from: NY April 03, 2014 1:26 PM

Mr. Huang is well-known here as a member of the 50 Cent Army paid by the CCP for his pro-CCP statements that parrot CCP propaganda. Notice he provides no evidence or facts to support his outrageous claims. The colonial mentality of the CCP is to accuse Tibetans of being barbaric & backward to justify their 1950 invasion. Why is it that majority of Tibetans want the return of the Dalai Lama and the CCP out of Tibet if Huang’s claims were true?

In Response

by: Jonathan Huang from: Canada March 30, 2014 2:47 AM

@roboco stop trusting the west media and west propaganda! They are plain liars! They lied about the excuse of starting Iraq war, they are lying about Ukraine crisis and Crimea referendum.
Tibetans are enjoying their better life in China except few brainwashed young monks who refuse to see the big picture of Tibet.
Any way I strongly suggest China should learn from America and Australia about how they treated aboriginals.
You are from Australia right? Tell me did you white ppl give back land to aboriginals? Dd you give them independence? Did white ppl kidnaped aboriginals kids and sent them to white families by force? Shame on you, you are animals!

In Response

by: Roboco from: Melbourne, Australia March 29, 2014 8:08 PM

Why don’t you do some research on what the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Global Freedom Network are doing? Take a look at

by: Regula from: USA March 29, 2014 1:36 AM

It is no secret that the US wants to use Tibet as one entrance area to destabilize China. Sadly, under the guise of “supporting” independence for Tibet, the US really doesn’t care for the Tibetans, only for its interests in destabilizing China.

The Tibetan clergy in Lhasa was without a doubt a despotic government – and would be a despotic government again, religion has no other way of governing than despotism – it has nothing to offer beyond religion. The Dalai Lama is dishonest, trying to convince with sly lies – but ignoring the pressure the religious establishment put on young people to self-immolate in protest against Chinese rule. Most Tibetans likely prefer Chinese rule, because it allows them to work for their own good instead of that of the religious establishment, but brainwashing with the supposed good of ‘tradition” and the fear of reprisals may keep many Tibetans silent on their true preference.

It would incumb on the US to stop its false propaganda. As to the Tibetans, there is a lesson to be learned from the recent US instigated events in Ukraine which the US characterized as a fight for freedom and dignity and democracy. Ukraine already was a democracy – maybe not perfect, but nevertheless, democratic. With IMF loans all that freedom and dignity will be summarized as dire poverty of the people, exploitation of their resources and a practically impossible struggle to restore livable conditions.

Is that what Tibetans really want? But that is all the US would have to offer. In comparison, China brought development and tangible improvement away from dire poverty.

In Response

by: Dawa from: Canada April 08, 2014 12:51 PM

Ha!..ha!…ha!…China brought development and improvement in Tibet. No! No! not all, China came to destruct and loot the Tibetan resources, and China truly wants cultural genocide in Tibet. Late Penchen Rinpochey made this public statements just before his death: He said, if we analyze and calculate carefully and find loss and gain on Tibet after the invasion, Peoples Republic of China brought more destruction and suffering rather than truly benefiting Tibet and Tibetan people, after making these strong and sharp points against CCP of PRC, he was poisoned and died a mysterious death in Shigatse, this is the true reality what CCP does if some one speaks the truth for the cause of Tibet. At present all the benefits from the mineral resources from Tibet is taken away to China and the true benefactors from the mineral resources are the politburo leaders and their members in power, not even the Chinese people. Don’t you know that most of the Chinese leaders have overseas bank account, a tax haven? Why? it is because the money they earned is not legal, it is the money they stole while they were in power. Concerning U.S.A. supporting Tibetan independence, it is all nonsense and baseless comments, how can u.S.A. support Tibet’s independence, when they officially says Tibet is a part of China, which means they don’t recognize the sovereignty of Tibet. However, in reality, Tibet is for Tibetans, as China is for Chinese and India is for Indians. Tibet is a sovereign country invaded and occupied by China in 1959. Don’t make excuses of bringing development and false comments, truth will shine and Tibet will be a free country sooner, just wait and watch!

In Response

by: Wangchuk from: NYC April 06, 2014 1:18 PM

It’s interesting that comrade Huang is unable to provide any response why the CCP won’t allow the UN or any independent investigators or journalists into Tibet to investigate the human rights situation. Only when they are accompanied by CCP officials and given an official tour to showcase Tibet but never any unsupervised or independent investigations. That’s why the CCP has zero credibility on the Tibet issue. They can’t provide verifiable evidence to support their claims. Besides if comrade Huang supports the Crimean referendum then why can’t Tibet & Xinjiang also have a referendum on independence? It seems when it comes to China, it’s do as I say not as I do. Comrade Huang’s earlier posts confirm his colonial mentality. He implicitly recognized that Tibet was invaded & occupied and that Tibetans have no rights. It’s that Stalinist-Leninist-Maoist mentality that tolerates no dissent or opposing views.

In Response

by: Jonathan Huang from: Canada April 03, 2014 6:08 PM

@wangchuk, you are a CIA troll. No matter what China does, west propaganda still bashes China. We open up Tibet to our friends but not to our enemies.
And go hel separatist! Tibet belongs to China forever!

In Response

by: Wangchuk from: NYC April 03, 2014 1:28 PM

It seems another member of CCP’s 50 Cent Army is here. These people are paid to spread CCP propaganda on online forums. If Tibetans are truly happy then open up Tibet to UN and human rights investigators and stop blocking access to Tibet by foreign journalists. Stop censoring the media and allow freedom of speech in China & Tibet. Let Tibetans have self-determination to decide for themselves to live in a free & independent Tibet or part of the PRC.

In Response

by: Jonathan Huang from: Canada March 29, 2014 5:29 PM

Someone from Switzerland. Please don’t be a fool, life standard improvement is the first step of reaching freedom and democracy not the opposite.
Look what happened to India, Ukraine, Mexico and Thailand, for poor countries, freedom means chaos, riots, genocide!
Communist party is very smart and long realized this problem, and that’s why China is the only developing country can remain fast growing and relatively stable.
As for Tibetans, my advice is stay calm, learn science, forget Dalai Lama, work hard and make money, if Han Chinese can be rich, so do you! Minorities in China have much more privileges than Hans. Minorities can have more than one child and go to universities with lower GAP.
So stop complaining, if you are not richer than Hans, then that’s your problem, either you are stupid or you are lazy!

In Response

by: Someone from: Switzerland

March 29, 2014 1:42 PM

Does “development and tangible improvement away from dire poverty” excuse the Chinese government’s use of force? Pulling out women’ reproductive organs so as to stop them from having children is just one of the things the use of Chinese force has done to Tibetan civilians. The Chinese government has taken a process of deterioration of Tibetan identity, Tibetans, and not advancement and development. Safety in Tibet cannot be achieved through heavy security.

You might not believe in the Dalai Lama, nor might you believe that the US’s intervention is wholly selfless but that doesn’t matter. The cruelty, the sheer violence in that region is inexcusable. If a society doesn’t recognise freedom of speech, there is no truth. I’m afraid that may be the case for China.
It’s true, over the past 20 years the Chinese authorities have allowed Chinese people to emerge from poverty and have access to knowledge and better education. You were able to move around and have access to classes. But there are socio-economic and norm problems to this. Not everyone was able to benefit, and this created a great deal of injustice and tension with those who have not been able to benefit from these reforms.There is reported use of torture, restrictions and control of media, forces, disappearances, extensive human rights violations… and so much more. I’m afraid you have forgotten those who suffer, and those who suffer. Violence is used as a form of keeping power. The national court of Spain made a decision and indicted the PRG for genocide in Tibet.

China is a beautiful country with a rich culture, and Tibet is part of that culture. You speak of poverty and development, and yet you forget human rights. I find it strange, though I don’t judge you. I just want you to know that it is more than just political, and I think that because the Chinese government has a similar view as you of the situation they do not wish to talk to the Dalai Lama, for example. I think that hinders any chance of peace or of unity and, to be frank, it isn’t only about the country but about the people. Even if you are suspicious, and even if you doubt their reasons, you should give someone the chance of expressing themselves and allow the chance of finding some sort of solution that does not involve the genocide of innocent people. You and I are very fortunate to live in the countries we do, and where we are coverage of these issues are not always neutral or received. Neither of us lives there, so it’s hard for us to know or even begin to understand the situation. Just be careful when you speak of the Ukraine and of Tibet, please.

In Response

by: Tenzin from: Mini Tibet March 29, 2014 12:48 PM

Your comment reveals true Communist intention, brainwashing its own citizens and intimidating foreign aids ( for Tibetans), US might not be genuinely interested in helping Tibetans however Tibetans themselves have found resonance among international communities. The whole concept underlying Tibet crisis began when Communist China illegally sent PLA troops to occupy the region in the name of liberation, China still vindicates its occupation saying Tibetan society was backward and needed to be uplifted, well in international law invading or forcefully occupying other territories in the name of social and economic ( or political) progress is illegal, that was Tibet’s internal matter and it should have been left for Tibetans to solve it.in these 60 years Tibetans in all three historical regions of Tibet have continuously rejected Chinese rule, thousands died, many more locked up in jails, in Panchan Lama’s speech during provincial congregation slammed Communist China of destroying Tibetan culture and political freedom, he further quoted ” Chinese rule has brought more suffering in Tibet ”, few days later he died due to massive heart attack ( it is believed the then party boss of TAR conspired against him)….
Tibetans have no basic freedom, they are forced to accept Official policies, tremendous pressures are levied on monasteries
monks are forced to denounce the Dalai lama, they are routinely taught communist history which asked them to accept Tibet being a part of China since ancient time, at least 120 people self immolated in protest against Chinese policies, and it still continues.

With The Dalai Lama relinquishing his political authority to an elected leadership, China has no rights to blame him for Political upheaval in Tibet, Tibetan leadership in Dharamsala has been preaching middle way which basically seeks compromised solution within PRC, by dropping Tibetan independence for political autonomy, Tibetans in Exile have shown willingness to solve Tibet’s problem in peaceful and amiable way. China on the other hand doesn’t even accept Tibet existence, they claim there is no problem in Tibet hence no negotiations are seriously taken by them, in contrary to their claim of progressive and peaceful Tibet we witness heavy military presence in the region, Tibetan cities are manned by armed personnel which can be seen every where, surveillance cameras on rooftops of temples and monasteries are common, Tibetans movement are strictly restricted within the areas of their livelihood, houses are arbitrarily searched, lands are confiscated, nomads are resettled, rivers are increasingly becoming polluted, mining activities in Tibet has increased manifold without local people’s involvement, forced sterilization among many women has been witnessed, list does not ends here there are many more reasons why Tibetans are increasingly becoming frustrated, which results in gravest acts like self immolation but one thing Tibetans have maintained is peace non violence …… wish Chinese govt recognize this and take impeding decisions to de escalate tibet crisis, only solution is dialogue and mutual agreement,

VOANews.com

Whole Strategy – The Correct Way to Freedom in Tibet. The Great Problem of Tibet is left on The Back Burner for several decades. How to move forward? I am seeking the application of ‘Compassion’ as a physical force to uplift Red Army from Tibet without giving them pain or suffering.

Whole Lesson – Lessons of Covert Action in Tibet

The Cold War in Asia – Lessons of Covert Action in Tibet

The Cold War in Asia represents the security threat posed by the spread of Communism to mainland China. Because of my lifetime affiliation with the military organization called Special Frontier Force, I can review the covert action in Tibet to draw some lessons.

Whole Dude – Whole Secret: The CIA covert operations inside Tibet led to the creation of a military organization called Establishment Number. 22, or Special Frontier Force which was formed in 1962 during the presidency of John F. Kennedy

In my analysis, the US, India, and Tibet lack the intelligence capabilities to conduct a successful covert action in Tibet. In 1959, Tibet National Uprising failed for the CIA underestimated the enemy’s capabilities both in terms of intelligence and the use of military power to crush civilian uprising or rebellion. In 1962, the CIA again failed to know the enemy’s war preparation and the attack across the Himalayan Frontier came as a rude surprise.

Establishment No. 22 – Operation Eagle: This badge represents a military alliance/pact between India, Tibet, and the United States of America. Its first combat mission was in the Chittagong Hill Tracts which unfolded on 03 November 1971. It was named Operation Eagle. It accomplished its mission of securing peace in the region that is now knownas Republic of Bangladesh.

I directly ask the CIA to improve its intelligence capabilities to respond to the security challenge posed by the spread of Communism to mainland China. The United States fought wars in Korea and Vietnam without testing the enemy’s military capabilities. To fight against the enemy, the United States must recognize the face of the enemy. No covert action will succeed without knowing your enemy.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

Special Frontier Force-Establishment 22-Vikas Regiment

TIBET AWARENESS – PROJECT CIRCUS. The quest for Freedom in Tibet. A military training Camp known as Camp Hale was established in Colorado under the supervision of CIA officers Roger E. McCarthy and John Reagan.

**Whole Dude – Whole Secret: The CIA Tibet Operation.**

Whole Dude – Whole Agency: Allen Welsh Dulles shaped the history of the Central Intelligence Agency. During World War II, he had served in the Office of Strategic Services(1942-1945), and when CIA formed in 1951, he served as Deputy Director under General Walter Bedell Smith. He was appointed the Director by President Dwight D. Eisenhower during January 1953.

Whole Dude-Whole Master: November 29, 1961. President John F. Kennedy welcomes the 6th Director of CIA, John Alexander McCone.

Richard McGarrah Helms(March 30, 1913 – October 22, 2002) was the chief architect of the legislation that created the Central Intelligence Agency during 1947. He had served in CIA in various positions and was its Director from June 1966 to February 1973. The 1962 India-China War was the consequence of a failed CIA mission inside Tibet.

Lessons of Covert Action in Tibet (1950 – 1972)

Clipped /from: http://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/lessons-covert-action-tibet-1950-1972

Between 1950 and 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in close cooperation with the Departments of State (DoS) and Defense (DoD), conducted a comprehensive covert action campaign in support of Tibetan resistance movements fighting against Communist Chinese occupation of their homeland. The campaign consisted of “political action, propaganda, paramilitary, and intelligence operations” intended to internally weaken and undermine the expansionist ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[i] Following the October 1950 invasion of Tibet by the PRC, the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD) inserted teams into Tibet to train, advise, and assist Tibetans who were already fighting the Communists.[ii]

A number of Tibetan resistance fighters were specially selected and exfiltrated to the Pacific island of Saipan and Camp Hale in Colorado to undergo training in demolitions, clandestine communication, and other critical skills.[iii] Operating out of neighboring Nepal and India, SAD-directed teams of Tibetan rebels waged a ceaseless campaign against the Chinese that tied down significant PRC troop strength, strengthened international opposition to Chinese atrocities against Tibetans, and prevented the PRC from effectively pursuing its regional ambitions in South Asia to further spread its communist ideology.[iv] The CIA continued to support the Tibetan resistance until 1972 when U.S. President Richard Nixon changed course and decided to normalize relations with the PRC.[v]

Though the CIA’s Tibetan covert action campaign never successfully ousted the Chinese Communists, the campaign was quite successful in accomplishing the U.S.’s limited objectives. Through its covert action campaign, the U.S. sought to internally weaken the PRC through sustained attrition and distraction in order to prevent the Chinese from spreading their brand of communism across South Asia – specifically India.[vi] The CIA’s covert action campaign succeeded in three ways: it depleted the PRC’s already limited resources, which further weakened the state; it undermined the PRC’s international standing and limited its regional influence, and it prevented the expansion of the PRC’s borders.[vii]

Specifically, the CIA’s covert action campaign forced the PRC to commit vast numbers of troops and resources to pacify Tibet, which delayed a number of other critical initiatives that the young communist state sought to pursue. In 1959, the CIA estimated that the PRC had over 60,000 soldiers deployed just to subjugate Tibet, a force that required 256 tons of supplies daily to sustain. [viii] The PRC, which had just successfully ended its own civil war in 1949, saw its military stretched incredibly thin by its Tibetan occupation. This strain likely undermined the ability of the Chinese government in Beijing to effectively consolidate full control over the expansive country, further encumbering efforts to pursue its strategic ambitions.

Adding to the PRC’s frustrations was the widespread international condemnation resulting from the increasingly brutal pacification campaign that China felt compelled to undertake to try and quell the Tibetan rebellion.[ix] Much of this international focus was (and still is) cultivated by Tenzin Gyatso, the 14^thDalai Lama and the spiritual leader of the majority of Tibet’s Buddhists. During a particularly violent 1959 revolt, The Dalai Lama fled from Tibet with over 100,000 of his followers, escaping with the help of the CIA to India where he established a Tibetan “government in exile”.[x] This government has been a constant thorn in the PRC’s side, with the Dalai Lama and his disciples incessantly lobbying the international community for Tibetan rights and autonomy from China.[xi] The sustained focus on Chinese atrocities against the Tibetans significantly undermined the PRC’s regional standing and efforts to strengthen ties with neighbors.

Finally, the CIA’s covert action campaign was successful in its primary objective of preventing the spread of communism across South Asia. Mao Tsetung, the chairman of the PRC’s Communist Party, was convinced during an extended stay in the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1950 to undertake the leadership role in “liberating” Asia for the cause of global communism.[xii] However, the PRC’s inability to fully control Tibet, largely due to the CIA’s covert action campaign that sustained indigenous resistance, denied China the use of key terrain that might have enabled military action against India or even the Middle East.[xiii] The covert action campaign thus protected the U.S. or its allies from the need to fight a major land conflict in South Asia against the military forces of the PRC.

The CIA achieved a significant victory for the U.S. with a minimal commitment of American resources: total expenditures per year amounted to roughly $1.7 million dollars.[xiv] However, it is important to note that the CIA’s covert action campaign cost tens of thousands of Tibetans their lives, and the supported resistance encouraged violent oppression from the Chinese occupiers. Further, when relations between the U.S. and China normalized under President Nixon, many Tibetans and even a few CIA SAD officers saw the abrupt decision in 1972 to cease support of the Tibetan resistance as tantamount to betrayal.[xv] The Dalai Lama described this sentiment with some bitterness in a 1998 interview, saying that the CIA had aided his cause, “not because they cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all Communist governments.”[xvi] Despite such accusations of duplicity, the CIA achieved its stated objectives through this covert action campaign.

The CIA’s efforts in Tibet were successful because the objectives of the covert action campaign were reasonably limited and achievable with the resources available. While the Tibetans themselves may have nursed illusions of eventually driving all Chinese occupiers from their homeland, it is clear from the available records that the CIA and the political leadership in Washington were content to simply destabilize China and frustrate the Communists’ designs to spread their ideology throughout Asia.[xvii] Once the political winds changed and relations started to improve between the U.S. and China, the continuation of support to the Tibetan resistance was no longer in the best interests of the U.S. The U.S. successfully achieved its objectives through this covert action campaign because those objectives were achievable without escalating into a wider conflict.

Other successful covert actions, such as the SAD-spearheaded coups that toppled the governments of Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953[xviii] and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954[xix] are thought by historians to have given the CIA and subsequent U.S presidents an overly optimistic opinion of the potential for covert action to achieve outsized objectives. This overconfidence likely led to the 1961 “Bay of Pigs” invasion in Cuba, which was a tremendous failure because its objectives were overly ambitious and unachievable given the limited resources that the U.S. committed.[xx] Rather than be greeted as liberators and reinforced by masses of Cubans dissidents flocking to their cause, the US-backed Cuban rebel forces were quickly overwhelmed. The most important lesson that covert action practitioners and policymakers who consider the use of covert action should take from the highly effective campaign in Tibet is that such campaigns must be reasonably limited in their objectives to maximize the chances of success.

The Cold War in Asia. Lessons from Covert Action in Tibet.

[i] “Memorandum for the 303 Committee,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, January 28, 1968, accessed October 10, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d342.

[ii] Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, The University Press of Kansas, 2002.

[iii] John Roberts and Elizabeth Roberts, Freeing Tibet: 50 Years of Struggle, Resilience, and Hope, (New York, AMACOM Books, 2009), 43-46.

[iv] Joe Bageant, “CIA’s Secret War in Tibet,” History.net, June 12, 2006, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.historynet.com/cias-secret-war-in-tibet.htm.

[v] Jonathan Mirsky, “Tibet: The CIA’s Cancelled War,” The New York Review of Books, April 9, 2013, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/04/09/cias-cancelled-war-tibet/.

[vi] “Chinese Communist Motives in Invasion of Tibet,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 16, 1950, accessed October 10, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R006300270010-6.pdf.

[vii] “Memorandum for the 303 Committee,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, January 28, 1968.

[viii] “Logistical Problems of the Tibetan Campaign,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 17, 1959, accessed October 10, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01049A001900130001-6.pdf.

[ix] “Tibet and China Background Paper,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 27, 1959, accessed October 10, 2017, 35-38, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82R00025R000100060022-5.pdf.

[x] Jennifer Latson, “How and Why the Dalai Lama Left Tibet,” Time Magazine, March 17, 2015, accessed October 10, 2017, http://time.com/3742242/dalai-lama-1959/.

[xi] Michael Backman, “Behind Dalai Lama’s Holy Cloak,” The Age, May 23, 2007, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/behind-dalai-lamas-holy-cloak/2007/05/22/1179601410290.html.

[xii] “Chinese Communist Motives in Invasion of Tibet,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 16, 1950, accessed October 10, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R006300270010-6.pdf.

[xiii] “Resistance in Tibet,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 21, 1958, accessed October 11, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01006A000100090001-7.pdf.

[xiv] “Memorandum for the Special Group,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, January 9, 1964, accessed October 10, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d337.

[xv] Joe Bageant, “CIA’s Secret War in Tibet,” History.net, June 12, 2006, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.historynet.com/cias-secret-war-in-tibet.htm.

[xvi] Jim Mann, “CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in ’60s, Files Show,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 1998, accessed October 10, 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/15/news/mn-22993.

[xvii] “Memorandum for the Special Group,” Department of State Office of the Historian, January 9, 1964.

[xviii] James Risen, “SECRETS OF HISTORY: The C.I.A. in Iran — A special report. How a Plot Convulsed Iran in ’53 (and in ’79),” The New York Times, April 16, 2000, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/world/secrets-history-cia-iran-special-report-plot-convulsed-iran-53-79.html?pagewanted=all.

[xix] Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954, (Stanford University Press: 1999).

[xx] Grayston Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2000).

**SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE DEMANDS TRUMP – DALAI LAMA MEETING. IT IS LOGICAL FOR BOTH ARE OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM.**

Whole Strategy – “America First, Tibet on the Back Burner” Strategy totally Failed

The Cold War in Asia – The US Strategy Putting Communist China ahead of Tibet totally Failed

**Whole Strategy – “America First, Tibet on the Back Burner” Strategy totally Failed**

The Cold War in Asia began with the spread of Communism to mainland China. It is no surprise if President Trump thinks of China as a ‘Security Threat’. However, American infatuation with Communist China is not over. Americans are not yet ready to come to grips with realities of world dominated by Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. “America First – Tibet on The Back Burner” Strategy has totally failed.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada
Special Frontier Force-Establishment 22-Vikas Regiment

The Cold War in Asia began with the spread of Communism to mainland China. It is no surprise if President Trump thinks of China as a ‘Security Threat’. However, American infatuation with Communist China is not over. Americans are not yet ready to come to grips with realities of world dominated by Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. “America First – Tibet on The Back Burner” Strategy has totally failed.

China condemns the US Cold War Mentality on National Security

Clipped from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42409148

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Chinese President Xi Jinping has enjoyed a cordial relationship with Donald Trump.

China has condemned the “Cold War mentality” of the White House after the publication of a new US national security policy.
The document labels China and Russia as “rival powers” and lays out a number of potential threats they pose.
The new strategy said Beijing and other governments were determined to challenge American power.
But China’s foreign ministry criticized the strategy report, saying Washington should “abandon outdated notions.”
Spokeswoman Hua Chunying said: “No country or report will succeed in distorting facts or deploying malicious slander.
“We urge the US side to stop intentionally distorting China’s strategic intentions and to abandon outdated ideas of Cold War mentality and the zero-sum game.”
Russia also responded to the new strategy by saying it “cannot accept” that it is treated as a threat. It also criticized what it said was the “imperialist character” of the document.

Trump’s pragmatic view of troubled world

In the new US national security strategy, China and Russia are said to “challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity”.
“They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”

The new national security strategy contains a range of claims about China, including:
China and Russia “are developing advanced weapons and capabilities” that could threaten the US. Competitors such as China “steal US intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars”
China and Russia are investing in the developing world “to expand influence and gain competitive advantages” over the US.
In Europe, China is gaining a foothold “by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries.” China also “seeks to pull the [Central America] region into its orbit through state-led investments and loans.”
Some of the claims have been made before, but the new document casts them as part of a battle for dominance.

Analysis: Friends or rivals?

The BBC’s Robin Brant in Shanghai
First at his golf club in Florida, then at the Forbidden City in Beijing, President Trump has taken every opportunity to say how close a friendship he’s built with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.
But now the official version is rivals – not friends. The classification sends a clear message about America’s changing stance towards a rising China, a China that’s made no secret of its plan to significantly expand its navy, assert more regional authority and expand its influence further abroad through a massive state-backed investment push.
Economic rivalry is crucial to this dynamic. The Trump administration is investigating China for what it alleges is the dumping of artificially cheap aluminum products on US markets. It has threatened to do the same on steel exports.
Ahead of the document’s publication, there were reports that the National Security Strategy would classify China as an economic “aggressor”, but that did not appear in the final version.
Strategy documents are often released with little ceremony, but President Trump appeared at a special event to mark the release of the new strategy. In a speech about his new strategy, Mr. Trump said the US faced a new era of competition, and that China and Russia were the primary threats to US economic dominance. But, he said, the US must attempt to build a “great partnership with them”.
Mr. Trump described “four pillars” to his new plan: protecting the homeland, promoting American prosperity, demonstrating peace through strength and advancing American influence.
The 68-page document, which White House officials began work on 11 months ago, suggests a return to Mr. Trump’s campaign promise of “America First.”

In his speech, Mr. Trump referred to his election victory, saying that in 2016 voters chose to “Make America Great Again.” Previous American leaders had “drifted” and “lost sight of America’s destiny” he said, standing before a backdrop of American flags. “Now less than one year later I am proud to report that the entire world has heard the news and has seen the signs,” he said.
“America is coming back and America is coming back strong.”
He also outlined his campaign promise to build a wall on the border with Mexico, as well as reform of the immigration visa system.
The new policy stresses economic security but does not recognize climate change as a national security threat. His predecessor, Barack Obama, in 2015 declared climate change an “urgent and growing threat to our national security”.

Whole Expansionism -The Cold War in Asia

Communist Expansionism in Asia – Unfinished Korea-Vietnam War

Democracy, Freedom, Peace, and Justice in Asia are threatened by Communist Expansionism in Asia. United States tried hard to prevent the spread of Communism to mainland China. Having failed to do so, the United States fought battles in Korea and Vietnam but again failed for Korea and Vietnam are not real enemies posing the threat. The United States has yet to fight a War to evict Communist China from Tibet, the very first victim of the spread of Communism to mainland China. I coined the phrase Unfinished Korea-Vietnam War as the real purpose of this War is to contain Communist Expansionism in Asia.

The problem threatening Peace in Asia cannot be resolved by imposing UN sanctions on North Korea. Communist China’s Expansionism in all directions, including Tibet, and South China Sea must be challenged and contained simultaneously. US cannot win this battle without Knowing the Enemy.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

Doom Dooma Doomsayer

TO STOP KIM JONG-UN, CHINA NEEDS A BIG PRIZE: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Clipped from: https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/09/07/to-stop-kim-jong-un-china-needs-a-big-prize-the-south-china-sea/#143f9f926df1

Without any doubt, China can stop Kim Jong-Un’s missile tests. Once and for all, and save a lot of trouble for America and its allies—and for Asian market investors.

But to do that, China needs a big prize, the South China Sea. All of it, so Beijing can write its own navigation rules, exploit all the riches that are hidden beneath, and satisfy the nationalistic sentiment it has nurtured.

The Korean Peninsula is far away from the South China Sea. But the on-going crisis in the Korean Peninsula isn’t independent from what’s going on in the South China Sea, as there is a key player behind each conflict: China.

In fact, Kim Jong-Un has emerged as China’s decoy in South China Sea disputes. As the world is fixated on Kim’s nuclear tests and missiles launches, China continues the building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, bullying every neighboring country that dares to challenge its ambitions to dominate the vast waterway. Like threatening the Philippines with all-out war should it enforce an international arbitration ruling, which confirmed that China has no historic title over the waters of the South China Sea.

China also told Vietnam and India to stop searching for oil in the region, or else risk an attack on the oil and gas bases. And it has demanded that Indonesia rescind its decision to rename its maritime region in the southwest part of the South China Sea as the “North Natuna Sea,” asserting its own sovereignty in the area.

But it hasn’t stopped there. It further demanded that America’s close Asian ally, Japan, stay away from its “own” South China Sea.

Meanwhile, bilateral trade between China and North Korea has increased by nearly 20% last year, as Apostolos Pittas, adjunct professor of economics at Long Island University Post notes.

So far, Asian markets have been responding more to the Korean Peninsula crisis, losing a couple of percentage points any time Kim fires a missile and less on China’s South China Sea bullying.

That’s why China has no real intention of taming Kim’s ambitions — unless America and its allies are prepared to let Beijing take control over the entire South China Sea, and step up its bullying tactics.

Are they prepared to pay this big a price?

THE EVIL RED EMPIRE – NUCLEAR EXPANSIONISM – NUCLEAR STRATEGY .

**Communist Expansionism in Asia – Unfinished Korea-Vietnam War**
**People’s Republic of China wants to legalize its military occupation of Tibet and other territories taking full advantage of its military and economic strength.**

Whole Regret – JUNE 04, 1989

Vikas Regiment regrets Tiananmen Massacre on June 04, 1989

I ask my readers to remember the events of June 04, 1989. Beijing Doomed because of her own evil actions.

On Wednesday, June 4, 2025, the 36th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square Massacre, The Living Tibetan Spirits revisit the past; the spread of Communism to mainland China in 1949.

Special Frontier Force Reviews Hump Airlift Operation 1942-1945. The Legacy of the Hump Operation lives to this day.

Today, on Wednesday, June 04, 2025 The Living Tibetan Spirits regret Tibet’s decision to pursue the policy of Isolationism while confronting the grave threat posed by Communist takeover of mainland China. In 1943, Tibet had the opportunity to establish formal diplomatic relationships with the United States and other countries of Free World to prevent the spread of Communism to Asia.

Tibet’s unwillingness to openly resist Communism in 1943 is a crucial factor contributing to the loss of human rights in mainland China apart from the misery and suffering imposed on the lives of Tibetan people.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

DOOM DOOMA DOOMSAYER

Learn from us on Democracy, Taiwan tells China on Tiananmen Anniversary

Sun Jun 4, 2017, | 8:49am EDT

**NEVER FORGET JUNE 04, 1989 – TIANANMEN ANNIVERSARY – BEIJING DOOMED.**

A paramilitary policeman keeps watch underneath the portrait of former Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, China June 4, 2017. REUTERS/Thomas Peter

By J.R. Wu and Katy Wong
| TAIPEI/HONG KONG

Taiwan’s president on Sunday offered to help China to transition to democracy, on the 28th anniversary of China’s bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protests in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, as thousands gathered in Hong Kong for an evening vigil.

Nearly three decades after Beijing sent tanks and troops to quell the 1989 pro-democracy, student-led protests, Chinese authorities ban any public commemoration of the subject on the mainland and have yet to release an official death toll.

Hong Kong, a former British colony that returned to Chinese rule in 1997, is the only place on Chinese soil where a large-scale commemoration takes place, symbolizing the financial hub’s relative freedoms compared with the mainland.

This year’s events are especially politically charged, coming just a month before an expected visit of President Xi Jinping to mark 20 years since Hong Kong was handed back to China.

“When Xi Jinping comes, he’ll know the people of Hong Kong have not forgotten,” said Lee Cheuk-yan, a veteran democracy activist and an organizer of the annual candlelight vigil.

“The students who died still haven’t got what they deserve. They fought for their future, in the same way, we’re fighting for our future,” 17-year-old Yanny Chan, a high school student, said.

In Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen said that the biggest gap between Taiwan and China was democracy and freedom, needling Beijing at a time when relations between China and the self-ruled island are at a low point.

“For democracy: some are early, others are late, but we all get there in the end,” Tsai said, writing in Chinese on her Facebook page and tweeting some of her comments in English on Twitter.

“Borrowing on Taiwan’s experience, I believe that China can shorten the pain of democratic reform.”

Beijing distrusts Tsai and her ruling Democratic Progressive Party because it traditionally advocates independence for Taiwan. Beijing says the island is part of China and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under its control.

After nearly 40 years of martial law, the island in the late 1980s began its own transition to democracy with presidential elections being held since 1996.

On Friday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China had long ago reached a conclusion about June 4.

“I hope you can pay more attention to the positive changes happening in all levels of Chinese society,” she said without elaborating.
In Beijing, security was tight as usual at Tiananmen Square, with long lines at bag and identity checks. The square itself was peaceful, thronged with tourists taking photos.
One elderly resident of a nearby neighborhood, out for a stroll at the edge of the square, said he remembered the events of 28 years ago clearly.

“The soldiers were just babies, 18, 19 years old. They didn’t know what they were doing,” he told Reuters, asking to be identified only by his family name, Sun.

While some search terms on China’s popular Twitter-like microblog Weibo appeared to be blocked on Sunday, some users were able to post cryptic messages.

“Never forget,” wrote one, above a picture of mahjong tiles with the numbers 6 and 4 on them, for the month and day of the anniversary.

(Reporting by J.R. Wu; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard and Philip Wen in BEIJING; Venus Wu and James Pomfret in HONG KONG; Editing by Tony Munroe, Kim Coghill, and Jane Merriman)

Reuters is the news and media division of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters is the world’s largest international multimedia news agency, providing investing news, world news, business news, technology news, headline news, small business news, news alerts, personal finance, stock market, and mutual funds information available on Reuters.com, video, mobile, and interactive television platforms. Learn more about Thomson Reuters products:

Inserted from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tiananmen-idUSKBN18V06C>

Whole Pain – Bitter Memories of April 30, 1975 – Vietnam War’s Never Ending Pain

The Cold War in Asia – The Unfinished Korea-Vietnam War

**BITTER MEMORIES OF APRIL 30, 1975 – VIETNAM WAR’S NEVER ENDING PAIN. CIA OFFICER JAMES E. PARKER Jr., IN VIETNAM.**

James E. Parker Jr., CIA’s last Vietnam evacuee shares his bitter memories of April 30, 1975 in a story published by The Washington Times. Mr. Parker joined the CIA in 1970. I joined the Indian Army on July 26, 1970 after grant of Short Service Regular Commission during September 1969. Both of us served the CIA’s Mission in Southeast Asia with different expectations. My sadness, and mental pain continue in the context of Tibet’s continued Military Occupation since 1950s. Vietnam War gave me hope of USA’s willingness to engage and contain the threat posed by Communist Expansionism in Southern Asia.

I am still patiently waiting for the US to fulfill its Mission to evict the Military Occupier of Tibet.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

Special Frontier Force – Establishment 22 – Vikas Regiment

James Parker, CIA’s last Vietnam evacuee, holds bitter memories of fateful day – Washington Times

Sunday, April 30, 2017, 8:18 PM

Last CIA evacuee bitterly recalls U.S. Embassy cowardice, betrayals as Saigon fell to North Vietnam

**BITTER MEMORIES OF APRIL 30, 1975 – VIETNAM WAR’S NEVER ENDING PAIN.**

James Parker (right) received the CIA’s Intelligence Medal of Merit from CIA Director William Colby in 1975. This photograph is signed: “To James Parker – with thanks and applause for a job well done in Vietnam. William Colby.

By Richard C. Ehrlich – Special to the Washington Times – – Sunday, April 30, 2017

BANGKOK — Time has done little to dull the anger of James Parker James Parker, the last CIA officer to evacuate Vietnam, as the world marks the latest anniversary of the U.S. evacuation of its embassy in Saigon just ahead of advancing North Vietnamese forces in 1975.

When South Vietnam’s capital fell on the last day of April that year, the intelligence officer’s two best military sources committed suicide and the actions of an American diplomat endangered the lives
of escaping diplomats and CIA personnel, the 73-year-old Mr. Parker recalled in an interview. Off the coast of Danang, panicked South Vietnamese who evacuated onto a U.S. ship shot, stabbed, raped, trampled and executed one another in revenge attacks.

But much of his anger targets Mr. Parker‘s fellow Americans as they stumbled through one of the low points of the postwar era in their nation’s history.

“As for my experiences, back in Vietnam at the end, [I remember] the absolute chickens—t character of the men in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, how they were so petty and self-indulgent, so pedantic and so distant from the fighting,” Mr. Parker said in an interview with The Washington Times.

He said the attitude in the embassy contributed to the ignominious defeat.

“Their pusillanimity disrespected the men, American and Asian, I had known who died fighting the good fight,” he said. “The State Department people were not folks to look up to in a combat zone.”

Mr. Parker lives in Las Vegas after a 32-year career in the CIA that started in 1970. He has written several books about his experiences in Southeast Asia, including his newest volume published last year, “The Vietnam War: Its Own Self.” The colorful, 706-page book includes photographs of CIA officers, Hmong and Vietnamese soldiers, maps of bomb sites, and pictures of dead bodies and one nude Lao bar girl.

His memories of the bitter end remain especially vivid. One week before the communist North defeated the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government, the “evacuation plan for the consulate” in Can Tho city where Mr. Parker was based degenerated into chaos.

“Jim D., a career Central Intelligence Operations officer and chief of the CIA base in the Delta of South Vietnam” insisted that the safest, most reliable evacuation would be in helicopters, Mr. Parker said in the interview, declining to reveal Jim D.’s full name. But Consul General Terry McNamara
did not trust that the CIA‘s battle-hardened Air America pilots would fly them to a waiting U.S. Navy ship.

Mr. McNamara yelled: “They could leave us all here. They are wild, uncontrollable animals, the Air America people. We control our own destiny if we go out by boat” on a 60-mile Bassac River route to the South China Sea.

Jim D. replied: “I have my people to protect, and I have [Air America] helicopters. My people go out by helicopter.”

Mr. Parker‘s and his CIA colleagues’ escape was also at risk.

“Mr. McNamara’s plan did not provide for the safety of the CIA officers,” he wrote. “We had no cover. If we were captured by the North Vietnamese, as was entirely possible, McNamara suggested we tell them that we were USAID engineers, which would not have held up during any type of serious interrogation.”

Mr. McNamara, his diplomatic staff and some South Vietnamese nationals went on boats down the “extremely dangerous” river, Mr. Parker said in the interview. “He must have known his plan would leave CIA agents behind. And I don’t think he cared.”

The State Department eventually overruled Mr. McNamara and cleared an evacuation by air.

This allowed Mr. Parker, Jim D. and others to arrange Air America helicopter flights to U.S. Navy ships for themselves, the consulate, embassy and CIA, plus more than 100 CIA key local allies during the final 48 hours.

LOSING SOURCES

One week before the war’s end, Mr. Parker‘s best South Vietnamese source, Gen. Tran Van Hai, predicted the April 30 deadline of North Vietnam’s victory. But the CIA station chief in Saigon, Tom Polgar, and CIA head analyst Frank Snepp refused to believe Mr. Parker.

backed South Vietnamese Rangers also climbed aboard.

“The Vietnamese Rangers took over my ship. Killed, raped, robbed. You could hear gunshots all the time. Soldiers were walking around with bloody knives,” Capt. Flink told Mr. Parker. “We had to lock ourselves in the pilot house. I only had a crew of 40 plus some security, but there were thousands of those wild, crazy Vietnamese people.

They insisted that North Vietnam would allow Saigon and the southern Delta to remain under U.S. protection after a cease-fire, he said.

On May 1, 1975, Gen. Hai was found dead.

“General Hai lay face down at his desk. Alone during the night, without saying good-bye to anyone, he had committed suicide. A half-empty glass of brandy, laced with poison, was near an outstretched hand,” Mr. Parker wrote.

“That report Hai gave me [predicting] the day Saigon would fall to the NVA” probably helped Mr. Parker win a top citation from his Langley bosses, the agent bitterly recalled in the interview.

Hours after Hanoi’s victory, South Vietnamese Gen. Le Van Hung — Mr. Parker‘s other top intelligence source — saluted his troops “and then shook each man’s hand. He asked everyone to leave. Some of his men did not move, so he pushed them out the door, shook off his wife’s final pleas and finally was alone in his office.

“Within moments there was a loud shot. General Hung was dead,” he wrote.

There were other bitter memories in those final days. One month before the final defeat, Merchant Marine Capt. Ed Flink aboard the Pioneer Contender — a U.S. ship chartered to the Military Sealift Command — was evacuating Americans and thousands of South Vietnamese civilians from Danang when it fell to the communists. As the mission proceeded, however, some U.S.-

“They finally shot some of the worst, once we docked but I’ll tell you, son, it was hell. We found bodies all over the ship after everyone got off. Babies, old women, young boys. Cut, shot and trampled to death.”

Mr. Parker said in the interview: “It was Vietnamese officials who shot the rioters.”

Capt. Flink later told interviewers that Vietnamese conducted onboard “kangaroo courts” and executed suspected communists.

Mr. Parker was the last CIA officer to evacuate Vietnam, escaping on May 1, 1975, two days after the U.S. abandoned the embassy in Saigon.

He joined the CIA in 1971 as a paramilitary case officer fighting alongside ethnic Hmong guerrillas and Thai forces against Lao and North Vietnamese communists inside Laos until 1973. In 1974, he became a CIA intelligence officer in South Vietnam handling Vietnamese agents and South Vietnam’s military.

He retired in 1992 but returned to the CIA on Sept. 11, 2001, as a contractor to “teach tradecraft to new hires” and work inside Cambodia, Afghanistan and elsewhere before retiring again in 2011.

Inserted from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/30/james-parker-cias-last-vietnam-evacuee-holds-bitte/>

Whole Tyrant – Red China – Trojan Horse

Red China – Trojan Horse if not Jackass

I describe Red China’s Communist Face using terms such as Evil, Aggressor, Public Enemy No. 1,Tyrant, Occupier, Subjugator, Wicked, Cunning, Jackal, Expansionist, Neocolonialist, Obstructionist, Jackass, and Trojan Horse.

Red China’s global ambitions cannot be trusted because of her One-Party Governance with no Public Accountability and Transparency. I describe Red China’s Communist Face using terms such as Evil, Aggressor, Public Enemy No. 1,Tyrant, Occupier, Subjugator, Wicked, Cunning, Jackal, Expansionist, Neocolonialist, Obstructionist, Jackass, and Trojan Horse.

Rudra Narasimham Rebbapragada

Special Frontier Force – Establishment 22 – Vikas Regiment

CHINA’S GLOBAL AMBITIONS: ARE THERE LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM TIBET?

Clipped from: http://www.smh.com.au/comment/chinas-global-ambitions-are-their-lessons-to-be-learnt-from-tibet-20170820-gy0dk0.html

The man who replaced the Dalai Lama as the head of Tibet’s government-in-exile has brought a troubling message to Australia. The Chinese military forcibly annexed Tibet in the 1950s, sending the Dalai Lama into hasty exile in India. The Dalai Lama retains his role as spiritual leader. But the Tibetan diaspora elected Lobsang Sangay as their political leader six years ago. He spoke at the National Press Club in Canberra earlier this month. The Harvard-educated lawyer’s message to Australia: “It happened to Tibet – you could be next.”

This is a disturbing idea, but surely a fanciful one? As president of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Sangay’s main agenda is to stir international empathy for Tibet. Encouraging us to identify with Tibet, putting us in Tibet’s shoes, is surely a clever technique for achieving his aim.

Does have anything to support his assertion? His case: “If you understand the Tibetan story, the Chinese government [before the military takeover] started building a road – our first ever highway in Tibet.

“Now, we were promised peace and prosperity with the highway, and our parents and grandparents joined in building the road. In fact, they were paid silver coins to help them build the road…

“So my parents told me the Chinese soldiers with guns were so polite, so nice, the kids used to taunt them and taunt them, they always smiled. They never said anything. Then they built the road. Once the road reached Lhasa – the capital city of Tibet – first trucks came, then guns came, then tanks came. Soon, Tibet was occupied. So it started with the road.

“Then another strategy that they deployed was divide and rule, co-opting our ruling elite… They were paid, I think, in Australian context, huge consultation fees.” This brought knowing guffaws from the Australian audience.

“So,” Sangay concluded, “what you see in Australia and around the world – co-optation of ruling elites, getting high consultation fees, business leaders supporting the Chinese line of argument, and even the religious figures – we have seen all that in Tibet. So it started with the road.”

And he compared China’s current international infrastructure project with that road: “So that was the consequence of One Belt, One Road in Tibet.”

One Belt, One Road is President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project. So far, 68 countries have signed up to the mighty vision of an interconnected system of road, rail, ports and bridges embracing most of the world’s population and connecting Europe to Asia and the Pacific through China on land and at sea.

However, this is just a beginning; One Belt, One Road was only launched formally in May. Beijing’s plan ultimately encompasses more than 100 countries and at an estimated total cost of between $US1 trillion ($1.26 trillion) and $US4 trillion or more. China has offered to link it with Australia’s Northern Australia Infrastructure Fund, although the Turnbull government has so far declined.

In the weekend edict from Beijing clamping down on Chinese foreign investment for fear of excess capital flight, Xi’s government nonetheless encouraged Chinese firms to redirect their money into projects in the One Belt, One Road plan.

Could Chinese infrastructure be a Trojan horse for Chinese takeover of foreign countries? In May, Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn exposed a detailed, 231-page Chinese plan for its 15-year infrastructure rollout in Pakistan. The newspaper’s Khurram Husain described it as “a deep and broad-based penetration of most sectors of Pakistan’s economy as well as its society by Chinese enterprises and culture”.

In Australia, some of China’s proposed infrastructure investments have been prohibited on national security grounds. Last year the Turnbull government blocked a $10 billion Chinese plan to buy into NSW power distribution company Ausgrid. China’s Huawei communications firm has been barred from any investment in Australia’s National Broadband Network. And, as Fairfax’s David Wroe reported on the weekend, the federal intelligence agencies are troubled by Huawei’s buy-in to the proposed 4500 kilometer fiber optic cable connecting the Solomon Islands to Sydney. They fear it is a Chinese state-sponsored effort to find a backdoor into Australia’s critical infrastructure.

A Chinese firm’s purchase of the Port of Darwin raised deep concerns in Washington. Ructions over the decision moved the federal government to change the way the Foreign Investment Review Board reviews proposals – the board is now chaired by a former head of ASIO.

Chinese soldiers with fixed bayonets attend the flag-raising ritual at dawn in Tiananmen Square.

Is Sangay right? Geremie Barme, former head of ANU’s Centre for China in the World, is both deeply knowledgeable about China and highly skeptical of its party-state apparatus. He says that Sangay is wrong on two counts. First, says Barme, it’s a “false comparison” to put Tibet with Australia and other countries in the Chinese worldview. “China went into Tibet to extract resources and for military reasons, it was not a big market for China,” says Barme, now an independent scholar and publisher of chinaheritage.net. “China as an economic and political entity is deeply implicated with global economics and politics and it needs not only resources, it needs markets.” Tibet was about resources, in other words, while it sees most of the rest of the world as markets.

Second, the Chinese ruling class has not yet decided the scope of their global ambitions, according to Barme. “There is a debate in China at the moment – what responsibilities will they take in the world, and what can they afford?

“They have been studying the US imperium closely for 70 years, and studying why the Soviet Union collapsed. They do know that imperial expansion comes at a very heavy price, and are they prepared to pay that price? They don’t know yet. They do debate it.”

Depending on China’s choice, Lobsang Sangay will turn out to be either a far-seeing prophet or Chicken Little.

Peter Hartcher is the international editor.

Whole Legacy – The Legacy of John F. Kennedy, the 35th US President

Special Frontier Force Remembers the Legacy of 35th US President

Special Frontier Force, a military organization in India was established during the Cold War Era while the US fought wars in the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. In my view, Special Frontier Force is the relic of Unfinished Vietnam War, America’s War against the spread of Communism in South Asia.

On behalf of Special Frontier Force, I feel honored to share John F Kennedy’s Legacy. Due to Cold War Era secret diplomacy, Kennedy’s role in Asian affairs is not fully appreciated both in the US and India. In 1962, during presidency of Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the second President of Republic of India, Kennedy joined hands with India and Tibet to transform the Tibetan Resistance Movement into a regular fighting force.

Special Frontier Force, a military organization in India was established during the Cold War Era while the US fought wars in the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam. In my view, Special Frontier Force is the relic of Unfinished Vietnam War, America’s War against the spread of Communism in South Asia.

Remembering John F. Kennedy’s Legacy on his 100th birthday

**SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE REMEMBERS JOHN F KENNEDY’S LEGACY ON 35th PRESIDENT’S 100th BIRTHDAY.**

Published May 29, 2017

Fox News

In this Feb. 27, 1959 file photo, Sen. John F. Kennedy, D-Mass., is shown in his office in Washington. Monday, May 29, 2017 marks the 100-year anniversary of the birth of Kennedy, who went on to become the 35th President of the United States. (AP Photo, File) (AP 1959)

As Americans celebrate this Memorial Day, they also will remember the life and legacy of President John F. Kennedy who was born 100 years ago this Monday.

While the 35^th president left a mixed legacy following his assassination in Dallas in 1963, Kennedy remains nearly as popular today as he did during his time in office, and he arguably created the idea of a president’s “brand” that has become commonplace in American politics.

“President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy worked hard to construct a positive image of themselves, what I call the Kennedy brand,” Michael Hogan, author of ‘The Afterlife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: A Biography.’ “And because history is as much about forgetting as remembering, they made every effort to filter out information at odds with that image.”

In commemoration of JFK’s 100^th birthday, Fox News has compiled a rundown on the life of the 35^th president:

Born on May 29, 1917 in Brookline, Massachusetts to Joseph “Joe” Kennedy and Rose Elizabeth Fitzgerald Kennedy

In 1940, Kennedy graduated cum laude from Harvard College with a Bachelor of Arts in government

From 1941 to 1945, Kennedy commanded three patrol torpedo boats in South Pacific during World War II, including the PT-109 which was sunk by a Japanese destroyer

In 1946, Kennedy was elected to Congress for Massachusetts’s 11th congressional district and served three terms

Elected to the U.S. Senate to represent Massachusetts in 1952

Kennedy marries Jacqueline Bouvier, a writer with the Washington Times-Herald, in 1953

Receives the Pulitzer Prize in 1957 for his book “Profiles in Courage”

Elected President of the United States in 1960, becoming the youngest person elected to the country’s highest office, and the first Roman Catholic president.

He is credited with overseeing the creation and launch of the Peace Corps

Sent 3,000 U.S. troops to support the desegregation of the University of Mississippi after riots there left two dead and many others injured

Approved the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 intending to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro

In 1962, Kennedy oversaw the Cuban Missile Crisis — seen as one of the most crucial periods of the U.S.’s Cold War with the Soviet Union

Signed a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1963

Asked Congress to approve more than $22 billion for Project Apollo with the goal of landing an American on the moon by the end of the 1960s

Escalated involvement in the conflict in Vietnam and approved the overthrow of Vietnam’s President Ngô Đình Diệm. By the time of the war’s end in 1975, more than 58,000 U.S. troops were killed in the conflict

Assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Inserted from <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/05/29/john-f-kennedys-life-and-legacy-remembered-on-35th-presidents-100th-birthday.html>

Bruce Riedel Reveals the Failed CIA Operations in Tibet and Cuba

Whole Review – JFK’s Forgotten Crisis, Book by Bruce Riedel. I reject Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s interpretation of Prime Minister Nehru’s Policy since 1947. In fact, Bruce Riedel reveals the failed CIA operations in Tibet and Cuba.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy faced two great crises in 1962 – the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian War. While his part in the missile crisis that threatened to snowball into a nuclear war has been thoroughly studied, his critical role in the Sino-Indian War has been largely ignored. Bruce Riedel fills that gap with JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War. Riedel’s telling of the president’s firm response to China’s invasion of India and his deft diplomacy in keeping Pakistan neutral provides a unique study of Kennedy’s leadership. Embedded within that story is an array of historical details of special interest to India, remarkable among which are Jacqueline Kennedy’s role in bolstering diplomatic relations with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan President Ayub Khan, and the backstory to the China-India rivalry – what is today the longest disputed border in the world.

Bruce Riedel is senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project. He joined Brookings following a thirty-year career at the CIA. His previous books include The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future; Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad; and Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back.

In my analysis, Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the US President John F. Kennedy are not accountable for the Failed CIA Operations in Tibet and Cuba. THE 1962 INDIA – CHINA WAR AND THE US FACTOR. PRESIDENT KENNEDY PLANNED TO NUKE CHINA IN 1962.

The great conspiracy hatched by the UK and the US to dismember India in 1947 is not mentioned in JFK’s Forgotten Crisis Book Review. The First Kashmir War of 1947-48 is not because of Nehru’s incompetence. Following this unfair and unjust attack on India in 1947, Nehru acted in the interests of India and obtained the Soviet support for Kashmir without any concern for his own policy of Non-Alignment. He was indeed a great diplomat who performed a balancing act. The Communist takeover of mainland China and Chairman Mao Zedongs’s Expansionist Doctrine compelled Nehru to visit Washington D.C. in 1949 to initiate the Tibetan Resistance Movement and Nehru kept it as a covert operation to avoid provoking the Soviets. Nehru offered the UN Security Council seat to Red China to please the Soviets for they are the only people who fully supported India on the Kashmir issue.

**It is the US policy which helped Red China to occupy Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. The US claims Kashmir as the territory of Pakistan. The US policy does not recognize India’s right to Kashmir.**

It is the US policy which helped Red China to occupy Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. The US claims Kashmir as the territory of Pakistan. Even today, the official maps of the US show Kashmir as Pakistan’s territory and the US continues to support Pakistan with an aim to dismember India. These covert operations have extended to Punjab and to the Northeast.
Nehru kept his cool and obtained the US support to defend the Northeast Frontier. Kennedy did not hesitate to use the Nuke threat and it forced Red China to declare unilateral ceasefire. India regained the full control of the Northeast Frontier while the Chinese still occupy Ladakh which clearly reveals the nature of the US policy which does not recognize India’s right to Kashmir.
Too much attention is given by Indian readers to Mrs. Kennedy’s sleeping arrangements during her visit to New Delhi in March 1962. She came with two other ladies. I know the man who cleans the trash cans of that suite. She was experiencing her monthly period during her stay in New Delhi. Nehru may wear a Red Rose but he was not fond of mating women during their monthly periods. Feel free to ask the CIA or Bruce Riedel to refute my account. The evidence is in the trash can, the dust bin called History.
All said and done, the CIA failed in 1959 for they underestimated the capabilities of the Enemy in Tibet. The Tibet Uprising of 1959 was brutally crushed and CIA helped the Dalai Lama to find shelter in India. The CIA again failed in Cuba for they underestimated the capabilities of the Enemy in Cuba. Basically, the CIA lacks intelligence capabilities and gave false assurances to Nehru about China’s intentions and preparedness to wage a war across the Himalayan Frontier. Ask Chairman Mao Zedong as to why he attacked India in 1962. What did he say about his own attack?
Indians keep repeating the false narrative shared by Neville Maxwell, a communist spy. What about Indian Army Chief? What was his name? Was he related to Nehru clan? Who appointed him to that position? Was there any favoritism? India honored all the military leaders who defended Kashmir.

Tell me about the Battlefield casualties. How many killed and wounded during the 1962 War? Ask Red China to give me its numbers. What is the secret about it? Ask Red China to declassify its War Record to get a perspective on the Himalayan Blunders of Nehru.

Whole Review – JFK’s Forgotten Crisis, Book by Bruce Riedel. On behalf of Special Frontier Force – Vikas Regiment, I reject Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s interpretation of Prime Minister Nehru’s Policy since 1947.

Rudra Rebbapragada

Special Frontier Force/Establishment 22/Vikas Regiment

The Himalayan Blunders of Nehru

As Stated In ‘JFK’s Forgotten Crisis’

Jaideep A Prabhu

Feb 06, 2025,

https://swarajyamag.com/books/the-failure-of-nehru-the-initiative-of-jfk

PM Modi urged the MPs to read ‘JFK’s Forgotten Crisis’ in his Parliament speech.

JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War, Bruce O. Riedel, Brookings Institution, 2015

Bruce Riedel’s book is written in an accessible style and adds considerably to our understanding of the limitations of Nehru, the India-friendliness of JFK, and the Sino-Indian War of ’62.

Occurring in the shadows of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 is a forgotten slice of history that is remembered vividly only in India.

With it is buried an important episode of US president John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s diplomacy, an intriguing ‘what-if’ of Indo-US relations, and perhaps the most active chapter in the neglected history of Tibet’s resistance to China’s brutal occupation.

The war, however, brought about significant geopolitical changes to South Asia that shape it to this day. Bruce Riedel’s JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War is a gripping account of the United States’ involvement in South Asia and Kennedy’s personal interest in India.

In it, he dispels the commonly held belief that India was not a priority of US foreign policy in the early 1960s and that Kennedy was too preoccupied with events in his own backyard to pay any attention to a “minor border skirmish” on the other side of the world.

Except perhaps among historians of the Cold War, it is not widely known that the United States cosied up to Pakistan during the Eisenhower administration not to buttress South and West Asia against communism but to secure permission to fly reconnaissance missions into the Soviet Union, China, and Tibet.

Initiated in 1957, the US-Pakistan agreement allowed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate U-2 reconnaissance planes from Lahore, Peshawar, and other airbases in West Pakistan over Communist territory. Airfields in East Pakistan, such as at Kurmitola, were also made available to the United States. Some of the missions were flown by the Royal Air Force as well.

These overflights provided a wealth of information about the Soviet and Chinese militaries, economies, terrain, and other aspects important to Western military planners. Particularly useful was the information on China, which was otherwise sealed off to Western eyes and ears.

Ayub Khan, the Pakistani president, claimed his pound of flesh for the agreement – Washington and Karachi signed a bilateral security agreement supplementing the CENTO and SEATO security pacts that Pakistan was already a member of and American military aid expanded to include the most advanced US jet fighter of the time, the F-104.

In addition to intelligence gathering, the United States was also involved – with full Pakistani complicity – in supporting Tibetan rebels fight the Chinese army.

The CIA flew out recruits identified by Tibetan resistance leaders, first to Saipan and then on to Camp Hale in Colorado or to the Farm – the CIA’s Virginia facility – to be trained in marksmanship, radio operations, and other crafts of insurgency. The newly-trained recruits were then flown back to Kurmitola, from where they would be parachuted back into Tibet to harass the Chinese military.

No one in Washington had any illusion that these rebels stood any chance against any professionally trained and equipped force, especially one as large as the People’s Liberation Army, but US policymakers were content to harass Beijing in the hope of keeping it off balance.

Jawaharlal Nehru knew of US activities in Tibet, for his Intelligence Bureau chief, BN Mullick, had his own sources in Tibet. It is unlikely, however, that he knew of Pakistan’s role in the United States’ Tibet operations.

In any case, Nehru did not believe that it was worth antagonising the Chinese when there was no hope of victory; India had to live in the same neighbourhood and hence be more cautious than the rambunctious Americans.

Furthermore, it was the heyday of non-alignment and panchsheel, and the Indian prime minister did not wish to upset that applecart if he could help it. In fact, Nehru urged US President Dwight Eisenhower during their 1956 retreat to the latter’s Gettysburg farmhouse to give the UN Security Council seat held by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China to Mao Zedong’s Communist China.

As Nehru saw it, a nation of 600 million people could not be kept outside the world system for long, but Ike, as the US president was known, still had bitter memories of the Chinese from Korea fresh in his mind. Yet three years later, when Ike visited India and Chinese perfidy in Aksai Chin had been discovered, the Indian prime minister’s tone was a contrast.

To most, Cuba defines the Kennedy administration: JFK had got off to a disastrous start in his presidency with the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, an inheritance from his predecessor’s era.

His iconic moment, indisputably, came two years later in the showdown with Nikita Khrushchev over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Less well known is the president’s interest in South Asia and India in particular.

Riedel explains how, even before assuming the presidency, Kennedy had made a name for himself in the US Senate with his powerful speeches on foreign policy.

In essence, he criticised the Eisenhower government for its failure to recognise that the era of European power was over; Kennedy wanted to fight a smarter Cold War, embracing the newly liberated peoples of Asia and Africa and denying the Communists an opportunity to fan any residual anti-imperialism which usually manifested itself as anti-Westernism.

Riedel points to a speech in May 1959 as a key indicator of the future president’s focus:

In May 1959, JFK declared, “…no struggle in the world today deserves more of our time and attention than that which now grips the attention of all Asia. That is the struggle between India and China for leadership of the East…” China was growing three times as fast as India, Kennedy went on, because of Soviet assistance; to help India, the future president proposed, NATO and Japan should put together an aid package of $1 billion per year that would revitalise the Indian economy and set the country on a path to prosperity.

The speech had been partially drafted by someone who would also play a major role in the United States’ India policy during Kennedy’s presidency: John Kenneth Galbraith.

Riedel shows how, despite his Cuban distraction, Kennedy put India on the top of his agenda. A 1960 National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA for the new president predicted a souring of India-China relations; it further predicted that Delhi would probably turn to Moscow for help with Beijing.

However, the border dispute with the Chinese had shaken Nehru’s dominance in foreign policy and made Indian leaders more sympathetic of the United States. The NIE also projected the military gap between India and China to increase to the disadvantage of the former.

The PLA had also been doing exceedingly well against Tibetan rebels, picking them off within weeks of their infiltration. By late 1960, a Tibetan enclave had developed in Nepal; Mustang, the enclave was called, became the preferred site for the CIA to drop supplies to the rebels.

Galbraith, the newly appointed ambassador to India, disapproved of the CIA’s Tibetan mission, which had delivered over 250 tonnes of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, communications gear, and other equipment by then.

Like Nehru, he thought it reckless and provocative without any hope of achieving a favourable result. There were, however, occasional intelligence windfalls coming from Tibet and Kennedy overruled Galbraith for the moment.
JFK’s Forgotten Crisis shows how Galbraith was far more attuned to India than he is usually given credit for. He is most famously remembered – perhaps only among Cold War historians – for nixing a Department of Defence proposal in 1961 that proposed giving India nuclear weapons.

Then, he predicted – most likely accurately – that Nehru would denounce such an offer and accuse the United States of trying to make India its atomic ally. Now, the Harvard professor pushed for Nehru and Kennedy to meet.

This would give the Indian prime minister, Galbraith hoped, an opportunity to remove any lingering suspicions he may have had about US foreign policy in South Asia. The large aid package Washington had planned for India would only sweeten the meeting.

This was not to be: Nehru remained most taciturn and almost monosyllabic during his visit to Jacqueline Kennedy’s home in Newport. However, he was quite enamoured by the First Lady, and Jackie Kennedy later said that she found the Indian leader to be quite charming; she, however, had much sharper things to say about the leader’s daughter!

Washington’s outreach to Delhi annoyed Karachi. Though ostensibly the US-Pakistan alliance was to fight communism, the reality was that Pakistan had always been preoccupied with India.

Ayub Khan felt betrayed that the United States would give India, a non-aligned state, economic assistance that would only assist it in developing a stronger military to be deployed against Pakistan. Riedel’s account highlights the irresistible Kennedy charm – when Pakistan suspended the Dragon Lady’s flights from its soil, JFK was able to woo Khan back into the fold.

However, the Pakistani dictator had a condition – that Washington would discuss all arms sales to India with him. This agreement would be utterly disregarded during the Sino-Indian War and Pakistan would start looking for more reliable allies against their larger Hindu neighbour.

Riedel reveals how Pakistan had started drifting into the Chinese orbit as early as 1961, even before China’s invasion of India, an event commonly believed to have occurred after India’s Himalayan humiliation.

When India retook Goa from the Portuguese, a NATO country, it caused all sorts of difficulties for the United States.

On the one hand, Kennedy agreed with the notion that colonial possessions should be granted independence or returned to their original owners but on the other, Nehru and his minister of defence, Krishna Menon, had not endeared themselves to anyone with their constant moralising; their critics would not, now, let this opportunity to call out India’s hypocrisy on the use of force in international affairs pass.

The brief turbulence in relations was set right, oddly, by the First Lady again. On her visit to India, she again charmed the prime minister and he insisted that he stay with him instead of the US embassy and had the room Edwina Mountbatten had often used on her visits readied. The play of personalities, an often ignored facet of diplomacy, has been brought out well by Riedel.

Ironically, China believed that the Tibetan resistance movement was being fuelled by India with US help. India’s granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama did not help matters either, even though it was Nehru who had convinced the young Dalai Lama to return to Tibet in 1956 and have faith in Beijing’s promises of Tibetan autonomy.

Although Indian actions did factor into the Chinese decision to invade India in October 1962, records from Eastern European archives indicate that the Sino-Soviet split was also partly to blame. Humiliating India served two purposes for Mao: first, it would secure Chinese access to Tibet via Aksai Chin, and second, it would expose India’s Western ties and humiliate a Soviet ally, thereby proclaiming China to be the true leader of the communist world.

Riedel’s treatment of the war and the several accounts makes for interesting reading, though his belief that there is rich literature on the Indian side about the war is a little puzzling.

Most of what is known about the Sino-Indian War comes from foreign archives – primarily the United States, Britain, and Russia but also European archives as their diplomats recorded and relayed to their capitals opinions they had formed from listening to chatter on the embassy grapevine.

There is, indeed, literature on the Indian side but much of it seeks to apportion blame rather than clarify the sequence of events. Records from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of External Affairs, or the Ministry of Defence are yet to be declassified, though the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report was partially released to the public by Australian journalist Neville Maxwell.

Chinese records, though not easily accessible, have trickled out via the most commendable Cold War International History Project. The Parallel History Project has also revealed somewhat the view from Eastern Europe.

Riedel dispels the notion of Nehru’s Forward Policy as the cassus belli. According to Brigadier John Dalvi, a prisoner of war from almost the outset, China had been amassing arms, ammunition, winter supplies, and other materiel at its forward bases since at least May 1962.

This matches with an IB report Mullick had provided around the same time. Furthermore, the Indian forces were outnumbered at least three-to-one all along the border and five-to-one in some places. The troops were veterans of the Korean War and armed with modern automatic rifles as compared to Indian soldiers’ 1895 issue Lee Enfield.

Though Riedel exonerates Nehru on his diplomacy, he does not allow the prime minister’s incompetence to pass: the political appointment of BM Kaul, the absolute ignorance of conditions on the ground, and the poor logistics and preparation of the troops on the border left them incapable of even holding a Chinese assault, let alone breaking it.

JFK’s Forgotten Crisis brings out a few lesser known aspects of the Sino-Indian War. For example, India’s resistance to the PLA included the recruitment of Tibetan exiles to harass the PLA from behind the lines. Nehru was approached by the two men most responsible for the debacle on the border – Menon and Kaul – with the proposal which Nehru promptly agreed.

A team, commanded by Brigadier Sujan Singh Uban and under the IB, was formed. A long-continuing debate Riedel takes up in his work is the Indian failure to use air power during the conflict in the Himalayas.

It has been suggested that had Nehru not been so timid and fearful of retaliation against Indian cities but deployed the Indian air force, India may have been able to repel or at least withstand the Chinese invasion. One wonders how effective the Indian Air Force really might have been given the unprepared state of the Army.

In any case, Riedel points out that the Chinese air force was actually larger than the IAF – the PLAAF had over 2,000 jet fighters to India’s 315, and 460 bombers to India’s 320. Additionally, China had already proven its ability to conquer difficult terrain in Korea.

Throughout the South Asian conflict, the United States was also managing its relationship with Pakistan. Despite the Chinese invasion, the bulk of India’s armies were tied on the Western border with Pakistan and Ayub Khan was making noises about a decisive solution to the Kashmir imbroglio; it was all the United States could do to hold him back.

However, Ayub Khan came to see the United States as a fair-weather friend and realised he had to look elsewhere for support in his ambitions against India: China was the logical choice. Thus, the 1962 war resulted in the beginning of the Sino-Pakistani relationship that would blossom to the extent of Beijing providing Islamabad with nuclear weapon and missile designs in the 1980s.

The Chinese had halted after their explosive burst into India on October 20. For a full three weeks, Chinese forces sat still while the Indians regrouped and resupplied their positions. On November 17, they struck again and swept further south. The Siliguri corridor, or the chicken neck, was threatened , and India stood to lose the entire Northeast.

In panic, Kaul asked Nehru to invite foreign armies to defend Indian soil. A broken Nehru wrote two letters to Washington on the same day, asking for a minimum of 12 squadrons of jet fighters, two B-47 bomber squadrons, and radar installations to defend against Chinese strikes on Indian cities.

These would all be manned by American personnel until sufficient Indians could be trained. In essence, India wanted the United States to deploy over 10,000 men in an air war with China on its behalf.

There is some doubt as to what extent the United States would have gone to defend India. However, that November, the White House dispatched the USS Kitty Hawk to the Bay of Bengal (she was later turned around as the war ended).

After the staggering blows of November 17, the US embassy, in anticipation of Indian requests for aid, had also started preparing a report to expedite the process through the Washington bureaucracy.

On November 20, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew its troops to the Line of Actual Control. A cessation of hostilities had come on Beijing’s terms, who had shown restraint by not dismembering India.

Riedel makes a convincing case that Kennedy would have defended India against a continued Chinese attack had one come in the spring of the following year, and that overt US support may have influenced Mao’s decision.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States sent Averell Harriman of Lend-Lease fame to India to assess the country’s needs. Washington had three items on its agenda with India:

1. Increase US economic and military aid to India;

2. Push India to negotiate with Pakistan on Kashmir as Kennedy had promised Ayub Khan; and

3. Secure Indian support for the CIA’s covert Tibetan operations.

The first met with little objection, and though Nehru strongly objected to talks with Pakistan, he obliged. Predictably, they got to nowhere. On the third point, Riedel writes that India agreed to allow the CIA to operate U-2 missions from Char Batia.

This has usually been denied on the Indian side though one senior bureaucrat recently claimed that Nehru had indeed agreed to such an arrangement but only two flights took off before permission was revoked.

Nonetheless, the IB set up a Special Frontier Force of Tibetans in exile and the CIA supported them with equipment and air transport from bases in India. All this, however, withered away as relations again turned sour after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the election of Richard Nixon.

Most of the sources JFK’s Forgotten Crisis uses are memoirs and prominent secondary sources on South Asia and China. Riedel also uses some recently declassified material from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library that sheds new light on the president’s views on South Asia.

Despite the academic tenor of the book, it is readily accessible to lay readers as well; personally, I would have preferred a significantly heavier mining of archival documents and other primary sources but that is exactly what would have killed sales and the publisher would not have liked!

Overall, Riedel gives readers a new way to understand the Kennedy years; he also achieves a fine balance in portraying Nehru’s limitations and incompetence. The glaring lack of Indian primary sources also reminds us of the failure of the Indian government to declassify its records that would inform us even more about the crisis.

As Riedel notes, the Chinese invasion of India created what they feared most and had not existed earlier: the United States and India working together in Tibet. This was largely possible also because of the most India-friendly president in the White House until then.

Yet Pakistan held great sway over American minds thanks to the small favours it did for the superpower. It was also the birth of the Sino-Pakistani camaraderie that is still going strong. The geopolitical alignment created by the Sino-Indian War affects South Asian politics to this day. Yet it was a missed opportunity for Indo-US relations, something that had to await the presidency of George W. Bush.

There are two things Indian officials would do well to consider.

First, Pakistan’s consistent ability to extract favours from Washington is worth study: if small yet important favours can evince so much understanding from the White House, it would be in Indian interests to do the same.

Second, Jaswant Singh’s comment to Strobe Talbott deserves reflection: “Our problem is China, we are not seeking parity with China. we don’t have the resources, and we don’t have the will.” It is time to develop that will.

Special Frontier Force Pays Tribute to President John F. Kennedy

The History of Special Frontier Force-Establishment No. 22: People’s Republic of China could not alter the course of India’s foreign policy. The 1962 War launched by China ended very abruptly when China declared unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from the captured territory on November 21, 1962. President Kennedy played a decisive role by threatening to “NUKE” China.

While sharing an interesting story titled Cold War Camelot published by The Daily Beast which includes excerpts from the book JFK’s Forgotten CIA Crisis by Bruce Riedel, I take the opportunity to pay tribute to President John F. Kennedy for supporting the Tibetan Resistance Movement initiated by President Dwight David Eisenhower. Both Tibet, and India do not consider Pakistan as a partner in spite of the fact of Pakistan permitting the use of its airfields in East Pakistan. Red China has formally admitted that she had attacked India during October 1962 to teach India a lesson and to specifically discourage India from extending support to Tibetan Resistance Movement. Red China paid a huge price. She is not able to truthfully disclose the human costs of her military aggression in 1962. She failed to achieve the objectives of her 1962 War on India. President Kennedy threatened to “Nuke” China and forced her to declare unilateral cease-fire on November 21, 1962. China withdrew from territories she gained using overwhelming force. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sustained massive casualties and their brief victory over India did not give them any consolation. Red China’s 1962 misadventure forged a stronger bonding between Tibet, India, and the United States.

On behalf of Special Frontier Force, I feel honored to share John F Kennedy’s Legacy. Due to Cold War Era secret diplomacy, Kennedy’s role in Asian affairs is not fully appreciated both in the US and India. In 1962, during the presidency of Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the second President of Republic of India, Kennedy joined hands with India and Tibet to transform the Tibetan Resistance Movement into a regular fighting force.

Cold War Camelot

**SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE PAYS TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT JOHN K. KENNEDY. SUPPORTING TIBET WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S MAIN REASON FOR HOSTING A STATE DINNER AT MOUNT VERNON ON JULY 11, 1961.**

Bruce Riedel

11.08.1512:01 AM ET

JFK’s Forgotten CIA Crisis

During a spectacular dinner at Mount Vernon, Kennedy pressed Pakistan’s leader for help with a sensitive spy operation against China.

At Mount Vernon

The magic of the Kennedy White House, Camelot, had settled in at Mount Vernon. It was a dazzling evening, a warm July night, but a cool breeze came off the Potomac River and kept the temperature comfortable. It was Tuesday, July 11, 1961, and the occasion was a state dinner for Pakistan’s visiting president, General Ayub Khan, the only time in our nation’s history that George Washington’s home has served as the venue for a state dinner.

President John F. Kennedy had been in office for less than six months, but his administration had already been tarnished by the failed CIA invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and a disastrous summit with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna, Austria. Ayub Khan wrote later that the president was “under great stress.” The Kennedy administration was off to a rocky start: It needed to show some competence.

The idea of hosting Ayub Khan at Mount Vernon came from Kennedy’s wife, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, who was inspired by a dinner during the Vienna summit held a month earlier at the Schönbrunn Palace, the rococo-style former imperial palace of the Hapsburg monarchy built in the seventeenth century. Mrs. Kennedy was impressed by the opulence and history displayed at Schönbrunn and at a similar dinner held on the same presidential trip at the French royal palace of Versailles. America had no royal palaces, of course, but it did have the first president’s mansion just a few miles away from the White House on a bluff overlooking the Potomac River. The history of the mansion and the fabulous view of the river in the evening would provide a very special atmosphere for the event.

On June 26, 1961, the First Lady visited Mount Vernon privately and broached the idea with the director of the Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association, which manages the estate. It was a challenging proposal. The old mansion was too small to host an indoor dinner so the event would have to take place on the lawn. The mansion had very little electricity in 1961 and was a colonial antique, without a modern kitchen or refrigeration, so that the food would have to be prepared at the White House and brought to the estate and served by White House staff. But the arrangements were made, with the Secret Service and Marine Corps providing security, and the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Regiment from Fort Myers providing the colonial fife and drum corps for official presentation of the colors. The National Symphony Orchestra offered the after-dinner entertainment. Tiffany and Company, the high-end jewelry company, provided the flowers and decorated the candlelit pavilion in which the guests dined.

The guests arrived by boat in a small fleet of yachts led by the presidential yacht, Honey Fitz, and the secretary of the navy’s yacht, Sequoia. They departed from the Navy Yard in Washington and sailed the fifteen miles down river to Mount Vernon past National Airport and Alexandria, Virginia; the trip took an hour and fifteen minutes. On arrival the most vigorous guests, such as the president’s younger brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, climbed the hill to the mansion on foot, but most took advantage of the limousines the White House provided.

Brookings Institution

The guest list was led by President Ayub Khan and his daughter, Begum Nasir Akhtar Aurangzeb, and included the Pakistani foreign minister and finance minister, as well as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Aziz Ahmed, and various attaches from the embassy in Washington. Initially the ambassador was upset that the dinner would not be in the White House, fearing it would be seen as a snub. The State Department convinced Ahmed that having it at Mount Vernon was actually a benefit and would generate more publicity and distinction.
The Americans invited to the dinner were the elite of the new administration. In addition to the president, attorney general, and vice president and their wives, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Navy John Connally, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer, and their wives joined the party. Six senators, including J. W. Fulbright, Stuart Symington, Everett Dirksen, and Mike Mansfield were joined by the Speaker of the House and ten congressmen, including a future president, Gerald Ford, and their wives. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, William Roundtree; the chief of the United States Air Force, General Curtis Lemay; Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Talbott; Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver; and the president’s military assistant, Maxwell Taylor, were also in attendance. Walter Hoving, chairman of Tiffany, and Mrs. Hoving, and a half-dozen prominent Pakistani and American journalists, such as NBC correspondent Sander Vanocur, attended from outside the government. In total more than 130 guests were seated at sixteen tables.

Perhaps the guest most invested in the evening, however, was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen W. Dulles. The Kennedys had long been friends of Allen Dulles. A few years before the dinner Mrs. Kennedy had given him a copy of Ian Fleming’s James Bond novel, From Russia, with Love, and Dulles, like JFK, became a big fan of 007. Dulles was also a holdover from the previous Republican administration. He had been in charge of the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs fiasco that had tarnished the opening days of the Kennedy administration, but Dulles still had the president’s ear on sensitive covert intelligence operations, including several critical clandestine operations run out of Pakistan with the approval of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

Before sitting down for dinner just after eight o’clock, the guests toured the first president’s home and enjoyed bourbon mint juleps or orange juice. Both dressed in formal attire for the occasion, Kennedy took Ayub Khan for a walk in the garden alone. At that time, the CIA was running two very important clandestine operations in Pakistan. One had already made the news a year earlier when a U-2 spy plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union by Russian surface-to-air missiles; this plane had started its top-secret mission, called Operation Grand Slam, from a Pakistani Air Force air base in Peshawar, Pakistan. The U-2 shoot down had wrecked a summit meeting between Khrushchev and President Eisenhower in Paris in 1960 when Ike refused to apologize for the mission. The CIA had stopped flying over the Soviet Union, but still used the base near Peshawar for less dangerous U-2 operations over China.

The history of Special Frontier Force-Establishment No. 22: 1957 was a turning point. India had recognized that its foreign policy of political neutralism was of no use and had started depending upon the United States to address the military threat posed by China’s occupation of Tibet. But, the effort was too modest and both India and the United States had grossly underestimated the strength of the People’s Liberation Army.

The second clandestine operation also dated from the Eisenhower administration, but was still very much top-secret. The CIA was supporting a rebellion in Communist China’s Tibet province from another Pakistani Air Force air base near Dacca in East Pakistan (what is today Bangladesh). Tibetan rebels trained by the CIA in Colorado were parachuted into Tibet from CIA transport planes that flew from that Pakistani air base, as were supplies and weapons. U-2 aircraft also landed in East Pakistan after flying over China to conduct photo reconnaissance missions of the communist state.

Ayub Khan had suspended the Tibet operation earlier that summer. The Pakistani president was upset by Kennedy’s decision to provide more than a billion dollars in economic aid to India.
Pakistan believed it should be America’s preferred ally in South Asia, not India, and shutting down the CIA base for air drops to Tibet was a quiet way to signal displeasure at Washington without causing a public breakdown in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Ayub Khan wanted to make clear to Kennedy that an American tilt toward India at Pakistan’s expense would have its costs. In his memoirs, Khan later wrote that he sought to press Kennedy not to “appease India.”

Before the Mount Vernon dinner, Allen Dulles had asked Kennedy to meet alone with Ayub Khan, thinking that perhaps a little Kennedy charm and the magic of the evening would change his mind. The combination worked; the Pakistani dictator told Kennedy he would allow the CIA missions over Tibet to resume from the Pakistani Air Force base at Kurmitula outside of Dacca.

Ayub Khan did get a quid pro quo for this decision later in his visit: Kennedy promised that, even if China attacked India, he would not sell arms to India without first consulting with Pakistan. However, when China did invade India the following year, Kennedy ignored this promise and provided critical aid to India, including arms, without consulting Ayub Khan, who was deeply disappointed.

The main course for dinner was poulet chasseur served with rice and accompanied by Moët and Chandon Imperial Brut champagne (at least for the Americans), followed by raspberries in cream for dessert. President Kennedy hosted a table at which sat Begum Aurangzeb, who wore a white silk sari. Khan enjoyed the beauty of a Virginia summer evening with America’s thirty-one-year-old First Lady; he sat next to Jackie, who wore a Oleg Cassini sleeveless white organza and lace evening gown sashed at the waist in Chartreuse silk. In his toast the Pakistani leader warned that “any country that faltered in Asia, even for only a year or two, would find itself subjugated to communism.” In turn Kennedy hailed Ayub Khan as the George Washington of Pakistan. After midnight the guests were driven back to Washington down the George Washington Parkway.

The CIA operation in Tibet had its detractors in the Kennedy White House, including Kennedy’s handpicked ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, who called it “a particularly insane enterprise” involving “dissident and deeply unhygienic tribesmen” that risked an unpredictable Chinese response. However, the operation did produce substantial critical intelligence on the Chinese communist regime from captured documents seized by the Tibetans at a time when Washington had virtually no idea what was going on inside Red China. The U-2 flights from Dacca were even more important to the CIA’s understanding of China’s nuclear weapon development at its Lop Nor nuclear test facility.

But Galbraith was in the end correct to be skeptical. The operation did have an unpredicted outcome: The CIA operation helped persuade Chinese leader Mao Zedong to invade India in October 1962, an invasion that led the United States and China to the brink of war and began a Sino-India rivalry that continues today. It also created a Pakistani-Chinese alliance that still continues. The contours of modern Asian grand politics thus were drawn in 1962.
The dinner at Mount Vernon was a spectacular social success for the Kennedys, although they received some predictable criticism from conservative newspapers over its cost. It was also a political success for both Kennedy and the CIA, keeping the Tibet operation alive. As an outstanding example of presidential leadership in managing and executing covert operations at the highest level of government, it is an auspicious place to begin an examination of JFK’s forgotten crisis.

From JFK’s FORGOTTEN CRISIS: TIBET, THE CIA, AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR, by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Institution Press, November 6, 2015.

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