TIBET NOT PART OF CHINA
TIBET NOT PART OF CHINA – ARUNACHAL PRADESH CHIEF MINISTER
Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu reveals the truth about Tibet’s military occupation. Red China’s military occupation of Tibet cannot wipe out reality of Tibetan nation.
Indian Defence News
Thursday, April 06, 2017
INDIA SHARES BOUNDARY WITH TIBET, NOT WITH CHINA: ARUNACHAL PRADESH CHIEF MINISTER
ARUNACHAL PRADESH Chief Minister Pema Khandu today said China has no business telling India what to do regarding the Dalai Lama’s movement in the country.
“China has no business telling us what to do and what not to do (regarding the Dalai Lama’s movement). It is not our next-door neighbor. India shares boundary with Tibet, not with China,” he told reporters here.
“In reality, the McMahon Line demarcated the boundary between India and Tibet,” he said.
Khandu, who accompanied the Dalai Lama during an eight-hour-long drive from Guwahati to Bomdila yesterday, said it was a brave decision on the part of the Tibetan spiritual leader to undertake the arduous trip.
“He wanted to reach Tawang anyhow and the weather could not deter him. Let us hope that his followers here get satisfaction from his discourses,” he said.
The Nobel laureate, he said, was the country’s most respected guest since 1959 and Arunachal Pradesh deserves his visit more than any other place.
This is the Dalai Lama’s sixth visit to Arunachal Pradesh as a state guest since 1983 and he has been to Tawang every time except in December 1996.
His last visit in 2009 was planned exactly 50 years after he had crossed through Arunachal Pradesh, then North East Frontier Agency, after escaping from Lhasa.
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE vs CHINA’S MILITARY MIGHT:
Special Frontier Force is a military organization founded by the United States, India, and Tibet to contain the military threat posed by Communist China’s military occupation of Tibet since 1950. Its military mission visualizes the eviction of the military occupier of Tibet through military action. In my opinion, China’s military power, military strategy and military tactics will not assure the inevitability of peace that is imposed by China by its occupation of Tibet. Peace and War are conditions that prevail in relationship with an external reality called Natural Order. Tibetan Resistance is the symptom of the absence of Natural Order. Tibetan Resistance will prevail and Resistance will endure if Natural Order is not restored in Tibet. It is true that China rules Tibet with an Iron Fist. Resistance will endure, and Resistance will prevail to break the knuckles of the military grip over Tibet. I am pleased to share this article written by Mr. Harsh V Pant, Department of Defence Studies, King College, London on the problem of China’s military spending.
By Harsh V Pant
Published: 13th February 2014 06:00 AM
The author is a reader in international relations, department of defence studies, King’s College, London.
It is being estimated that China’s defence budget will reach a whopping US $148 billion in 2014, second only to the defence budget of the USA and leaving behind the combined defence budgets of western nations such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
China’s defence budget has risen each year for two decades and the trend shows no sign of abating. Thanks to rapidly rising defence expenditures by China and Russia, global defence spending is rising for the first time in five years. Across Asia-Pacific, there is an arms race brewing as nations try to secure their interests at a time of geopolitical transition. The region is likely to account for nearly 28 per cent of global defence spending by 2020.
Last year China had hiked its defence budget by 10.7 per cent to USD 115.7 billion, well above India’s defence spending of USD 37.4 billion. While its civilian leadership has tried to downplay the increase suggesting much of it will go to human resources development, infrastructure and training, it is the response of the Chinese military that should be a matter of concern. The military has been unambiguous in suggesting when it comes to military spending, there is no need for China “to care about what others may think”.
Divisions within China about the future course of the nation’s foreign policy are starker than ever before. It is now being suggested that much like young Japanese officers in the 1930s, young Chinese military officers are increasingly taking charge of strategy with the result that rapid military growth is shaping the nation’s broader foreign policy objectives.
Civil-military relations in China are under stress with the PLA asserting its pride more forcefully than even before and demanding respect from other states. Not surprisingly, China has been more aggressive in asserting its interests not only vis-à-vis India but also vis-à-vis the US, the EU, Japan and Southeast Asian states. There is a sense that China can now prevail in conflicts with its regional adversaries. Some voices have openly called for wars.
The Air Force Colonel, Dai Xu, has argued that in light of China’s disputes with Japan in the East China Sea and Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, a short, decisive war, like the 1962 border clash with India, would deliver long-term peace. This would be possible, as Washington would not risk war with China over these territorial spats, according to this assessment.
The increasing assertion by the Chinese military and changing balance of power in the nation’s civil-military relations is a real cause of concern for China’s neighbours. The pace of Chinese military modernisation has already taken the world by surprise and it is clear that the process is going faster than many had anticipated. China launched its first aircraft carrier last year as well as several versions of new fighter jets including a stealth fighter bracing to deal with big US military push into Asia-Pacific.
A growing economic power, China is now concentrating on the accretion of military might so as to secure and enhance its own strategic interests. China, which has the largest standing army in the world with more than 2.3 million members, continues to make the most dramatic improvements in its nuclear force among the five nuclear powers, and improvements in conventional military capabilities are even more impressive.
What has been causing concern in Asia and beyond is the opacity that seems to surround China’s military build-up, with an emerging consensus that Beijing’s real military spending is at least double the announced figure. Tensions are escalating between China and its neighbours. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has suggested the two countries are “in a similar situation” to Germany and Britain just before the outbreak of World War One.
At this critical juncture in the regional strategic landscape, India’s own defence modernisation programme is faltering despite this being at a time when India is expected to spend $112 billion on capital defence acquisitions over the next five years in what is being described as “one of the largest procurement cycles in the world”. Indian military planners are shifting their focus away from Pakistan as China takes centre-stage in future strategic planning.
Over the past two decades, the military expenditure of India has been around 2.75 per cent but since India has been experiencing significantly higher rates of economic growth over the last decade compared to any other time in its history, the overall resources that it has been able to allocate to its defence needs has grown significantly. The armed forces for long have been asking for an allocation of 3% of the nation’s GDP to defence.
The Indian Parliament has also underlined the need to aim for the target of 3% of the GDP. Yet as a percentage of the GDP, the annual defence spending has declined to one of its lowest levels since 1962. And now with a slow-down in the Indian economy, the Indian prime minister has suggested that the golden age of defence modernisation is already over.
But defence expenditure alone will not solve all the problems plaguing Indian defence policy. More damagingly, for the last several years now the defence ministry has been unable to spend its budgetary allocation. The defence acquisition process remains mired in corruption and bureaucratese. India’s indigenous defence production industry has time and again made its inadequacy to meet the demands of the armed forces apparent. The Indian armed forces keep waiting for arms while the finance ministry is left with unspent budget year after year. Most large procurement programmes get delayed resulting in cost escalation and technological or strategic obsolescence of the budgeted items. The present defence minister has been one of the most ineffective leaders of India’s defence establishment.
The Indian government is yet to demonstrate the political will to tackle the defence policy paralysis that is rendering all the claims of India’s rise as a military power increasingly hollow. The capability differential between China and India is rising at an alarming rate. Without a radical overhaul of the national security apparatus, Indian defence planners will not be able to manage China’s rise.
An effective defence policy is not merely about deterring China. But if not tackled urgently, India will lose the confidence to conduct its foreign policy unhindered from external and internal security challenges.