Whole Dude – Whole Concept

On October 20, 2024, 62-Years after the 1962 War, ask China to share the truth

Kindly read the attached story titled “Remembering a War : The 1962 India-China War” and share your comments and views. The attached story is attributed to Neville Maxwell (1923 to 1974), a British journalist who worked for China’s Intelligence service. He published a book titled “India’s China War” and I call him a “Peddler” for he indulged in peddling information provided by China’s Intelligence Service. Neville Maxwell’s story is inspired by Communist China’s Intelligence Service and I am happy to give a public response to their Communist Propaganda that aims to promote fear psychosis among gullible Indian citizens and others. They must know that the people of the world are getting united to oppose China’s military occupation of Tibet.

I have the following problems with this story about “The 1962 India-China War.” You may also share it with others who have Service experience in India and Southeast Asia.

1. The author justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet during 1949-50.

2. The author claims that Communist China respects the McMahon Line. In reality China occupied Aksai Chin region prior to the 1962 War. China has no legal authority inside Tibet and China cannot tell India not to cross the McMahon Line. We have valid reasons to ignore and refuse China’s legitimacy inside Tibet.

3. The author uses slander and innuendo to discredit General Kaul and there is no substance or proof to verify any of those claims. General Kaul’s only fault is that; Kaul is a Kashmiri Brahmin. His promotion and creation of a new Army Corps Commander position are justified because of enemy’s hostility and threats.

4. The author blames Mr. N. B. Mullik, the Director of Intelligence Bureau for doing his job. Mr. Mullik did his best under the given circumstances. To gather intelligence, we need to have aggressive patrolling and we must cross the McMahon Line to verify enemy’s strength and intentions. I did the same thing during 1972 while I was posted in North East Frontier Agency. I went with foot patrol parties and had deliberately, and intentionally crossed the border to know and detect enemy activities. A person with basic Infantry training knows the purpose of a patrol. It is not a picnic. India has a natural right to gather intelligence about the activities of its enemy. The enemy has no jurisdictional rights or legal authority (other than the fact of its military occupation) in that area of Indian security operations.

5. The report gives no credit to Simla Agreement of 1914 and McMahon Treaty that established the legitimate boundary between Tibet and India. Manchu China had signed this Treaty apart from Tibet. Red China invaded and occupied Tibet during 1949-50 and changed the situation for India. Since China had occupied Tibet, there was no good reason for India to initiate bilateral talks with China about border demarcation as the issue was already decided by McMahon Treaty. The essay criticizes India’s effort to control its own legitimate territory. It says India had provoked an angry reaction from China as India wanted to send armed patrols to a few selected border posts. Why should not India send patrols to define its own territory? The story says that India was a bit aggressive. Look at the aggressiveness of China which had already occupied the whole of Tibet and crushed all Tibetan resistance to its military occupation.

6. India played a reasonable role to protect its interests and used its Army with the resources they had at that time. If we are facing a superior force, it does not mean that we should remain entirely passive on our side of border. The only mistake made by Indian Prime Minister Nehru was that of not getting help from the United States to fully confront the military threat posed by Communist China. The Indian Prime Minister was constrained by the US military support for Pakistan’s acts of military aggression.

We had a very good chance to kick the Chinese out of Tibet during 1949-50 and we missed a golden opportunity on account of Pakistan’s War of Aggression in Kashmir. I still believe that India must prepare for this military challenge and stand up to defend Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Unfortunately, we lost Aksai Chin to China without fighting them. After Chinese unilateral occupation of Aksai Chin, India must have joined United States to fight the threat posed by Communist China. We lost territory to China in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India must not relent on this border issue and our goal must be that of evicting the military occupier from Tibet.

7. This essay justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet and blames India for defending its borders in the face of China’s superior strength. It has no word to blame China and its Expansionism. The author may even suggest and say that India had offended Alexander the Great and hence he had to fight and conquer India.

8. The 1962 War is not a total loss. The Top Secret of the 1962 India-China War is the number of Chinese killed and wounded in this military invasion. If Communist China has any courage, I ask them to disclose the true numbers. I am glad for we could kill the Enemy on the battlefield.

9. While I served on the Himalayan frontier (1971-December,1974), I had always medically inspected each soldier and made assessment of each soldier’s physical and mental fitness. Each was physically, and mentally fully prepared to face the challenge and fight the Enemy. I have never sent a soldier to get a medical opinion from an Army Psychiatrist. The essay talks about the divisions among the Officer Corps. I have personally met several Officers who served during 1962. In 1971, India had won a great Military Victory in the conduct of Bangladesh Operations. Indian Army, the Officers and men are totally united and worked together with no differences of opinion and executed the operation on the Battlefield. I had no personal or direct contact with very senior Officers but I know all Officers of the rank of Brigadier and below within my Formation. Both during 1962 and during 1971, the men and the Officer Corps of Indian Army were fully united to oppose the enemy and were willing to fight the enemy.

10. All said and done, the 1962 War was a good lesson and we are better prepared and more willing to fight this War again.

Dr. R. Rudra Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S.,
Personal Number. MS-8466 Rank. Captain, AMC/SSC,
Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle (1971-72),
Personal Number. MR-03277K Rank. Major, AMC/DPC
Medical Officer, Headquarters Establishment No. 22 C/O 56 APO (1971-74),
Directorate General of Security,
Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force,
East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram,
New Delhi – 110 022 – India.

The story titled, “Remembering  A War: The 1962 India – China War” is another face of Communist China’s propaganda warfare. China has been selling this story to gullible Indians and claims that China is a victim of India’s attack on China. This entire piece does not mention the word TIBET and Communist China’s illegal occupation of Tibet and the uprising in Tibet and H.H. Dalai Lama’s getting asylum in India. Communist China had used a massive force of Peoples’ Liberation Army to attack India all across the Himalayan frontier. The political mistake made by Prime Minister Nehru was that of not seeking help from the United States to prevent this attack. United States was willing to check Communist China’s expansionist policy and we should have kicked China out of Tibet during 1949-50.

REMEMBERING A WAR: THE 1962 INDIA-CHINA WAR A STORY POSTED BY CHINA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND CONTRIBUTED BY NEVILLE MAXWELL:

After the 1962 war, the Indian Army commissioned Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat to study the debacle. As is wont in India, their report was never made public and lies buried in the government archives. But some experts have managed to piece together the contents of the report. One such person is Neville Maxwell, who has studied the 1962 war in depth and is the author of ‘India’s China War’. 

In the articles that follow, Indians will be shocked to discover that, when China crushed India in 1962, the fault lay at India, or more specifically, at Jawaharlal Nehru and his clique’s doorsteps. It was a hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation. This is a three part series of articles by Neville Maxwell:-
Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
Part 2 – How the East was Lost.
Part 3 – India’s Shameful Debacle.

Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War

When the Army’s report into its debacle in the border war was completed in 1963, the Indian government had good reason to keep it TOP SECRET and give only the vaguest, and largely misleading, indications of its contents. At that time the government’s effort, ultimately successful, to convince the political public that the Chinese, with a sudden ‘unprovoked aggression,’ had caught India unawares in a sort of Himalayan Pearl Harbour was in its early stages, and the Report’s cool and detailed analysis, if made public, would have shown that to be self-exculpatory mendacity.
But a series of studies, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, revealed to any serious enquirer the full story of how the Indian Army was ordered to challenge the Chinese military to a conflict it could only lose. So, by now, only bureaucratic inertia, combined with the natural fading of any public interest, can explain the continued non-publication – the Report includes no surprises and its publication would be of little significance but for the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a 1962 Chinese ‘aggression.’
It seems likely now that the Report will never be released. Furthermore, if one day a stable, confident and relaxed government in New Delhi should, miraculously, appear and decide to clear out the cupboard and publish it, the text would be largely incomprehensible, the context, well known to the authors and therefore not spelled out, being now forgotten. The Report would need an Introduction and gloss – a first draft of which this paper attempts to provide, drawing upon the writer’s research in India in the 1960s and material published later.
Two Preambles are required, one briefly recalling the cause and course of the border war; the second to describe the fault-line, which the border dispute turned into a schism, within the Army’s officer corps, which was a key factor in the disaster — and of which the Henderson Brooks Report can be seen as an expression.
Origins of the border conflict
India, at the time of Independence, can be said to have faced no external threats. True, it was born into a relationship of permanent belligerency with its weaker Siamese twin, Pakistan, left by the British inseparably conjoined to India by the chronically enflamed member of Kashmir, vital to both new national organisms; but that may be seen as essentially an internal dispute, an untreatable complication left by the crude, cruel surgery of Partition.
In 1947, China, wracked by civil war, was in what appeared to be death throes and no conceivable threat to anyone. That changed with astonishing speed, however, and, by 1950, when the new-born People’s Republic re-established in Tibet the central authority which had lapsed in 1911, the Indian government will have made its initial assessment of the possibility and potential of a threat from China, and found those to be minimal, if not non-existent.
First, there were geographic and topographical factors, the great mountain chains which lay between the two neighbours and appeared to make large-scale troop movements impractical (few could then see in the German V2 rocket the embryo of the ICBM). More important, the leadership of the Indian government – which is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru – had for years proclaimed that the unshakable friendship between India and China would be the key to both their futures, and therefore Asia’s, even the world’s.
The new leaders in Beijing were more chary, viewing India through their Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeois state. But, in the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and, through the 1950s, New Delhi’s defence planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only “thinkable” but inevitable.
From the first days of India’s Independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India’s inheritance. China’s other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing.
The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable – that Beijing would allow India to impose China’s borders unilaterally and annex territory at will – Nehru’s policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.
Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing ‘aggression’ by refusing to surrender to Indian claims.
From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On Oct 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India’s intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of ‘Chinese aggression’ had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: ‘If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked.’
On Oct 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along the borders, overwhelming the feeble – but, in this first instance, determined – resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the eastern sector. On Oct 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese withdrawal on the condition that India agrees to open negotiations: Nehru refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local counterattack on Nov 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total victory.
The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by Nov 20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted.
Naturally the Indian political public demanded to know what had brought about the shameful debacle suffered by their Army. On Dec 14, a new Army Cdr, Lt Gen JN Chaudhuri, instituted an Operations Review for that purpose, assigning the task of enquiry to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat.

Part II – How the East was Lost

All colonial armies are liable to suffer from the tugs of contradictory allegiance and, in the case of India’s, that fissure was opened in the Second World War by Japan’s recruitment from prisoners of war of the Indian National Army to fight against their former fellows. By the beginning of the 1950s, two factions were emerging in the officer corps:-

· One patriotic but above all professional and apolitical, and orthodox in adherence to the regimental traditions established in the century of the Raj;
· The other nationalist, ready to respond unquestioningly to the political requirements of their civilian masters and scorning their rivals as fuddy-duddies still aping the departed rulers, and suspected as being of doubtful loyalty to the new ones. The latter faction soon took on an eponymous identification from its leader, B M Kaul.
At the time of Independence, Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. Although Sandhurst-trained for infantry service, he had eased through the war without serving on any frontline and ended it in a humble and obscure post in public relations. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that Independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman.
Boosted by the prime minister’s steady favoritism, Kaul rocketed through the Army structure to emerge in 1961 at the very summit of the Army HQ. Not only did he hold the key appointment of Chief of General Staff but the Army Commander, Thapar, was, in effect, his client. Kaul had, of course, by then acquired a significant following, disparaged by the other side as ‘Kaul boys’ (‘call-girls’ had just entered usage), and his appointment as CGS opened a putsch in HQ, an eviction of the old guard, with his rivals, until then his superiors, being not only pushed out but often hounded thereafter with charges of disloyalty.
The struggle between those factions both fed on and fed into the strains placed on the Army by the government’s contradictory and hypocritical policies – on the one hand, proclaiming China an eternal friend against whom it was unnecessary to arm; on the other, exerting armed force to seize territory it knew China regarded as its own.
Through the early 1950s, Nehru’s covertly expansionist policy had been implemented by armed border police under the Intelligence Bureau, whose director, NB Mullik, was another favourite and confidant of the prime minister. The Army high command, knowing its forces to be too weak to risk conflict with China, would have nothing to do with it. Indeed when the potential for Sino-Indian conflict inherent in Mullik’s aggressive forward patrolling was demonstrated in the serious clash at the Kongka Pass in Oct 1959, Army HQ and the MEA united to denounce him as a provocateur and insisted that control over all activities on the border be assumed by the Army, which thus could insulate China from Mullik’s jabs.
The takeover by Kaul and his ‘boys’ at Army HQ in 1961 reversed that. Now, regular infantry would take over from Mullik’s border police in implementing what was formally designated a ‘forward policy,’ one conceived to extrude the Chinese presence from all territory claimed by India. Field commanders receiving orders to move troops forward into territory the Chinese both held and regarded as their own warned that they had no resources or reserves to meet the forceful reaction they knew must be the ultimate outcome: they were told to keep quiet and obey orders.
That may suggest that those driving the forward policy saw it in kamikaze terms and were reconciled to its ending in gunfire and blood – but the opposite was true. They were totally and unshakably convinced that it would end not with a bang but a whimper – from Beijing. The psychological bedrock upon which the forward policy rested was the belief that, in the last resort, the Chinese military, snuffling from a bloody nose, would pack up and quit the territory India claimed.
The source of that faith was Mullik, who from beginning to end proclaimed as oracular truth that, whatever the Indians did, there need be no fear of a violent Chinese reaction. The record shows no one squarely challenging that mantra at higher levels than the field commanders who throughout knew it to be dangerous nonsense: there were civilian ‘Kaul boys’ in the ministries of external affairs and defence too and they basked happily in Mullik’s fantasy. Perhaps the explanation for the credulousness lay in Nehru’s dependent relationship with his Intelligence Bureau chief: since the prime minister placed such faith in Mullik, it would be at the least lese majeste, and even heresy, to deny him a kind of papal infallibility.
If it be taken that Mullik was not just deluded, what other explanation could there be for the unwavering consistency with which he urged his country forward on a course which, in rational perception, could lead only to war with a greatly superior military power and, therefore, defeat? Another question arises: who, in those years, would most have welcomed the great falling-out which saw India shift in a few years from strong international support for the People’s Republic of China to enmity and armed conflict with it? From founding and leading the Non-Aligned Movement to tacit enlistment in the hostile encirclement of China which was Washington’s aim? Mullik maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi, Harry Rossitsky. Answers may lie in the agency’s archives.
China’s stunning and humiliating victory brought about an immediate reversal of fortune between the Army factions. Out went Kaul, out went Thapar, out went many of their adherents – but by no means all. Gen Chaudhuri, appointed to replace Thapar as Army chief, chose not to launch a counter-putsch. He and his colleagues of the restored old guard knew full well what had caused the debacle: political interference in promotions and appointments by the prime minister and Krishna Menon, defence minister, followed by clownish ineptitude in the Army HQ as ‘Kaul boys’ scurried to force the troops to carry out the mad tactics and strategy laid down by the government.
It was clear that the trail back from the broken remnants of the 4th Division limping onto the plains in the north-east, up through intermediate commands to the Army HQ in New Delhi and then, on to the source of political direction, would have ended at the prime minister’s door – a destination which, understandably, Chaudhuri had no desire to reach. (Mullik was anyway to tarnish him with the charge that he was plotting to overthrow the discredited civil order, but, in fact, Chaudhuri was a dedicated constitutionalist – ironically, Kaul was the only one of the generals who harbored Caesarist ambitions.)

The Investigation

While the outraged humiliation of the political class left Chaudhuri with no choice but to order an inquiry into the Army’s collapse, it was up to him to decide its range and focus, indeed its temper. The choice of Lt Gen Henderson Brooks to run an Operations Review (rather than a broader and more searching board of inquiry) was indicative of a wish not to make the already bubbling stew of recriminations boil over.
Henderson Brooks (until then in command of a corps facing Pakistan) was a steady, competent but not outstanding officer, whose appointments and personality had kept him entirely outside the broils stirred up by Kaul’s rise and fall. That could be said too of the officer Chaudhuri appointed to assist Henderson Brooks, Brig PS Bhagat (holder of a WW II Victoria Cross and commandant of the military academy). But the latter complemented his senior by being a no-nonsense, fighting soldier, widely respected in the Army, and the taut, unforgiving analysis in the Report bespeaks the asperity of his approach.
There is further evidence that Chaudhuri did not wish the inquiry to dig too deep, range too widely, or excoriate those it faulted. The following were the terms of reference he set:-
· Training;
· Equipment;
· System of command;
· Physical fitness of troops;
· Capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command.
The first four of those smacked of an inquiry into the sinking of the Titanic briefed to concentrate on the management of the shipyard where it was built and the health of the deck crew; only the last term has any immediacy, and there the wording was distinctly odd – commanders do not usually ‘influence’ those they command, they issue orders and expect instant obedience.
But Henderson Brooks and Bhagat (henceforth HB/B) in effect ignored the constraints of their terms of reference and kicked against other limits Chaudhuri had laid upon their investigation, especially his ruling that the functioning of Army HQ during the crisis lay outside their purview. ‘It would have been convenient and logical’, they note, ‘to trace the events [beginning with] Army HQ, and then move down to the Commands for more details… ending up with field formations for the battle itself’. Forbidden that approach, they would, nevertheless, try to discern what had happened at Army HQ from documents found at lower levels, although those could not throw any light on one crucial aspect of the story – the political directions given to the Army by the civil authorities.
As HB/B began their inquiry, they immediately discovered that the short rein kept upon them by the Army chief was by no means the least of their handicaps. They found themselves facing determined obstruction in Army HQ, where one of the leading lights of the Kaul faction had survived in the key post of director of military operations – Brigadier DK Palit.
Kaul had exerted his power of patronage to have Palit made DMO although others senior to him were listed for the post, and Palit, as he was himself to admit, was ‘one of the least qualified among [his] contemporaries for this crucial General Staff appointment.’ Palit had thereafter acted as enforcer for Kaul and the civilian protagonists of the ‘forward policy,’ Mullik foremost among the latter, issuing the orders and deflecting or over-ruling the protests of field commanders who reported up their strategic imbecility or operational impossibility.
Why Chaudhuri left Palit in this post is puzzling: the Henderson Brooks Report was to make quite clear what a prominent and destructive role he had played throughout the Army high command’s politicization, and, through inappropriate meddling in command decisions, even in bringing about the debacle in the north-east. Palit, though, would immediately have recognized that the HB/B inquiry posed a grave threat to his career and so did that entire he could to undermine and obstruct it.
After consultation with Mullik, Palit took it upon himself to rule that HB/B should not have access to any documents emanating from the civil side – in other words, he blindfolded the inquiry, so far as he could, as to the nexus between the civil and military. As Palit smugly recounts his story, in an autobiography published in 1991, he personally faced down both Henderson Brooks and Bhagat, rode out their formal complaints about his obstructionism, and prevented them from prying into the ‘high level policies and decisions’ which he maintained were none of their business.
In fact, however, the last word lies with HB/B – or will do if their report is ever published. In spite of Palit’s efforts, they discovered a great deal that the Kaul camp and the government would have preferred to keep hidden; and their report shows that Palit’s self-admiring and mock-modest autobiography grossly misrepresents the role he played.
The Henderson Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexes, covers nearly 200 typed foolscap pages), detailed and, as far as the restrictions placed upon its authors allowed, far-ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some salient points, to give the flavor of the whole (a full account of the subject they covered is in the writer’s 1970 study, India’s China War).

Part III – India’s Shameful Debacle

The Forward Policy

This was born and named at a meeting chaired by Nehru on Nov 2, 1961, but it had been alive and kicking in the womb for years before that – indeed its conception dated back to 1954, when Nehru issued an instruction for posts to be set up all along India’s claim lines, ‘especially in such places as might be disputed.’ What happened at this 1961 meeting was that the freeze on provocative forward patrolling, instituted at the Army’s insistence after Mullik had engineered the Kongka Pass clash, was ended – with the Army, now under the courtier leadership of Thapar and Kaul, eagerly assuming the task which Mullik’s armed border police had carried out until the Army stopped them.
HB/B note that no minutes of this meeting had been obtained, but were able to quote Mullik as saying that ‘the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.’ That opinion contradicted the conclusion Army Intelligence had reached 12 months before: that the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them.
HB/B then trace a contradictory duet between the Army HQ and the Western Army Command, with HQ ordering the establishment of ‘penny-packet’ forward posts in Ladakh, specifying their location and strength, and the Western Command protesting that it lacked the forces to carry out the allotted task, still less to face the grimly foreseeable consequences. Kaul and Palit ‘time and again ordered, in furtherance of the “forward policy,” the establishment of individual posts, overruling protests made by the Western Command’. By Aug 1962 about 60 posts had been set up, most manned with less than a dozen soldiers, all under close threat by overwhelmingly superior Chinese forces. The Western Command submitted another request for heavy reinforcements, accompanying it with this admonition:
‘[I]t is imperative that political direction is based on military means. If the two are not correlated, there is a danger of creating a situation where we may lose both in the material and moral sense much more than we already have. Thus, there is no short cut to military preparedness to enable us to pursue effectively our present policy…’
That warning was ignored, reinforcements were denied, orders were affirmed and, although the Chinese were making every effort, diplomatic, political and military, to prove their determination to resist by force, again it was asserted that no forceful reaction by the Chinese was to be expected. HB/B quote Field Marshall Roberts: ‘The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable’ But, in this instance, troops were being put in dire jeopardy in pursuit of a strategy based upon an assumption – that the Chinese would not resist with force – which the strategy would itself inevitably prove wrong. HB/B notes that from the beginning of 1961, when the Kaulist putsch reshaped Army HQ, crucial professional military practice was abandoned:
This lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the CGS [Kaul], his deputy, the DMO [Palit] and other Staff Directors is inexcusable. From this stemmed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces. These appointments in General Staff are key appointments and officers were handpicked by Gen Kaul to fill them. There was therefore no question of clash of personalities. General Staff appointments are stepping stones to high command, and correspondingly carry heavy responsibility. When, however, these appointments are looked upon as adjuncts to a successful career and the responsibility is not taken seriously, the results, as is only too clear, are disastrous. This should never be allowed to be repeated and the Staff as of old must be made to bear the consequences of their lapses and mistakes. Comparatively, the mistakes and lapses of the Staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of battle are more heinous than the errors made by the commanders in the field of battle.

War and Debacle

While the main thrust of the Forward Policy was exerted in the western sector of the border, it was also applied in the east from Dec 1961. There the Army was ordered to set up new posts along the McMahon Line (which China treated – and treats – as the de facto boundary), and, in some sectors, beyond it. One of these trans-Line posts, named Dhola Post, was invested by a superior Chinese force on Sep 8, 1962, the Chinese thus reacting there exactly as they had been doing for a year in the western sector. In this instance, however, and although Dhola Post was known to be north of the McMahon Line, the Indian government reacted aggressively, deciding that the Chinese force threatening Dhola must be attacked forthwith, and thrown back.
Now, again, the duet of contradiction began, the Army HQ and, in this case, Eastern Command (headed by Lt Gen L P Sen) united against the commands below: 33 Corps (Lt Gen Umrao Singh), 4 Div (Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad) and 7 Bde (Brig John Dalvi). The latter three stood together in reporting that the ‘attack and evict’ order was militarily impossible to execute.
The point of confrontation, below Thagla ridge at the western extremity of the McMahon Line, presented immense logistical difficulties to the Indian side and none to the Chinese, so whatever concentration of troops could painfully be mustered by the Indians could instantly be outnumbered and outweighed in weaponry. Tactically, again the irreversible advantage lay with the Chinese, who held well-supplied, fortified positions on a commanding ridge feature.
The demand for military action and the victory it was expected to bring was political, generated at top level meetings in Delhi. ‘The Defence Minister [Krishna Menon] categorically stated that in view of the top secret nature of conferences no minutes would be kept [and] this practice was followed at all the conferences that were held by the Defence Minister in connection with these operations’. HB/B commented: ‘This is a surprising decision and one which could and did lead to grave consequences. It absolved in the ultimate analysis anyone of the responsibility for any major decision. Thus it could and did lead to decisions being taken without careful and considered thought on the consequences of those decisions.’
Army HQ by no means restricted itself to the big picture. In mid-Sep it issued an order to troops beneath Thagla ridge to:-
(a) Capture a Chinese post 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post.
(b) Contain the Chinese concentration S of Thagla.

HB/B comment: ‘The General Staff, sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post is astounding. The country was not known, the enemy situation vague, and for all that there may have been a ravine in between [the troops and their objective], but yet the order was given. This order could go down in the annals of History as being as incredible as the order for “the Charge of the Light Brigade.”

Worse was to follow

Underlying all the meetings in Delhi was still the conviction or by now, perhaps, prayer, that even when frontally attacked the Chinese would put up no serious resistance, still less react aggressively elsewhere. Thus it came to be believed that the problem lay in weakness, even cowardice, at lower levels of command. Gen Umrao Singh (33 Corps) was seen as the hub of the problem, since he was backing his div and brigade commanders in their insistence that the eviction operation was impossible.
‘It was obvious that Lt Gen Umrao Singh would not be hustled into an operation, without proper planning and logistical support. The Defence Ministry and, for that matter, the General Staff and Eastern Command were prepared for a gamble on the basis of the Chinese not reacting to any great extent.’ So the political leadership and Army HQ decided that if Umrao Singh could be replaced by a commander with fire in his belly all would come right, and victory be assured.
Such a commander was available – Gen Kaul. A straight switch, with Kaul relinquishing the CGS post to replace Umrao Singh, would have raised too many questions, so it was decided instead that Umrao Singh would simply be moved aside, retaining his corps command but no longer being concerned with the situation on the border. That would become the responsibility of a new formation, 4 Corps, whose sole task would be to attack and drive the Chinese off Thagla ridge. Gen Kaul would command the new corps.
HB/B noted how even the most secret of government’s decisions were swiftly reported in the press, and called for a thorough probe into the sources of the leaks.
Many years later Palit, in his autobiography, described the transmission procedure. Palit had hurried to see Kaul on learning of the latter’s appointment to command the notional new Corps: ‘I found him in the little bedsitter den where he usually worked when at home. I was startled to see, sitting beside him on the divan, Prem Bhatia, editor of The Times of India, looking like the proverbial cat who has just swallowed a large yellow songbird. He got up as I arrived, wished [Kaul] good luck and left, still with a greatly pleased smirk on his face.’
Bhatia’s scoop led his paper next morning. The ‘spin’ therein was the suggestion that whereas, in the western sector, Indian troops faced extreme logistical problems, in the east that situation was reversed and, therefore, with the dashing Kaul in command of a fresh ‘task force,’ victory was imminent. The truth was exactly the contrary, those in NEFA faced even worse difficulties than their fellows in the west, and victory was a chimera.
Those difficulties were compounded by persistent interference from the Army HQ. On orders from Delhi, ‘troops of [the entire 7 Bde] were dispersed to outposts that were militarily unsound and logistically unsupportable.’ Once Kaul took over as Corps Commander, the troops were driven forward to their fate in what HB/B called ‘wanton disregard of the elementary principles of war.’
Even in the dry, numbered paragraphs of their report, HB/B’s account of the moves that preceded the final Chinese assault is dramatic and riveting, with the scene of action shifting from the banks of the Namka Chu, the fierce little river beneath the menacing loom of Thagla ridge along which the under-clad Indian troops shivered and waited to be overwhelmed, to Nehru’s house in Delhi – whither Kaul rushed back to report when a rash foray he had ordered was crushed by a fierce Chinese reaction on Oct 10. To follow those events, and on into the greater drama of the ensuing debacle is tempting but would add only greater detail to the account already published.
Given the nature of the dramatic events they were investigating, it is not surprising that HB/B’s cast of characters consisted in the main of fools and/or knaves on the one hand, their victims on the other. But they singled out a few heroes too, especially the jawans, who fought whenever their commanders gave them the necessary leadership, and suffered miserably from the latter’s often gross incompetence. As for the debacle itself, ‘Efforts of a few officers, particularly those of Capt NN Rawat’ to organize a fighting retreat, ‘could not replace a disintegrated command;’ nor could the cool-headed Brig Gurbax Singh do more than keep his 48 Brigade in action as a cohesive combat unit until it was liquidated by the joint efforts of higher command and the Chinese.
HB/B place the immediate cause of the collapse of resistance in NEFA in the panicky, fumbling and contradictory orders issued from Corps HQ in Tezpur by a ‘triumvirate’ of officers they judge to be grossly culpable: Gen Sen, Gen Kaul, and Brig Palit. Those were, however, only the immediate agents of disaster: its responsible planners and architects were another triumvirate, comprised of Nehru, Mullik and again, Kaul, together with all those who accompanied them into the fantasy that a much stronger neighbor could be confronted and overcome through guile and puny force.

The Great Lesson Learned from the 1962 India-China War:

I shared my view in my blog post titled “Tibet’s Independence is India’s Security.” Kindly view the same at this page:

http://Bhavanajagat.com/2010/10/25/Tibets-Independence-is-Indias-Security/