One Belt One Road – Neocolonialism
CHINA’S TIBET POLICY – RECIPE FOR NATURAL DISASTER
Red China’s Tibet Policy is driven by Expansionist Doctrine proclaimed by Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong in 1949. China’s Neocolonialism includes Territorial Expansionism, Military Expansionism, Economic Expansionism, Political Expansionism, and Cultural Expansionism. Red China accomplishes her Mission using tools of Oppression, Repression, and Suppression to subjugate people in all occupied territories.
In my analysis, China’s Tibet Policy in Tibet and Xinjiang is Recipe for Natural Disaster. Nature designed its own plan for this geographical region and for thousands of years, the denizens of this region lived in harmony with Nature’s Plan. I claim, “Beijing Doomed,” for in my expectation, Nature has Plan for Change of Regime in Beijing.
CHINA’S ‘TIBET RECIPE’ IN XINJIANG SHOULD PUT INDIA ON ALERT
The stability of the Muslim region is vital for Beijing and its gigantic BRI project.
At the end of August 2016, Wu Yingjie takes over as party secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) from Chen Quanguo who is sent to “pacify” the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party has taken this crucial decision during the annual closed-door meeting in the summer resort of Beidaihe.
Chen replaces Zhang Chunxian as XUAR party secretary. It is indeed a promotion for Chen, given the fact that Xinjiang’s party secretaries often serve in the politburo.
His selection is linked to the “Tibet Recipe”, the way Chen managed to “pacify” the TAR. Once in Urumqi, Chen immediately started applying the formula that he used in Tibet to Xinjiang. But what is this recipe?
First, Chen transformed the Roof of the World into a vast Disneyland. In 2006, the arrival of the train on the plateau changed everything for Beijing and unfortunately for the Tibetans. Wave after wave of Chinese tourists could be poured into Tibet to experience the “Paradise on Earth” with its blue sky, pristine lakes and rivers, its luxuriant forests and deep canyons (the latter in Southern Tibet).
In 2016, 25 million tourists, mainly from the Mainland, are said to have visited the Land of Snows. For this, infrastructure needed to be developed, airports opened, four-way highways constructed, hotels and entertainment parks built; this was done in Tibet on a war-footing.
Wave after wave of Chinese tourists poured into Tibet.
In passing, the Tibetan intangible heritage had to be preserved, often with Chinese characteristics. The same formula has now to be replicated in Xinjiang.
Second, in order to “stabilize” the plateau, Chen imposed restrictions on the local population like never before. Similar policies will be used in Xinjiang. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an organization based in the US, just released a “glossary” of special slogans or “formulations” (tifa) used by the Chinese officials and the media when referring to party policies on the plateau.
HRW explains: “China’s authorities place extraordinary emphasis on the importance of ‘propaganda’ in sustaining their rule. This phenomenon is particularly evident in Tibet, where there has been a long history of human rights violations, extreme hostility towards political rights, and heavy restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information.”
“Poetic” tifas such as Social Management, Comprehensive Rectification, Preventive Control, Eliminate-Unseen-Threats, Nets-in-the-Sky-Traps-on-the-Ground or Copper-Ramparts-Iron Walls, are recurrently used. The latter one for example, translates into “an impenetrable public security defense network consisting of citizen patrols, border security posts, police check posts, surveillance systems, internet controls, identity card monitoring, travel restrictions, informant networks, and other mechanisms.”
The implementation of these tifas, which originated during Chen’s tenure in Tibet, is often dreadful… but efficient for Beijing.
Chen has taken these tifas with him to Xinjiang and started making good use of them. The “stability” of the Western province is vital for China, as it is the geographical hub for the Belt and Road Initiative: it will connect the New Silk Road (Central Asia) to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Chen now plans to bring millions of tourists to Xinjiang in order to “dilute” the Uyghur characteristics. In a “White Paper on Xinjiang” recently published by Beijing, the Communist Party hides its failure by saying: “Legitimate rights of religious organizations have been effectively safeguarded. Xinjiang has published translations of the religious classics of Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity in multiple languages,” adding 1.76 million copies of the Quran have been printed and distributed.
But on the ground the situation is different. To take just one example, Beijing has decided to collect DNA samples from all Xinjiang’s residents. This week, Xinhua reported China’s decision to dispatch 10,000 teachers to the restive XUAR and TAR “to support local education could help solve the educational problems.”
Beijing says that the main problem is the lack of eligible bilingual teachers in the regions, but will the teachers from the mainland teach the Turkish language of the Uyghurs or Mandarin? Not difficult to guess. Language, in Tibet or Xinjiang, is an instrument of assimilation.
Chen is also working hard to improve the infrastructure. Last week, Xinhua announced the construction of 10 new airports to be built in Xinjiang by 2020; further, six older airports will be renovated and expanded. It has implications for India. One of these airports will be built in Yutian (also known as Keriya), a county of Hotan Prefecture not far from the disputed Aksai Chin.
Located south of the Taklamakan desert and north of the Kunlun range, Keriya has always been a major stopover on the ancient Silk Road. In view of the proximity of the Indian border, it makes sense for China to have a new “civil” airport at Keriya, considering that there is no such thing as a “civil” airport in China, especially so close to the Indian border.
Keriya airport is designed to annually handle 1,80,000 passengers and 400 tons of cargo; it will have a 3,200-meter runway, a 3,000-square-meter terminal building and cost 104 million US dollars, says Xinhua. There is no doubt that Chen has been mandated to apply the “Tibet Recipe” in Xinjiang. Will he succeed is another question.
It is however certain that the stability of the Muslim region is vital for the Middle Kingdom and its gigantic BRI “linking” project; India needs to watch and be prepared.
(Courtesy: Mail Today)
THE FUTURE OF RED CHINA’S EXPANSIONISM – BEIJING DOOMED
People’s Republic of China in 1949 embraced Communism as State Doctrine and lost no time to announce ambitious plan of Territorial, Maritime, Economic, and Political Expansionism. While others painfully reflect upon ‘The Future of the Tibetan Resistance Movement’, I express optimism by announcing Beijing’s Doom, sudden downfall, as consequence of her own evil actions. This predestined Disaster, Catastrophe, Cataclysm, Calamity, Apocalypse, Doom will bring Regime Change and The Evil Red Empire cannot ward it off by paying ransom.
TIBETAN PROTEST MOVEMENT – THE NEWS LENS INTERNATIONAL EDITION
Friday, May 26, 2017
PODCAST: Tibet, Protest and China; The Future of the Tibetan Protest Movement
Photo Credit: Reuters
These small acts have reverberations and impact way beyond what we can see through the media and numbers. – Tenzin Dorjee.
Earlier this month, Radio Free Asia reported that a Tibetan monk, Jamyang Losal, had died after setting himself on fire in China’s northwestern Qinghai province. Losal was the 150th Tibetan to self-immolate since 2009 when Tibetan monks started taking their own lives in protest of China’s rule. But it seems these desperate protests are having little impact on China as it continues to crack down on any signs of dissent in Tibet.
In this episode of The News Lens Radio, we are bringing you the views of three Tibetan leaders to discuss the efforts to keep the protest movement alive both inside and outside Tibet. They say not only is the Chinese government continuing to rule Tibet with an iron fist, it is also increasingly working beyond its own borders to shut down the movements calling for Tibetan autonomy or independence from China.
About today’s guests
Tenzing Jigme is the president of the Tibetan Youth Congress, an international organization with about 30,000 members advocating for Tibetan independence.
Pema Yoko is the interim executive director of the New York-headquartered Students for a Free Tibet.
Tenzin (Tendor) Dorjee is a U.S.-based author and program director with the Tibet Action Institute. He is also the former executive director of Students for a Free Tibet.
This podcast is available via SoundCloud, Stitcher and iTunes apps.
Editor: Olivia Yang
Cold Shoulder: Why Beijing Snubbed Singapore at the Belt and Road Summit
Angela Han is a Research Associate in the Polling Program. She holds a Masters in European and International Studies from the University of Trento and a Graduate Diploma in Transnational Governance from Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna. She has also spent six months abroad learning Mandarin at the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. Prior to undertaking her Masters, Angela spent two years as a researcher of labor and economic policies in her home country of Singapore.
Beijing did not invite Singapore’s Prime Minister to attend the Belt and Road event in Beijing this week, signifying strain in Sino-Singapore relations.
Among the 29 Heads of State who converged on Beijing for the Belt and Road Summit earlier this week were leaders of seven of the ten ASEAN states. One leader was noticeably missing: Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.
Various observers have noted this absence, including Hugh White, who suggested it was no co-incidence that, like others – Japan, India, Australia and “most western countries” – who had not sent their national leaders to Beijing, Singapore was aligned with the U.S. and uneasy about China’s rise – “or perceived to be so.”
However, it has since emerged that Singapore was never given the choice. China had not invited Singapore’s prime minister in the first place.
This is surprising, especially as Singapore has been one of the biggest advocates of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While many other states were initially hesitant in signing up to BRI, including some of its ASEAN neighbors, Singapore’s support has been unequivocal from the beginning. Many high-level cooperation talks between China and Singapore on the subject have taken place, with both sides warmly welcoming cooperation on BRI.
In light of this past co-operation, Beijing’s snub is significant. It is fair to conclude that, if China continues to freeze out Singapore, there could be significant implications on at least three levels.
What it might mean for Sino-Singapore relations
First, this marks a low point in Sino-Singapore relations. Since its independence 50 years ago, managing the U.S.-China dichotomy has been a key tenet of Singapore’s foreign policy. Despite close defense partnerships with the U.S., China has referred to Singapore as an “important partner and a special friend of China.” This long-standing relationship has been fostered not only by historical and cultural linkages, but also the deep bond that existed between former leaders, Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping. When Lee Kuan Yew died in 2015 there were video tributes on Chinese state media, and he was described as “an old friend of the Chinese people” by President Xi Jinping.
Of late, however, the bilateral relationship has been less than smooth, particularly since remarks made by the Singaporean prime minister at a White House state dinner in August last year. At that event, Lee Hsien Loong praised the U.S. rebalance and endorsed the arbitral tribunal ruling on the South China Sea. In a separate incident, a Chinese tabloid accused Singapore of bringing up the tribunal ruling at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which led to a very public spat between the Global Times editor and Singapore’s Ambassador to China.
Singapore is not a claimant state but the fear that China might extend its reach in the South China Sea is nevertheless acute for the tiny island-state. Given its trade volumes are 3.5 times its GDP, any instability in the region would affect Singapore’s trade routes, and therefore its economy. When Singapore advocates for a rules-based order, it is not just values that it seeks to defend but its economic lifeblood.
Singapore’s stance on the South China Sea did not please China. In November nine of Singapore’s armored troop carriers were impounded in Hong Kong on their way back from Taiwan. At the time, many saw Beijing’s heavy hand at work behind the scenes and believed the incident reflected China’s displeasure with Singapore’s joint military exercises with Taiwan, even though these dates back decades.
In their usual quiet diplomatic style, Singapore diplomats worked hard behind the scenes to eventually secure the vehicles’ return after two months. This was then quickly followed up by a high-level bilateral cooperation forum, postponed the previous year due to strained ties. Yet, China still raises the South China Sea matter at bilateral forums.
Implications for other middle powers
China’s snub is yet another example of the narrowing diplomatic space that small states like Singapore have in which to maneuver. Relying on its hard-nosed pragmatism has, for half a decade, served Singapore well. But with most of its ASEAN neighbors increasingly willing to set aside the South China Sea disputes in return for a massive influx of Chinese investment, it is increasingly difficult for Singapore to both protect its national interest and maintain an independent foreign policy of not picking sides.
This has implications for other countries like Australia, which occupy a very similar position in the world. Like Singapore, Australia has strong historical, security and defense ties to the United States, while China is now far and away from its biggest trading partner. Perhaps one lesson from this incident is that it is becoming harder to compartmentalize politics and economics.
Implications for China’s role in the world
Finally, what does the incident say about the Belt and Road Initiative and more broadly, China’s role as architect of global initiatives? Although the BRI is as much about geoeconomics as geopolitics, it is undeniable that just on the basis of scale, access to and participation in Chinese initiatives have a tendency to draw lines in the sand; clearly distinguishing between who is a friend of China, and who is not.
The snub demonstrates Beijing now has another diplomatic tool in its arsenal. Such “sanctions with Chinese characteristics” are proving to be increasingly effective at asserting dominance and deterring actions counter to China’s interest. It is clear that China’s already considerable diplomatic and economic clout is increasing and its reach is becoming more pervasive. This too makes it more difficult for states that seek to steer a middle course.
This article originally appeared in the Lowy Interpreter. The News Lens has been authorized to republish this article.
TNL Editor: Edward White
NEWS WORTH KNOWING, VOICES WORTH SHARING
Copyright © 2016 The News Lens
Inserted from <https://international.thenewslens.com/article/69284>
THE EVIL RED EMPIRE – THE ROAD TO CONQUEST AND SUBJUGATION
Red China, often recognized as ‘The Evil Red Empire’ is reshaping the world as per its doctrine of Neocolonialism. In the historical past, Colonial Powers of Europe conquered countries using military power to establish Colonies with intent to dominate Land, People and their economic resources. Red China’s Neocolonialism involves use of Economic Power to gain acceptance of other countries to its plan of Expansionism. Red China achieved this military and economic power after her successful military conquest of Tibet in 1950s. Red China’s ‘One Belt-One Road’ (OBOR) simply reflects the reality of Military Conquest and Political Subjugation of Tibet.
XI’S $500 BILLION PUSH TO RESHAPE THE WORLD IN CHINA’S IMAGE
China is one of the few countries in the world today with money to spend, and Xi Jinping is ready to write some checks.
China’s president will host some 28 world leaders in Beijing on Sunday at the first Belt and Road Forum, the centerpiece of a soft-power push backed by hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure projects. More than 100 countries on five continents have signed up, showing the demand for global economic cooperation despite rising protectionism in the U.S. and Europe.
For Xi, the initiative is designed to solidify his image as one of the world’s leading advocates of globalization while U.S. President Donald Trump cuts overseas funds in the name of “America First.” The summit aims to ease concerns about China’s rise and boost Xi’s profile at home, where he’s become the most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping died in 1997.
The Belt and Road Initiative “will likely be Xi’s most lasting legacy,” said Trey McArver, the London-based director of China research for TS Lombard, an investment research company. “It has the potential to remake global — particularly Asian — trade and economic patterns.”
The strategy also carries risks. The initiative is so far little more than a marketing slogan that encompasses all sorts of projects that China had initiated overseas for years, and major world leaders like Trump, Angela Merkel and Shinzo Abe are staying away. How Xi answers a range of outstanding questions will go a long way in determining its success.
Key to reducing uncertainty will be addressing the concerns of strategic rivals like India, Russia and the U.S., particularly as China’s growing military prowess lets it be more assertive over disputed territory. Chinese moves to spend more than $50 billion on an economic corridor in Pakistan, build a port in Djibouti and construct oil pipelines in central Asia are all creating infrastructure that could be used to challenge traditional powers.
“China needs to recognize that the way it perceives the Belt and Road Initiative is not necessarily the same way others will,” said Paul Haenle, a former China director on the U.S. National Security Council who now heads the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing. For countries like the U.S., he said, “it’s impossible not to view the BRI through a geopolitical lens — a Chinese effort to build a sphere of influence.”
© Bloomberg News Chinese president Xi Jinping
In September 2013, when Xi first pitched the plan at an obscure Kazakhstan university, he focused on the Eurasia landmass. Since then, it has repeatedly changed names and expanded to include the entire world, with the main goal of rebuilding the ancient trading routes from China to Europe overland and by sea.
One key driver was economic: China wants to spur growth in underdeveloped hinterlands and find more markets for excess industrial capacity. With more than $3 trillion in international reserves — more than a quarter of the world’s total — China has more resources than developed economies struggling to hit budget targets.
The plan gained steam last year when populist movements spurred a backlash against trade and immigration in the U.S. and Europe. Brexit raised questions about the European Union’s viability, while Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership gutted the biggest U.S. push to shape global economic rules.
“It was very disappointing, and it makes us feel that there is a big vacuum that Belt and Road can help to fill,” Cheah Cheng Hye, chairman and co-chief investment officer at the Hong Kong-based Value Partners Group. “So all of sudden, we begin to appreciate this Chinese initiative.”
Xi wasted no time filling the void. With exporting nations looking for a free-trade champion, he told the global elite in Davos, Switzerland, to resist protectionism and join China in boosting global commerce.
The U.S. and Europe “almost unwittingly” created space for Xi to push China’s interests, according to Peter Cai, research fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
“China is offering an alternative to the U.S. version of globalization,” Cai said. “In the Chinese case, it’s globalization paved by concrete: railways, highways, pipelines, ports.”
Related gallery: 33 giant Chinese infrastructure projects that are reshaping the world (provided by Business Insider)
33 giant Chinese infrastructure projects that are reshaping the world
This year, five European countries — Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, France and Italy — openly voiced support for the initiative. On trips to China in February, Italian President Sergio Mattarella proposed plans for the ports of Genoa and Trieste, while French Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve attended the arrival ceremony of a freight train from Lyon.
The summit will feature the likes of Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Greece’s Alexis Tsipras and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte. The U.S. and most Western countries are expected to send lower-level representatives.
A draft communique circulated before the event combined a commitment to open markets with endorsements of China’s diplomatic goals, Bloomberg reported Wednesday, citing people familiar with the document. It also generated some controversy among Beijing-based diplomats who said they didn’t have enough time to vet the document, underscoring the initiative’s potential to cause conflict.
China has invested more than $50 billion in Belt and Road countries since 2013, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. Credit Suisse Group AG said this month that China could pour more than $500 billion into 62 countries over five years.
China’s state-run companies like China National Petroleum Corp. and China Mobile Ltd. — the world’s largest wireless carrier — are positioned to reap the rewards. Executives from six of China’s largest state-run firms sought to reassure the public this week that the risks were manageable.
China’s three development banks, its Silk Road Fund and China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank were involved in $143 billion of lending outside of the country last year, up more than 140 percent from 2014, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Read More: Chinese Largesse Lures Countries to Its Belt and Road Initiative
Still, financial hurdles are starting to appear. China’s slowing economic growth has left fewer resources to spend overseas. Its international reserves have fallen about 6 percent over the past year, and China needs a healthy amount to defend the yuan.
Some previous Chinese ventures abroad have turned sour. While China’s no-strings-attached approach to investment is generally welcomed by developing countries, they often have poor credit ratings and questionable governance. China has struggled to recoup loans in Venezuela and Africa, and several projects in Central Asia have spurred protests. Announcements with big dollar signs often fail to materialize.
Nonetheless, Chinese scholars see the sum of Xi’s plan as bigger than any individual project. It represents a “profound change” in how China interacts with the world, according to Wang Yiwei, director of at Renmin University’s Institute of International Affairs in Beijing, who has written three books on the initiative.
“China has moved from a participant of globalization to a main leader,” he said. “It’s Globalization 2.0.”
To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Ting Shi in Hong Kong at firstname.lastname@example.org, Miao Han in Beijing at email@example.com. To contact the editors responsible for this story: Daniel Ten Kate at firstname.lastname@example.org, Brendan Scott