Spirituality- Gautama Buddha
DOOMSAYER – BEIJING IS DOOMED – TIANJIN EXPLOSION
At Special Frontier Force, I have identified myself as ‘Doomsayer of Doom Dooma’ and I predicted tragic fate, ruin, destiny of Red China when I claimed ‘Beijing is Doomed’. However, I express my sense of great sorrow for the sudden, unexpected, enormous explosion at a warehouse in Tianjin on August 13, 2015. This is a calamity that brings deep trouble, great misery, and great loss. This disaster is extremely unfortunate for it caused great damage resulting in loss of human lives, and property bringing deep distress to people involved in this happening. This extreme misfortune generates great feelings of compassion, the same feelings that I use to uplift deep sorrow experienced by Tibetans living under brutal oppression.
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA
|The Spirits of Special Frontier ForceAt Special Frontier Force, I host ‘The Living Tibetan Spirits’ to promote Tibet Awareness.|
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SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE – INDIA – CHINA RELATIONS:
I am pleased to share the article titled “TIBET IS THE REAL SOURCE OF SINO-INDIAN FRICTION” by Brahma Chellaney that was published by Nikkei Asian Review in its edition dated September 26, 2014. I speak on behalf of Special Frontier Force and The Living Tibetan Spirits. I often describe about my “Kasturi-Sarvepalli-Mylapore-India-Tibet-US” Connection and I openly promote friendly relations between India and Tibet and support the condition called ‘Natural Freedom’ in the Land of Tibet. The military invasion and occupation of Tibet is not consistent with the principles of Panch Sheela Agreement that India signed during 1954. At that time, both Tibet, and India desired friendly relations with China and had used diplomacy to influence China to relax its military grip over Tibet. Tibetans for centuries enjoyed a natural sense of Freedom in spite of foreign invasions by Mongols and later Manchu China. It may be noted that His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama was not arrested after China’s successful military attack in 1950. He had continued to occupy Patola Palace in Lhasa and had visited New Delhi along with China’s Prime Minister Chou En-Lai and during May 1956 during 2500th Buddha Jayanti (Gautama Buddha’s Birth Anniversary) Celebration.
Both India, and Tibet had good reasons to entertain an optimistic view about Tibet’s status and had anticipated that China would relent and allow Tibetans to enjoy their natural Freedom and their traditional way of life which is guided by the political philosophy called ‘Isolationism’. The Great 13th Dalai Lama had declared Tibet’s full independence on February 13, 1913 after the fall of Manchu China’s regime during 1911. However, Tibet did not establish formal diplomatic relations with other countries and remained aloof from the events shaping world history.
I am only seeking transparency and full public accountability while nations pursue their foreign policies to promote their own national interests. People’s Republic of China has to make a choice and it can choose to establish friendly relations with Tibet and India and maintain its trade and commerce relations with the United States and the rest of the world.
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA
September 26, 2014 7:00 pm JST
Brahma Chellaney: Tibet is the real source of Sino-Indian friction
The sprawling, mountainous country of Tibet was annexed by China in the 1950s, eliminating a historical buffer with India. Today, the region remains at the heart of Sino-Indian problems, including territorial disputes, border tensions and water feuds. Beijing lays claim to adjacent Indian territories on the basis of alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links, rather than an ethnic Chinese connection.
So when Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled in mid-September to India — home to Tibet’s government in exile — Tibet loomed large. The Tibetan plateau, and the military tensions the issue provokes, will also figure prominently in the Sept. 29-30 summit at the White House between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Barack Obama, who has urged Beijing to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama, the exiled religious leader revered as a god-king by Tibetans.
Xi’s visit to New Delhi began with the visitor toasting Modi’s birthday. But, underlining the deep divide regarding Tibet, the visit was overshadowed by a Chinese military incursion across the traditional Indo-Tibetan border. It was as if the incursion — the biggest in terms of troop numbers in many years and the trigger for a military standoff in the Ladakh region — was Xi’s birthday gift for Modi.
An Indian policeman restrains a Tibetan youth during a protest in New Delhi on Sept. 19. The rally against China’s control of Tibet was held outside the Taj Palace Hotel, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping was staying. © AP
An Indian policeman restrains a Tibetan youth during a protest in New Delhi on Sept. 19. The rally against China’s control of Tibet was held outside the Taj Palace Hotel, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping was staying. © AP
Modi’s government, for its part, allowed Tibetan exiles to stage street protests during the two days that Xi was in New Delhi, including some close to the summit venue. This reversed a pattern that had held since the early 1990s, in which police routinely prevented such protests during the visits of Chinese leaders. During the decade-long reign of Modi’s predecessor, Manmohan Singh, police would impose a lockdown on the Indian capital’s Tibetan quarter and beat up Tibetans who attempted to rally.
Such brutal practices would have befitted a repressive autocracy like China, but not a country that takes pride in being the world’s largest democracy. In any event, the muzzling of protests won India no gratitude from an increasingly assertive China.
It was a welcome change that India permitted members of its large Tibetan community to exercise their legitimate democratic rights. Even the Dalai Lama felt at liberty to speak up during Xi’s visit, reminding Indians: “Tibet’s problem is also India’s problem.” The Tibetan protests, although peaceful, rattled China, which had grown accustomed to Indian authorities doing its bidding.
When Modi took office in May, the prime minister of Tibet’s government in exile, Lobsang Sangay, was invited to the swearing-in event. So Xi sought an assurance that the Modi government regards Tibet as part of China. Modi has yet to speak his mind on this issue in public, but the Chinese foreign ministry, apparently citing private discussions, announced: “Prime Minister Modi said that Tibet is a part of China, and India does not allow any separatist activities on its soil.”
Tibet — the world’s highest and largest plateau — separated the Chinese and Indian civilizations until relatively recently, limiting their interaction to sporadic cultural and religious contact, with no political relations. It was only after China forcibly occupied Tibet that Chinese military units appeared for the first time on the Himalayan frontiers.
The fall of Tibet represented the most profound and far-reaching geopolitical development in India’s modern history. It led to China’s bloody trans-Himalayan invasion in 1962 and its current claims to vast tracts of additional Indian land.
Yet Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 surrendered India’s extraterritorial rights in Tibet — inherited from Britain at independence — and accepted the existence of the “Tibet region of China” with no quid pro quo,not even Beijing’s acknowledgement of the then-prevailing Indo-Tibetan border. He did this by signing a pact mockingly named after the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Panchsheela, or the five principles of peaceful coexistence. As agreed in the pact, India withdrew its “military escorts” from Tibet and conceded to China, at a “reasonable” price, the postal, telegraph and public telephone services operated by the Indian government in the region.
Years later, another Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, went further. During Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 2003, China wrung from India the concession it always wanted — an unambiguous recognition of Tibet as part of China. Vajpayee went so far as to use the legal term “recognize” in a document signed by the two nations’ heads of government, confirming that what China calls the Tibet Autonomous Region was “part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”
This opened the way for China to claim the large northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — three times the size of Taiwan. Please read on..
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE AND CHINA – TIBET BORDER DISPUTE:
The fact that India does not trust People’s Republic of China is clearly established when India had joined a multinational defense plan or pact between the United States, Tibet, and India during November 1962. It is surprising to note that people who write about the Sino-Indian border conflict make no reference to the history of Tibet. To state very briefly, the Great Fifth Dalai Lama founded the Ganden Phodrang Government of Tibet in 1642. The successive Dalai Lamas have headed the Tibetan State for nearly four centuries. From 1279 to 1368 Tibet was under the nominal control of the YUAN or Mongol dynasty of China, but subsequently regained its independence. In 1644, the Manchu or QING dynasty was established in China and Tibet came under its nominal protection although for the most part the country retained control over its internal affairs. With the downfall of the QING or Ching dynasty, the Great 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet’s Independence on 13th February, 1913. For 39 years, from 1911 to 1950, Tibet was an independent nation. In Political Science, when states are called free and independent, their autonomy or sovereignty means that they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may have the right to do. In its capacity as an independent nation, Tibet signed a treaty called the McMahon Treaty( following the Simla Agreement) which established the border between India and Tibet. The Republic of India after gaining its full independence during 1947 had not annulled or revoked this treaty. As such, for all legal purposes, this treaty is valid. People’s Republic of China came into its existence after the Communists took over mainland China during 1949 and had forced the Nationalist Party(Kuomintang) establish the Republic of China in Formosa or Taiwan. Both the Nationalists, and the Communists seek the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. That issue is not yet decided. Meantime, Communist China had invaded Tibet during 1950 and had occupied it. In 1951, a defeated Tibet signed a treaty making Tibet a part of China. However, most Tibetans do not recognize this treaty and do not accept its legitimacy. In 1959, after a failed, massive Tibetan uprising, the 14th Dalai Lama and about 100, 000 of his followers escaped to India. Tibetans have established the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and on September 02, 1960, the first members of the First Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile took their oath of office. In September, 2012, Tibetans have celebrated 52nd Democracy Day. During 1965, People’s Republic of China had formed a province that it named as Tibetan Autonomous Region or “TAR.” In doing so, Communist China had annexed several parts of Tibet and had added them to its own territory. Tibetans have not agreed for this seizure of their territory. One of the central demands of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile is that of unifying all the Tibetan territory that is now under Chinese military occupation.
We have to very important issues; 1. Unification of Republic of China with People’s Republic of China and establish a national entity called China, and 2. demarcating the border between the new “ONE-CHINA” and its neighbor, Tibet. Tibetans have not surrendered their claims for independence, freedom, and self-determination. As such, Tibet is not a part of China and the borders of China’s province called “TAR” do not establish the legitimate borders between Tibet and China. As far as the issue of Tibet and India border is concerned, today Tibetan soldiers along with Indian Army are deployed along the Himalayan frontier and they are willing to defend the frontier as best possible and would lay down their lives to resist Communist China’s expansion. China is free to play its pranks and gimmicks, but, in reality, we exercise the control on ground and we have established a Line of Control. The so-called lucrative trade and commerce between India and China will stop if China crosses this Line in another foolish excursion to display its superior power. Such an attack would definitely draw the United States into this battle to support its partners of the military alliance/pact.
Rudra N Rebbapragada
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA
Dr. R. Rudra Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S.,
Ex-Personal Number:MS-8466. Rank:Lieutenant/Captain.
Branch:Army Medical Corps/Short Service Regular Commission(1969-1972).Designation:Medical Officer.Unit:South Column,Operation Eagle(1971-72),
Ex-Personal Number:MR-03277K. Rank:Captain/Major.
Branch:Army Medical Corps/Direct Permanent Commission(1973-1984).
Unit:Headquarters Establishment Number. 22 C/O 56 APO(1971-74),
Organization: Special Frontier Force.
India forgets that China cannot be trusted
December 5, 2012:
National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s optimism over reaching a border pact with China is hard to understand.
One cannot but be surprised by the statement of the National Security Advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon brushing aside the serious implications of Chinese actions, while voicing optimism that “we are in the
process of agreeing on a framework to settle the boundary”.
Have we forgotten that after agreeing to delineate the Line of Actual Control, the Chinese backed off
on the entire process?
In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao agreed that “in reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall
safeguard due interests of their settled populations in border areas”.
This clearly signalled that there was no question of transferring territories containing settled populations
and addressed Indian concerns on Chinese claims to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. Within a year, however, China was laying claim not merely to Tawang, but the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
One can only conclude that the new “framework” the NSA spoke of to settle the boundary issue would
be about as successful as the much-touted “Joint anti-Terror Mechanism” with Pakistan, which came
apart with the 26/11 attacks.
Just a day before the NSA spoke, Army Chief General Bikram Singh described bilateral relations
with China as “absolutely perfect” and added that mechanisms were now in place to solve any issues
between the two countries. This was an astonishing comment, at a time when the army wants additional
strike formations, apart from vastly improved communications on the border with China.
Was it because Singh feels the army is unlikely to get its needs fulfilled soon, and needs to sound
conciliatory to the Chinese? Do the other two Service Chiefs and the Defence Minister share this
optimism? All these issues need to be debated now that Parliament is in session.
China can now be described as a “dynastic dictatorship,” after its 18th Party Congress.
Outgoing leader Hu Jintao voiced concern at the growing dissatisfaction in China over political corruption.
The Party Congress had been preceded by the downfall of its rising star Bo Xilai, whose lavish and
flamboyant lifestyle had led to the conviction of his wife for murdering a British businessman and
revelations of the billions of dollars of assets that Bo and his family had acquired.
This was followed by a a well documented leak, quite evidently by Bo’s supporters, about
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and his family.
China’s worst kept secrets about dynastic politics in the Communist Party became public when
it emerged that four of the seven members of its highest decision-making body, the Standing Committee
of the Politburo, were “Princelings,” or descendants of first generation, Mao-era political leaders.
Most “Princelings”, including Party Chief Xi Jinping, lead lavish life styles, with families having
extensive business interests. The contradictions between having an open economy linked to foreign
markets on the one hand and a one-party, authoritarian political structure perceived to be
unresponsive to pubic grievances on the other, are coming to the forefront in China.
China will continue to seek new ways to further open up its economy and maintain a high growth rate.
But the “Princelings” are unlikely to bring any changes in the basic authoritarian nature of the State
apparatus. Tutored by Deng Xiao Ping, who was determined not to follow the glasnost and perestroika
path of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the new dispensation will be averse to increasing democratisation.
With jingoistic propaganda, evidently to divert public opinion away from domestic issues like high level corruption, China is obviously in no mood to show any flexibility on its territorial claims along the Sino-Indian border. As Chinese passports are generally valid for ten years, there can logically be no change in China’s territorial claims in this period.
China will continue on its path of rapid military modernisation, combined with an assertive line
on its maritime and land boundary claims.
China’s recent decision to depict the entire South China Sea, together with Arunachal Pradesh and
parts of Ladakh as Chinese territory in maps on Chinese passports, has to be seen in the light of this
growing Chinese readiness to use force and military coercion to enforce its territorial claims. One has
recently witnessed aggressive Chinese postures resulting in a virtual naval takeover around the
disputed Scarborough Shoal, claimed by the Philippines.
A similar aggressive approach has been taken on recent tensions with Japan, with Chinese naval vessels entering territorial waters, adjacent to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
China has evidently been emboldened by the American assertion that while the US does have a stand on freedom and maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea, it “does not take sides in (maritime) disputes”.
New Delhi is now talking of getting superfast trains and rail equipment from China, at a time when there is growing concern at our over dependence on second rate Chinese power equipment.
There are also concerns about dangers to cyber security and communications infrastructure posed by
imports from China. Should we not insist on co-production, together with transfer or technology, in such strategic sectors, with preference for cooperation with friendly countries like Japan, France and Germany?
(The author is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
Dear Mr GP, Many thanks for this caution. Will the ears listen to and the eyes see the ground realities instead of indulging in this ‘all is well’ kind of assumption and self assurance? . The present atmosphere is somewhat similar to the one that prevailed in early 1960s when our leaders wrongly assumed that China would never attack India. Reference is invited to the recent interview granted by Dai Bingguo Chinese Negotiator to PTI (covered by this publication) covering China – Pakistan relationships and China’s territorial claims. We need to exercise extra caution, think and act carefully. I held the view earlier that China will think twice before attacking India once again. But am forced to rethink. Camradely with China can wait. Recent bonhomie in the form of financial assistance, collaboration in power and infrastructure may not be entirely and mutually beneficial. One may need to read the fine print very carefully! Thanks for this opportunity to interact.
Posted on: Dec 5, 2012 at 23:08 IST
- Special Frontier Force-operation Eagle-gallantry Award (bhavanajagat.com)
SPIRITUALISM – THE LIVING TIBETAN SPIRITS: THE SPIRITS OF SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE( ESTABLISHMENT NO. 22) – OPERATION EAGLE – LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH 1971:
TIBETAN BUDDHISM AND THE LIVING TIBETAN SPIRITS OF SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE :
At the beginning, I would like to submit to all of my readers that this conversation is not about the principles of Tibetan Buddhism. I ask my readers to know that I am not speaking about Tibetan’s traditional belief in reincarnation. In Tibetan Buddhism, a “TULKU” is a particularly high-ranking Lama who can choose the manner of his( or her) rebirth or reincarnation. I have no personal affiliation with any high-ranking Lama including the Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness The Dalai Lama. I do not seek to represent him in any manner. I am sharing my personal experience, my association, and my contact with non-clergy members among Tibetan exiles, the laity, the peasants, and other ordinary folks of Tibetan origin. The Tibetan Spirits that I know are not supernatural beings and they do not claim to possess any kind of supernatural powers. I am exclusively speaking on behalf of ‘The Living Tibetan Spirits’ that inhabit my ‘Consciousness’ and we are not affiliated with any political organization or governmental Agency. I would like to carefully define each term that I may use in this conversation to avoid confusion and misrepresentation of facts or information that pertains to Tibetan Identity and Tibetan Culture. It must be clearly noted that traditional Tibetan Buddhism supports the concept of “ANATMA” and proclaims the non-existence of human soul. Having studied, Human Anatomy, and Human Physiology, I would like to share my understanding about human soul and spirit. I would not be surprised if a majority of Tibetan Buddhist clergy reject my views about human soul and spirit.
WHAT IS SPIRIT? WHAT IS THE LIVING SPIRIT? :
I use the term ‘soul’ to refer to the animating, or vital, Life Principle in living things. The term ‘spirit’ is often used to refer to the intelligent, or immaterial part of man as distinguished from the human body, and mind. It may be said that the ‘spirit’ is the immaterial reality that is imperceptible to the organs of sense perception. I describe consciousness as the fundamental characteristic of living things and I describe consciousness as a spiritual function; a function that requires the operation of soul, and spirit. I claim that consciousness is the absolute nature of living things or living objects. Consciousness is the natural principle by which a living thing knows and experiences its external and internal environment. Being conscious means recognizing the existence, the fact of something. Consciousness is the biological characteristic which is the evidence of a living thing knowing the fact of its own existence; it knows as to where it exists and knows as to how it is existing. A dead, or non-living thing has no consciousness and the dead object has no awareness of the world in which it may be found. I cannot describe a soul and spirit as entities that may exist independently of living matter. Hence, I would like to suggest that soul, and spirit are known because of their association with a living person. I do not believe in a disembodied spirit. I am intentionally using the term, ‘The Living Spirits’ as I do not believe in the existence of ‘Dead Spirits’. Spiritism is a belief that natural, living objects have indwelling spirits. When used as an adjective, the term ‘spiritual’ means, relating to or concerned with the spirit or soul. This term is often used to describe human relationships. The term ‘spiritual’ in the context of human relationships describes the nature of a relationship, a partnership, an association, a connection, or bonding between two or more living people based upon thoughts, or feelings of sympathy, and understanding.
THE STORY ABOUT THE LIVING TIBETAN SPIRITS OF SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE :
I was granted Short Service Regular Commission to serve in the Indian Army Medical Corps during 1969 and had joined the Service on July 26, 1970 in the rank of Lieutenant. On completion of basic military training at Lucknow and professional training at Military Hospital, Ambala, I was posted to Headquarters Establishment Number. 22, C/O 56 APO which belonged to an organization called Special Frontier Force. This organization is primarily concerned about defending the legitimate border between India and Tibet as established by the McMahon Treaty and the Simla Agreement of 1914 and its purpose is that of ending the military occupation of Tibet by People’s Republic of China. This organization was conceived by the 35th U.S. President, John Fitzgerald Kennedy during 1962. President Kennedy had pursued the U.S. Foreign Policy that was initiated by the 33rd U.S. President, Harry S Truman(1949-1952). President Truman founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or ‘NATO’ on 04 April, 1949. NATO is a multinational defense plan to defend Europe in response to tensions with Soviet Union(USSR). The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was formulated to protect Greece and Turkey from Communist domination. The 34th U.S. President, Dwight David Eisenhower(1953-1961), and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles continued Truman administration’s policy of containing Communism. Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 was designed to protect the Middle East from Communist aggression. At that time, the U.S. administration and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) started playing an increasing role to defend Tibetan interests and provided training and equipment to Tibetan freedom fighters to resist the military occupation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army of Communist China. During October 1962, after a massive, and brutal attack on India’s Himalayan Frontier, India recognized the military threat posed by Communist China. India needed urgent foreign assistance as it had faced critical shortages in its Defence preparedness. Despite its military weakness, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who had embraced the policy of political neutralism, demanded that military assistance would be accepted on a secret basis while India officially continued its adherence to its Non-Alignment Policy. Similarly, Tibetan Exile Leader, His Holiness The 14th Dalai Lama continued Tibet’s policy of political isolationism, and had agreed to participate in a military alliance or pact with the United States and India to respond to the military threat and military occupation of Tibet by Communist China without publicly disclosing the military agreement and cooperation between these three nations. The Cold War era of secret diplomacy made it easy to give birth to a secretive military organization called Special Frontier Force. The Government of India, and Tibetan Government-in-Exile have administered the oaths of secrecy to all of their participating members of Special Frontier Force. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided the necessary military instructors to train the personnel in the use of U.S. military equipment and stores. The U.S. Congress made the budgetary provision to provide the funds to this organization which primarily uses U.S. military equipment. However, the Officers and the men who serve in this military establishment are not mercenaries who may join battle to provide some benefit to a foreign government or Agency. The men and the Unit are motivated to perform their duties to defend their rights and their own territory. United States participates in the operational activities of Special Frontier Force to collect intelligence about Communist China’s military preparedness. This organization participated in a difficult military operation called Operation Eagle and had initiated the Liberation of Bangladesh in the Chittagong Hill Tracts during 1971. I had witnessed the loss of the lives of some young Tibetan soldiers during this battle. Since I had a spiritual relationship with the men of my Unit, I was not a simple witness to the fact of their death. Without any recognizable sense perception, my consciousness has given home to the Tibetan Spirits. At that time, I had no particular mental awareness of this fact. We had returned to India during January 1972 on completion of our Bangladesh operations. We had returned with a sense of pride for our successful execution of the military campaign. I had served in Special Frontier Force until December 1974 and had lost contact with the men of my Unit. The events of 1971-72 got buried in my memory. In January 1984, I left India with my family to begin our lives away from the country of our origin. In practical terms, I began my life as an exile and I had no direct contact with my Indian relatives or Tibetan exiles who continue to live in India.
THE JOY OF EMPTINESS – THE DISCOVERY OF THE LIVING TIBETAN SPIRITS :
I had arrived in Ann Arbor, Michigan with my family during July 1986 and started leading a life of voluntary simplicity. I had maintained very minimal indirect contacts with my relatives who live in India. Apart from the fact of physical separation, there is mental separation from all the events and experiences that had shaped my life in India before I left the country. While I live in Ann Arbor, Michigan, it came as a big surprise to me when His Holiness The Dalai Lama visited Ann Arbor to speak at a function organized by The University of Michigan. He had explained the concept of finding “JOY” in Emptiness or the emptying of the mind in which the mind has been emptied of all particular objects and images. Emptiness is created by casting aside the attachment to everyday things and worries. While I practiced the emptying of my mind, I have recognized that I cannot remove the desire for Freedom in the Land of Tibet. On careful introspection, I have discovered that this desire is attached to The Living Tibetan Spirits who inhabit my consciousness. I have no personal attachment to the Land of Tibet. I have no personal attachment to the Tibetan Identity. I have no personal attachment to Tibetan Culture. I have no personal attachment to Tibetan Buddhism. I believe in God as the Creator of man, this world, and the universe. But, I find myself attached to this desire that seeks Freedom in the Land of Tibet. I can remove all my desires and break my attachment to impermanent things or thoughts. This desire for Tibetan Freedom is not a thought that I have imagined in my mind. This concern for Tibetan Freedom is the evidence for the existence of The Living Tibetan Spirits in my consciousness. There are two aspects of consciousness that are registered by a living individual; 1. Consciousness is a state of knowing or awareness of what goes on around an individual, and 2. Consciousness is a state of knowing or awareness of what goes on within the individual. In my Consciousness, there is the existence of Freedom in Tibet. In the world that I am conscious and aware of today, there is no Freedom in Tibet. So, I have decided to fight the sense of fear and darkness that has enveloped my mind and tell the people around that I demand Freedom in Tibet. I want to give a sense of “JOY” to The Living Tibetan Spirits. I want to share these photo images that have captured the moments of pride and victory in War. These photo images were illegally obtained by the Enemy. This Enemy Agent who took these photo images had killed himself for his act of betrayal; for he had worked for the Enemy. However, The Living Tibetan Spirits recognize a moment of glory in their sacrifice. They were not alive on June 03, 1972 and could not personally witness the event shown in these photo images. The Living Tibetan Spirits can easily identify all the objects shown in these images and are pleased by viewing these images. The Enemy had unintentionally served a purpose while he engaged in acts of espionage. I am not surprised and we as an organization have always accepted the challenge and are willing to meet the Enemy on the battlefield.
THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN TIBET :
In conclusion, I suggest that without effort and struggle, there can be no real upward movement in our lives, or in the lives of people, or in the history of a Nation. The people of Tibet need to struggle to realize the hope of regaining their natural Freedom. The darkness of military occupation has enveloped the Land of Tibet. When the oppressor intends to be unjust, he would use any excuse and he will always find a pretext for his tyranny. It is useless for the innocent to try reasoning to get justice from a tyrant. Let us all join and work together to Fight the Battle of Right against Might.
I would like to invite all of my readers to visit my Facebook Page dedicated to ‘The Spirits of Special Frontier Force. I would request all of you to show your support to the Spirit of Tibetan Independence by clicking on I “LIKE” this Page box:
Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.
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REMEMBERING A WAR: THE 1962 INDIA – CHINA WAR – THE WAR’S TOP SECRET:
Kindly read the attached story titled “Remembering a War : The 1962 India-China War” and share your comments and views. The attached story is attributed to Neville Maxwell(1923 to 1974), a British journalist who had worked for China’s Intelligence service. He had published a book titled “India’s China War” and I call him a “PEDDLER” for he indulged in peddling information provided by China’s Intelligence Service. This story is inspired by Communist China’s Intelligence Service and I am happy to give a public response to their Communist Propaganda that aims to promote fear psychosis among gullible Indian citizens and others. They must know that the people of the world are getting united to oppose China’s military occupation of Tibet.
I have the following problems with this story about “The 1962 India-China War.” You may also share it with others who have Service experience in India and Southeast Asia.
1. The author justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet during 1949-50.
2. The author claims that Communist China respects the McMahon Line. In reality China had occupied Aksai Chin region prior to the 1962 War. China has no legal authority inside Tibet and China cannot tell India not to cross the McMahon Line. We have valid reasons to ignore and refuse China’s legitimacy inside Tibet.
3. The author uses slander and innuendo to discredit General Kaul and there is no substance or proof to verify any of those claims. General Kaul’s only fault is that; Kaul is a Kashmiri Brahmin. His promotion and creation of a new Army Corps Commander position are justified because of enemy’s hostility and threats.
4. The author blames Mr. N. B. Mullik, the Director of Intelligence Bureau for doing his job. Mr. Mullik did his best under the given circumstances. To gather intelligence, we need to have aggressive patrolling and we must cross the McMahon Line to verify enemy’s strength and intentions. I did the same thing during 1972 while I was posted in North East Frontier Agency. I went with foot patrol parties and had deliberately, and intentionally crossed the border to know and detect enemy activities. A person with basic Infantry training knows the purpose of a patrol. It is not a picnic. India has a natural right to gather intelligence about the activities of its enemy. The enemy has no jurisdictional rights or legal authority( other than the fact of its military occupation) in that area of Indian security operations.
5. The report gives no credit to Simla Agreement of 1914 and McMahon Treaty that established the legitimate boundary between Tibet and India. Manchu China had signed this Treaty apart from Tibet. China invaded and occupied Tibet during 1949-50 and changed the situation for India. If China had occupied Tibet, there was no good reason for India to initiate bilateral talks with China about border demarcation as the issue was already decided by McMahon Treaty. The essay criticizes India’s effort to control its own legitimate territory. It says India had provoked an angry reaction from China as India wanted to send armed patrols to a few selected border posts. Why should not India send patrols to define its own territory? The story says that India was a bit aggressive. Look at the aggressiveness of China which had already occupied the whole of Tibet and crushed all Tibetan resistance to its military occupation.
6. India had played a reasonable role to protect its interests and had used its Army with the resources they had at that time. If we are facing a superior force, it does not mean that we should remain entirely passive on our side of border. The only mistake made by Indian Prime Minister Nehru was that of not getting help from the United States to fully confront the military threat posed by Communist China. We had a very good chance to kick the Chinese out of Tibet during 1949-50 and we had missed a golden opportunity. I still believe that India must prepare for this military challenge and stand up to defend Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Unfortunately, we lost Aksai Chin to China without fighting them. After Chinese unilateral occupation of Aksai Chin, India must have joined United States to fight the threat posed by Communist China. We lost territory to China in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India must not relent on this border issue and our goal must be that of evicting the military occupier from Tibet.
7. This essay justifies Communist China’s military invasion of Tibet and blames India for defending its borders in the face of China’s superior strength. It has no word to blame China and its Expansionism. The author may even suggest and say that India had offended Alexander the Great and hence he had to fight and conquer India.
8. The 1962 War is not a total loss. The Top Secret of the 1962 India-China War is the number of Chinese killed and wounded in this military invasion. If Communist China has any courage, I would ask them to disclose the true numbers. I am glad for we could kill the Enemy on the battlefield.
9. While I had served on the Himalayan frontier(1971-December,1974), I had always medically inspected each soldier and made assessment of each soldier’s physical and mental fitness. Each was physically, and mentally fully prepared to face the challenge and fight the Enemy. I have never sent a soldier to get a medical opinion from an Army Psychiatrist. The essay talks about the divisions among the Officer Corps. I have personally met several Officers who had served during 1962. In 1971, India had won a great Military Victory in the conduct of Bangladesh Operations. Indian Army, the Officers and men are totally united and worked together with no differences of opinion and executed the operation on the Battlefield. I had no personal or direct contact with very senior Officers but I know all Officers of the rank of Brigadier and below within my Formation. Both during 1962 and during 1971, the men and the Officer Corps of Indian Army were fully united to oppose the enemy and were willing to fight the enemy.
10. All said and done, the 1962 War was a good lesson and we are better prepared and more willing to fight this War again.
Rudra N Rebbapragada
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162, USA
Dr. R. Rudra Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S.,
Ex Number. MS-8466 Rank Lieutenant/Captain AMC/SSC,
Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle(1971-72),
Ex Number. MR-03277K Rank Captain/Major AMC/DPC
Medical Officer, Headquarters Establishment No. 22 C/O 56 APO(1971-74),
Directorate General of Security,
Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force,
East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram,
New Delhi – 110 022 – India.
THE GREAT LESSON LEARNED FROM THE 1962 INDIA – CHINA WAR :
I have shared my view in my blog post titled “TIBET’S INDEPENDENCE IS INDIA’S SECURITY.” Kindly view the same at this page:
COMMUNIST CHINA’S PROPAGANDA :
This story titled, “Remembering A War: The 1962 India – China War” that is reproduced below is another face of Communist China’s propaganda warfare. China has been selling this story to gullible Indians and claims that China is a victim of India’s attack on China. This entire piece does not mention the word TIBET and Communist China’s illegal occupation of Tibet and the uprising in Tibet and H.H. Dalai Lama’s getting asylum in India. Communist China had used a massive force of Peoples’ Liberation Army to attack India all across the Himalayan frontier. The political mistake made by Prime Minister Nehru was that of not seeking help from the United States to prevent this attack. United States was willing to check Communist China’s expansionist policy and we should have kicked China out of Tibet during 1949-50.
Kindly share this view with your other friends who have military service experience. It will be abundantly clear that the attached story is a pack of lies.
After the 1962 war, the Indian Army commissioned Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat to study the debacle. As is wont in India, their report was never made public and lies buried in the government archives. But some experts have managed to piece together the contents of the report. One such person is Neville Maxwell, who has studied the 1962 war in depth and is the author of ‘India’s China War’.
In the articles that follow, Indians will be shocked to discover that, when China crushed India in 1962, the fault lay at India, or more specifically, at Jawaharlal Nehru and his clique’s doorsteps. It was a hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi, and paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation. This is a three part series of articles by Neville Maxwell:-
Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
Part 2 – How the East was Lost.
Part 3 – India’s Shameful Debacle.
Part I – The Genesis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War
When the Army’s report into its debacle in the border war was completed in 1963, the Indian government had good reason to keep it TOP SECRET and give only the vaguest, and largely misleading, indications of its contents. At that time the government’s effort, ultimately successful, to convince the political public that the Chinese, with a sudden ‘unprovoked aggression,’ had caught India unawares in a sort of Himalayan Pearl Harbour was in its early stages, and the Report’s cool and detailed analysis, if made public, would have shown that to be self-exculpatory mendacity.
But a series of studies, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, revealed to any serious enquirer the full story of how the Indian Army was ordered to challenge the Chinese military to a conflict it could only lose. So, by now, only bureaucratic inertia, combined with the natural fading of any public interest, can explain the continued non-publication – the Report includes no surprises and its publication would be of little significance but for the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a 1962 Chinese ‘aggression.’
It seems likely now that the Report will never be released. Furthermore, if one day a stable, confident and relaxed government in New Delhi should, miraculously, appear and decide to clear out the cupboard and publish it, the text would be largely incomprehensible, the context, well known to the authors and therefore not spelled out, being now forgotten. The Report would need an Introduction and gloss – a first draft of which this paper attempts to provide, drawing upon the writer’s research in India in the 1960s and material published later.
Two Preambles are required, one briefly recalling the cause and course of the border war; the second to describe the fault-line, which the border dispute turned into a schism, within the Army’s officer corps, which was a key factor in the disaster — and of which the Henderson Brooks Report can be seen as an expression.
Origins of the border conflict
India, at the time of Independence, can be said to have faced no external threats. True, it was born into a relationship of permanent belligerency with its weaker Siamese twin, Pakistan, left by the British inseparably conjoined to India by the chronically enflamed member of Kashmir, vital to both new national organisms; but that may be seen as essentially an internal dispute, an untreatable complication left by the crude, cruel surgery of Partition.
In 1947, China, wracked by civil war, was in what appeared to be death throes and no conceivable threat to anyone. That changed with astonishing speed, however, and, by 1950, when the new-born People’s Republic re-established in Tibet the central authority which had lapsed in 1911, the Indian government will have made its initial assessment of the possibility and potential of a threat from China, and found those to be minimal, if not non-existent.
First, there were geographic and topographical factors, the great mountain chains which lay between the two neighbours and appeared to make large-scale troop movements impractical (few could then see in the German V2 rocket the embryo of the ICBM). More important, the leadership of the Indian government – which is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru – had for years proclaimed that the unshakable friendship between India and China would be the key to both their futures, and therefore Asia’s, even the world’s.
The new leaders in Beijing were more chary, viewing India through their Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeois state. But, in the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and, through the 1950s, New Delhi’s defence planning and expenditure expressed that confidence. By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only “thinkable” but inevitable.
From the first days of India’s Independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India’s inheritance. China’s other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing.
The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable – that Beijing would allow India to impose China’s borders unilaterally and annex territory at will – Nehru’s policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.
Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing ‘aggression’ by refusing to surrender to Indian claims.
From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On Oct 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India’s intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of ‘Chinese aggression’ had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: ‘If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked.’
On Oct 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along the borders, overwhelming the feeble – but, in this first instance, determined – resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in the eastern sector. On Oct 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese withdrawal on the condition that India agrees to open negotiations: Nehru refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local counterattack on Nov 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total victory.
The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by Nov 20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted.
Naturally the Indian political public demanded to know what had brought about the shameful debacle suffered by their Army. On Dec 14, a new Army Cdr, Lt Gen JN Chaudhuri, instituted an Operations Review for that purpose, assigning the task of enquiry to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat.
Part II – How the East was Lost
All colonial armies are liable to suffer from the tugs of contradictory allegiance and, in the case of India’s, that fissure was opened in the Second World War by Japan’s recruitment from prisoners of war of the Indian National Army to fight against their former fellows. By the beginning of the 1950s, two factions were emerging in the officer corps:-
· One patriotic but above all professional and apolitical, and orthodox in adherence to the regimental traditions established in the century of the Raj;
· The other nationalist, ready to respond unquestioningly to the political requirements of their civilian masters and scorning their rivals as fuddy-duddies still aping the departed rulers, and suspected as being of doubtful loyalty to the new ones. The latter faction soon took on an eponymous identification from its leader, B M Kaul.
At the time of Independence, Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. Although Sandhurst-trained for infantry service, he had eased through the war without serving on any frontline and ended it in a humble and obscure post in public relations. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that Independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman.
Boosted by the prime minister’s steady favouritism, Kaul rocketed through the Army structure to emerge in 1961 at the very summit of the Army HQ. Not only did he hold the key appointment of Chief of General Staff but the Army Commander, Thapar, was, in effect, his client. Kaul had, of course, by then acquired a significant following, disparaged by the other side as ‘Kaul boys’ (‘call-girls’ had just entered usage), and his appointment as CGS opened a putsch in HQ, an eviction of the old guard, with his rivals, until then his superiors, being not only pushed out but often hounded thereafter with charges of disloyalty.
The struggle between those factions both fed on and fed into the strains placed on the Army by the government’s contradictory and hypocritical policies – on the one hand, proclaiming China an eternal friend against whom it was unnecessary to arm; on the other, exerting armed force to seize territory it knew China regarded as its own.
Through the early 1950s, Nehru’s covertly expansionist policy had been implemented by armed border police under the Intelligence Bureau, whose director, NB Mullik, was another favourite and confidant of the prime minister. The Army high command, knowing its forces to be too weak to risk conflict with China, would have nothing to do with it. Indeed when the potential for Sino-Indian conflict inherent in Mullik’s aggressive forward patrolling was demonstrated in the serious clash at the Kongka Pass in Oct 1959, Army HQ and the MEA united to denounce him as a provocateur and insisted that control over all activities on the border be assumed by the Army, which thus could insulate China from Mullik’s jabs.
The takeover by Kaul and his ‘boys’ at Army HQ in 1961 reversed that. Now, regular infantry would take over from Mullik’s border police in implementing what was formally designated a ‘forward policy,’ one conceived to extrude the Chinese presence from all territory claimed by India. Field commanders receiving orders to move troops forward into territory the Chinese both held and regarded as their own warned that they had no resources or reserves to meet the forceful reaction they knew must be the ultimate outcome: they were told to keep quiet and obey orders.
That may suggest that those driving the forward policy saw it in kamikaze terms and were reconciled to its ending in gunfire and blood – but the opposite was true. They were totally and unshakably convinced that it would end not with a bang but a whimper – from Beijing. The psychological bedrock upon which the forward policy rested was the belief that, in the last resort, the Chinese military, snuffling from a bloody nose, would pack up and quit the territory India claimed.
The source of that faith was Mullik, who from beginning to end proclaimed as oracular truth that, whatever the Indians did, there need be no fear of a violent Chinese reaction. The record shows no one squarely challenging that mantra at higher levels than the field commanders who throughout knew it to be dangerous nonsense: there were civilian ‘Kaul boys’ in the ministries of external affairs and defence too and they basked happily in Mullik’s fantasy. Perhaps the explanation for the credulousness lay in Nehru’s dependent relationship with his IB chief: since the prime minister placed such faith in Mullik, it would be at the least lese majeste, and even heresy, to deny him a kind of papal infallibility.
If it be taken that Mullik was not just deluded, what other explanation could there be for the unwavering consistency with which he urged his country forward on a course which, in rational perception, could lead only to war with a greatly superior military power and, therefore, defeat? Another question arises: who, in those years, would most have welcomed the great falling-out which saw India shift in a few years from strong international support for the People’s Republic of China to enmity and armed conflict with it? From founding and leading the Non-Aligned Movement to tacit enlistment in the hostile encirclement of China which was Washington’s aim? Mullik maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi, Harry Rossitsky. Answers may lie in the agency’s archives.
China’s stunning and humiliating victory brought about an immediate reversal of fortune between the Army factions. Out went Kaul, out went Thapar, out went many of their adherents – but by no means all. Gen Chaudhuri, appointed to replace Thapar as Army chief, chose not to launch a counter-putsch. He and his colleagues of the restored old guard knew full well what had caused the debacle: political interference in promotions and appointments by the prime minister and Krishna Menon, defence minister, followed by clownish ineptitude in the Army HQ as ‘Kaul boys’ scurried to force the troops to carry out the mad tactics and strategy laid down by the government.
It was clear that the trail back from the broken remnants of the 4th Division limping onto the plains in the north-east, up through intermediate commands to the Army HQ in New Delhi and then, on to the source of political direction, would have ended at the prime minister’s door – a destination which, understandably, Chaudhuri had no desire to reach. (Mullik was anyway to tarnish him with the charge that he was plotting to overthrow the discredited civil order, but, in fact, Chaudhuri was a dedicated constitutionalist – ironically, Kaul was the only one of the generals who harboured Caesarist ambitions.)
While the outraged humiliation of the political class left Chaudhuri with no choice but to order an enquiry into the Army’s collapse, it was up to him to decide its range and focus, indeed its temper. The choice of Lt Gen Henderson Brooks to run an Operations Review (rather than a broader and more searching board of enquiry) was indicative of a wish not to make the already bubbling stew of recriminations boil over.
Henderson Brooks (until then in command of a corps facing Pakistan) was a steady, competent but not outstanding officer, whose appointments and personality had kept him entirely outside the broils stirred up by Kaul’s rise and fall. That could be said too of the officer Chaudhuri appointed to assist Henderson Brooks, Brig PS Bhagat (holder of a WW II Victoria Cross and commandant of the military academy). But the latter complemented his senior by being a no-nonsense, fighting soldier, widely respected in the Army, and the taut, unforgiving analysis in the Report bespeaks the asperity of his approach.
There is further evidence that Chaudhuri did not wish the enquiry to dig too deep, range too widely, or excoriate those it faulted. The following were the terms of reference he set:-
· System of command;
· Physical fitness of troops;
· Capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command.
The first four of those smacked of an enquiry into the sinking of the Titanic briefed to concentrate on the management of the shipyard where it was built and the health of the deck crew; only the last term has any immediacy, and there the wording was distinctly odd – commanders do not usually ‘influence’ those they command, they issue orders and expect instant obedience.
But Henderson Brooks and Bhagat (henceforth HB/B) in effect ignored the constraints of their terms of reference and kicked against other limits Chaudhuri had laid upon their investigation, especially his ruling that the functioning of Army HQ during the crisis lay outside their purview. ‘It would have been convenient and logical’, they note, ‘to trace the events [beginning with] Army HQ, and then move down to the Commands for more details… ending up with field formations for the battle itself’. Forbidden that approach, they would, nevertheless, try to discern what had happened at Army HQ from documents found at lower levels, although those could not throw any lighton one crucial aspect of the story – the political directions given to the Army by the civil authorities.
As HB/B began their enquiry, they immediately discovered that the short rein kept upon them by the Army chief was by no means the least of their handicaps. They found themselves facing determined obstruction in Army HQ, where one of the leading lights of the Kaul faction had survived in the key post of director of military operations – Brigadier DK Palit.
Kaul had exerted his power of patronage to have Palit made DMO although others senior to him were listed for the post, and Palit, as he was himself to admit, was ‘one of the least qualified among [his] contemporaries for this crucial General Staff appointment.’ Palit had thereafter acted as enforcer for Kaul and the civilian protagonists of the ‘forward policy,’ Mullik foremost among the latter, issuing the orders and deflecting or over-ruling the protests of field commanders who reported up their strategic imbecility or operational impossibility.
Why Chaudhuri left Palit in this post is puzzling: the Henderson Brooks Report was to make quite clear what a prominent and destructive role he had played throughout the Army high command’s politicisation, and, through inappropriate meddling in command decisions, even in bringing about the debacle in the north-east. Palit, though, would immediately have recognised that the HB/B enquiry posed a grave threat to his career and so did that entire he could to undermine and obstruct it.
After consultation with Mullik, Palit took it upon himself to rule that HB/B should not have access to any documents emanating from the civil side – in other words, he blindfolded the enquiry, so far as he could, as to the nexus between the civil and military. As Palit smugly recounts his story, in an autobiography published in 1991, he personally faced down both Henderson Brooks and Bhagat, rode out their formal complaints about his obstructionism, and prevented them from prying into the ‘high level policies and decisions’ which he maintained were none of their business.
In fact, however, the last word lies with HB/B – or will do if their report is ever published. In spite of Palit’s efforts, they discovered a great deal that the Kaul camp and the government would have preferred to keep hidden; and their report shows that Palit’s self-admiring and mock-modest autobiography grossly misrepresents the role he played.
The Henderson Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers nearly 200 typed foolscap pages), detailed and, as far as the restrictions placed upon its authors allowed, far-ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some salient points, to give the flavour of the whole (a full account of the subject they covered is in the writer’s 1970 study, India’s China War).
Part III – India’s Shameful Debacle
The Forward Policy
This was born and named at a meeting chaired by Nehru on Nov 2, 1961, but it had been alive and kicking in the womb for years before that – indeed its conception dated back to 1954, when Nehru issued an instruction for posts to be set up all along India’s claim lines, ‘especially in such places as might be disputed.’ What happened at this 1961 meeting was that the freeze on provocative forward patrolling, instituted at the Army’s insistence after Mullik had engineered the Kongka Pass clash, was ended – with the Army, now under the courtier leadership of Thapar and Kaul, eagerly assuming the task which Mullik’s armed border police had carried out until the Army stopped them.
HB/B note that no minutes of this meeting had been obtained, but were able to quote Mullik as saying that ‘the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so.’ That opinion contradicted the conclusion Army Intelligence had reached 12 months before: that the Chinese would resist by force any attempts to take back territory held by them.
HB/B then trace a contradictory duet between the Army HQ and the Western Army Command, with HQ ordering the establishment of ‘penny-packet’ forward posts in Ladakh, specifying their location and strength, and the Western Command protesting that it lacked the forces to carry out the allotted task, still less to face the grimly foreseeable consequences. Kaul and Palit ‘time and again ordered, in furtherance of the “forward policy,” the establishment of individual posts, overruling protests made by the Western Command’. By Aug 1962 about 60 posts had been set up, most manned with less than a dozen soldiers, all under close threat by overwhelmingly superior Chinese forces. The Western Command submitted another request for heavy reinforcements, accompanying it with this admonition:
‘[I]t is imperative that political direction is based on military means. If the two are not correlated, there is a danger of creating a situation where we may lose both in the material and moral sense much more than we already have. Thus, there is no short cut to military preparedness to enable us to pursue effectively our present policy…’
That warning was ignored, reinforcements were denied, orders were affirmed and, although the Chinese were making every effort, diplomatic, political and military, to prove their determination to resist by force, again it was asserted that no forceful reaction by the Chinese was to be expected. HB/B quote Field Marshall Roberts: ‘The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable’ But, in this instance, troops were being put in dire jeopardy in pursuit of a strategy based upon an assumption – that the Chinese would not resist with force – which the strategy would itself inevitably prove wrong. HB/B notes that from the beginning of 1961, when the Kaulist putsch reshaped Army HQ, crucial professional military practice was abandoned:
This lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the CGS [Kaul], his deputy, the DMO [Palit] and other Staff Directors is inexcusable. From this stemmed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces. These appointments in General Staff are key appointments and officers were handpicked by Gen Kaul to fill them. There was therefore no question of clash of personalities. General Staff appointments are stepping stones to high command, and correspondingly carry heavy responsibility. When, however, these appointments are looked upon as adjuncts to a successful career and the responsibility is not taken seriously, the results, as is only too clear, are disastrous. This should never be allowed to be repeated and the Staff as of old must be made to bear the consequences of their lapses and mistakes. Comparatively, the mistakes and lapses of the Staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of battle are more heinous than the errors made by the commanders in the field of battle.
War and Debacle
While the main thrust of the Forward Policy was exerted in the western sector of the border, it was also applied in the east from Dec 1961. There the Army was ordered to set up new posts along the McMahon Line (which China treated – and treats – as the de facto boundary), and, in some sectors, beyond it. One of these trans-Line posts, named Dhola Post, was invested by a superior Chinese force on Sep 8, 1962, the Chinese thus reacting there exactly as they had been doing for a year in the western sector. In this instance, however, and although Dhola Post was known to be north of the McMahon Line, the Indian government reacted aggressively, deciding that the Chinese force threatening Dhola must be attacked forthwith, and thrown back.
Now, again, the duet of contradiction began, the Army HQ and, in this case, Eastern Command (headed by Lt Gen L P Sen) united against the commands below: 33 Corps (Lt Gen Umrao Singh), 4 Div (Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad) and 7 Bde (Brig John Dalvi). The latter three stood together in reporting that the ‘attack and evict’ order was militarily impossible to execute.
The point of confrontation, below Thagla ridge at the western extremity of the McMahon Line, presented immense logistical difficulties to the Indian side and none to the Chinese, so whatever concentration of troops could painfully be mustered by the Indians could instantly be outnumbered and outweighed in weaponry. Tactically, again the irreversible advantage lay with the Chinese, who held well-supplied, fortified positions on a commanding ridge feature.
The demand for military action and the victory it was expected to bring was political, generated at top level meetings in Delhi. ‘The Defence Minister [Krishna Menon] categorically stated that in view of the top secret nature of conferences no minutes would be kept [and] this practice was followed at all the conferences that were held by the Defence Minister in connection with these operations’. HB/B commented: ‘This is a surprising decision and one which could and did lead to grave consequences. It absolved in the ultimate analysis anyone of the responsibility for any major decision. Thus it could and did lead to decisions being taken without careful and considered thought on the consequences of those decisions.’
Army HQ by no means restricted itself to the big picture. In mid-Sep it issued an order to troops beneath Thagla ridge to:-
(a) Capture a Chinese post 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post.
(b) Contain the Chinese concentration S of Thagla.
HB/B comment: ‘The General Staff, sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position 1,000 yards NE of Dhola Post is astounding. The country was not known, the enemy situation vague, and for all that there may have been a ravine in between [the troops and their objective], but yet the order was given. This order could go down in the annals of History as being as incredible as the order for “the Charge of the Light Brigade.”
Worse was to follow
Underlying all the meetings in Delhi was still the conviction or by now, perhaps, prayer, that even when frontally attacked the Chinese would put up no serious resistance, still less react aggressively elsewhere. Thus it came to be believed that the problem lay in weakness, even cowardice, at lower levels of command. Gen Umrao Singh (33 Corps) was seen as the hub of the problem, since he was backing his div and bde commanders in their insistence that the eviction operation was impossible.
‘It was obvious that Lt Gen Umrao Singh would not be hustled into an operation, without proper planning and logistical support. The Defence Ministry and, for that matter, the General Staff and Eastern Command were prepared for a gamble on the basis of the Chinese not reacting to any great extent.’ So the political leadership and Army HQ decided that if Umrao Singh could be replaced by a commander with fire in his belly all would come right, and victory be assured.
Such a commander was available – Gen Kaul. A straight switch, with Kaul relinquishing the CGS post to replace Umrao Singh, would have raised too many questions, so it was decided instead that Umrao Singh would simply be moved aside, retaining his corps command but no longer being concerned with the situation on the border. That would become the responsibility of a new formation, 4 Corps, whose sole task would be to attack and drive the Chinese off Thagla ridge. Gen Kaul would command the new corps.
HB/B noted how even the most secret of government’s decisions were swiftly reported in the press, and called for a thorough probe into the sources of the leaks.
Many years later Palit, in his autobiography, described the transmission procedure. Palit had hurried to see Kaul on learning of the latter’s appointment to command the notional new Corps: ‘I found him in the little bedsitter den where he usually worked when at home. I was startled to see, sitting beside him on the divan, Prem Bhatia, editor of The Times of India, looking like the proverbial cat who has just swallowed a large yellow songbird. He got up as I arrived, wished [Kaul] good luck and left, still with a greatly pleased smirk on his face.’
Bhatia’s scoop led his paper next morning. The ‘spin’ therein was the suggestion that whereas, in the western sector, Indian troops faced extreme logistical problems, in the east that situation was reversed and, therefore, with the dashing Kaul in command of a fresh ‘task force,’ victory was imminent. The truth was exactly the contrary, those in NEFA faced even worse difficulties than their fellows in the west, and victory was a chimera.
Those difficulties were compounded by persistent interference from the Army HQ. On orders from Delhi, ‘troops of [the entire 7 Bde] were dispersed to outposts that were militarily unsound and logistically unsupportable.’ Once Kaul took over as Corps Cdr, the troops were driven forward to their fate in what HB/B called ‘wanton disregard of the elementary principles of war.’
Even in the dry, numbered paragraphs of their report, HB/B’s account of the moves that preceded the final Chinese assault is dramatic and riveting, with the scene of action shifting from the banks of the Namka Chu, the fierce little river beneath the menacing loom of Thagla ridge along which the under-clad Indian troops shivered and waited to be overwhelmed, to Nehru’s house in Delhi – whither Kaul rushed back to report when a rash foray he had ordered was crushed by a fierce Chinese reaction on Oct 10. To follow those events, and on into the greater drama of the ensuing debacle is tempting but would add only greater detail to the account already published.
Given the nature of the dramatic events they were investigating, it is not surprising that HB/B’s cast of characters consisted in the main of fools and/or knaves on the one hand, their victims on the other. But they singled out a few heroes too, especially the jawans, who fought whenever their commanders gave them the necessary leadership, and suffered miserably from the latter’s often gross incompetence. As for the debacle itself, ‘Efforts of a few officers, particularly those of Capt NN Rawat’ to organise a fighting retreat, ‘could not replace a disintegrated command;’ nor could the cool-headed Brig Gurbax Singh do more than keep his 48 Bde in action as a cohesive combat unit until it was liquidated by the joint efforts of higher command and the Chinese.
HB/B place the immediate cause of the collapse of resistance in NEFA in the panicky, fumbling and contradictory orders issued from Corps HQ in Tezpur by a ‘triumvirate’ of officers they judge to be grossly culpable: Gen Sen, Gen Kaul, and Brig Palit. Those were, however, only the immediate agents of disaster: its responsible planners and architects were another triumvirate, comprised of Nehru, Mullik and again, Kaul, together with all those who accompanied them into the fantasy that a much stronger neighbour could be confronted and overcome through guile and puny force.
- Interview: Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Kalon Tripa Tibet (firangionindia.com)
- Threat of Sino-Indian battle looms large ahead of 50th anniv of 1962 war (stratrisks.com)
- US & China: How Will They Engage In The Next 25 Years (2ndlook.wordpress.com)
- Tawang War Memorial: Honoring the unsung heroes of the 1962 India-China War (beontheroad.com)
- History’s Hostage: China, India and the War of 1962 (thediplomat.com)
- Remembering a Forgotten War in the Himalayas (theepochtimes.com)
- ‘There will not be a repeat of the 1962 war,’ insists Chief of Army Staff (dailymail.co.uk)
- India to Send Tank Brigades to the China Border (fromthetrenchesworldreport.com)
TIBETAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIBETAN RESISTANCE :
I am not surprised to read that Tibetans are expressing their sense of resentment and frustration by acts of self-immolation. I grew up in India and I am proud to be an Indian because of the Courage displayed by Rani Padmini of Chittorgarh while she had confronted her enemy. She had preserved her Essence by ending her Existence. She had acted as an Individual who had faced a tough challenge posed by her enemy’s intention to violate her and dishonor her spiritual Essence. In Tibet, I describe the problem as that of foreign occupation. The foreign invader had imposed his identity across the Land of Tibet. Historically, Tibetans had witnessed foreign conquests, but the Land was never subjugated by the invading forces. The Tibetan Identity has survived and the foreign domination died its natural death. The occupation by Communist China had not only disrupted the natural sense of freedom enjoyed by Tibetans, but also it is wiping out the Identity of the Land of Tibet and all of its denizens. As long as Tibetans are conscious of their Identity, they would continue to resist foreign occupation. The international community must not remain as silent spectators. The global community of nations had responded in the past to help Jews and to stop Nazi persecution of Jews. Communist China must be contained and the Land known as Tibet must exist with its own Identity and we should not recognize occupation as a final event.
I am pleased to share an article written by Bahukutumbi Raman. Mr. Raman had served in Intelligence Bureau along with Mr. R. N. Kao who got appointed as Secretary(Research) of India’s Research and Analysis Wing from 1968 to 1977. Mr. Raman had also served as Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. If my recollection is correct, both Mr. R. N. Kao and Mr. B. Raman had visited my Organization during 1971 while I had served under the Command of Major General Sujan Singh Uban, the Inspector General of Special Frontier Force.
THE SPIRITS OF SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE:
Special Frontier Force is a multinational defense plan to establish Freedom and Democracy in the occupied Land of Tibet.
Dr. R. Rudra Narasimham, B.Sc., M.B.B.S.,
Service Number: MS-8466. Rank: Captain. Branch: AMC/SSC (& Number. MR-03277K Rank Major AMC/DPC)
Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle(1971-1972),
Directorate General of Security,
Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force,
East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram,
New Delhi – 110 022
Tibetan Unrest shows Signs of Spreading from Sichuan to Tibet
By B. Raman 2/11/2011
The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation –seven of them successful resulting in deaths— in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.
2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation. The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet’s Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26, 2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.
3. For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows: “Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them. If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence.”
4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.
5. Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal (about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community. Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt by some members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.
6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay, the newly elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China. While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest. He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.”
- Special Frontier Force and China – Tibet Dispute (bhavanajagat.com)
- Opinion: Tibet rejects Chinese rule (edition.cnn.com)
- A 17-Year-old Tibetan Girl Dies after Self-Immolation in Amdo Tsekock (voatibetanenglish.com)
- Tibet Slams Beijing Crackdown on Immolation ‘Inciters’ (voanews.com)
- Teenage Tibetan Girl Dies from Self-Immolation (voanews.com)
UPRISING IN THE LAND OF RISING SUN :
I would like to share the Guest Column titled ‘Dragon’s Familiar Dance’ published in India Today, November 07, 2011. Brahma Chellaney, the author of this article is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
The word uprising describes the action of rising up and specifically it means an outbreak against a ruler or power or the act of revolt. The Living Tibetan Spirits have witnessed an uprising in the Land of Rising Sun. The Living Tibetan Spirits are conscious of the fact of the flight of His Holiness Dalai Lama to India to lead a life in exile. I am conscious of the fact of Communist China’s attack on India during 1962. Communist China’s brutal aggression has provoked an uprising in my heart. It has stirred me, it caused an intense swelling of emotions and it gave birth to a desire to resist Communist China as best possible. The Living Tibetan Spirits and myself have experienced similar emotions and feelings and share a common desire to resist Communist China and the threat it imposed upon our consciousness. During 1962, I was a young student at Giriraj Government Arts College, Nizamabad, Nizamabad District, Andhra Pradesh, India. The students of Giriraj College had spontaneously reacted to China’s attack and had expressed their sense of resentment and we joined hands and walked on the City streets to express our Unity and Solidarity to defend India. This desire to oppose Communist China has helped me to find an opportunity to join the ranks of Indian Army. On completion of my Basic Medical Officers Command Training( BMOC Course 20/70 ) at Officers Training School, Army Medical Corps Centre, Lucknow, and professional training at Military Hospital Ambala, during my first military assignment, I have joined others who share my desire to fight the Communist Forces. We all know that it is a challenge that needs preparation. While getting trained to gain the ability to move upwards to face the enemy, some people have fallen down. They have fallen with a desire still living in their hearts. My consciousness is aware of this desire and it keeps the Spirits alive in the form of a desire to resist the enemy and to end the illegal occupation of the Land of Rising Sun. The desire to resist your enemy causes feelings of sorrow or dukha like all other human desires. But, the condition called Freedom is not a desire. Freedom is the natural state or condition of human beings and military occupation is a violation or transgression of this natural condition of human existence. There is no choice other than that of revolting against occupation. So, we have accepted the desire to revolt against the enemy seeking the Compassion of Buddha to uplift us from the feelings of sorrow or Dukha.
BUDDHAM SARANAM GACCHAMI.
Rudra N Rebbapragada, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A. & The Living Tibetan Spirits,
Service Information: Service Number: MS-8466/MR-03277K; Rank: Lieutenant/ Captain/Major; Branch: Army Medical Corps/Short Service Regular Commission/Direct Permanent Commission(1969-1984);
Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle(1971-1972); Unit: Establishment No. 22, C/O 56 APO. Organization:
Directorate General of Security,
Office of Inspector General Special Frontier Force,
East Block V, Level IV, R. K. Puram,
New Delhi – 110 022.
DRAGON’S FAMILIAR DANCE:
With the 50th anniversary of the 1962 invasion approaching, history is in danger of repeating itself.
The writer is professor of strategic studies
at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
India Today, November 7, 2011
As the 50th anniversary of China’s invasion approaches, history is in danger of repeating itself, with Chinese military pressures and aggressive designs against India not only mirroring the pre-1962 war situation but also extending to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the oceans around India. China’s expanding axis of evil with Pakistan, including a new troop presence in PoK, heightens India’s vulnerability in Jammu and Kashmir, even as India has beefed up its defences in Arunachal Pradesh.
By muscling up to India, what is China seeking to achieve? The present situation, ominously, is no different in several key aspects from the one that prevailed in the run-up to the 1962 war.
● The aim of “Mao’s India war” in 1962, as Harvard scholar Roderick MacFarquhar has called it, was largely political: to cut India to size by demolishing what it represented—a democratic alternative to China’s autocracy. The swiftness and force with which Mao Zedong defeated India helped discredit the Indian model, boost China’s international image, and consolidate Mao’s internal power. The return of the China-India pairing decades later riles Beijing.
● Just as the Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959 set the stage for the Chinese military attack, the exiled Tibetan leader today has become a bigger challenge for China than ever. The continuing security clampdown across the Tibetan plateau since the March 2008 Tibetan uprising parallels the harsh Chinese crackdown in Tibet during 1959-62.
● The prevailing pattern of cross-frontier incursions and other border incidents is no different from the situation that led up to the 1962 war. Yet, India is repeating the same mistake by playing down the Chinese intrusions. Gratuitously stretching the truth, Indian officials say the incursions are the result of differing perceptions about the line of control. But which side has refused to define the line of control? It speaks for itself that China hasn’t offered this excuse. The fact is that Chinese forces are intruding even into Utttarakhand—the only sector where the line of control has been clarified by an exchange of maps—and into Sikkim, whose 206-km border with Tibet is recognized by Beijing.
● The 1962 war occurred against the backdrop of China instigating and arming insurgents in India’s northeast. Although such Chinese activities ceased after Mao’s death, China has come full circle today, with Chinese-made arms increasingly flowing into guerrilla ranks in northeast India via Burmese front organisations. In fact, Pakistan-based terrorists targeting India also rely on Chinese arms.
● China’s pre-1962 psychological war is returning. In recent years, Beijing has employed its state-run media and nationalistic websites to warn of another armed conflict. It is a throwback to the coarse rhetoric China had used in its build-up to the 1962 war. Its People’s Daily, for example, has warned India to weigh “the consequences of a potential confrontation with China.” China merrily builds strategic projects in an internationally disputed area like Pak Occupied Kashmir but responds with crude threats when others explore just for oil in the South China Sea.
● Just as India in the early 1960s retreated to a defensive position in the border negotiations after having undermined its leverage through a formal acceptance of the “Tibet region of China,” the spotlight now is on China’s revived Tibet-linked claim to Arunachal rather than on the core issue, Tibet itself. India, with its focus on process than results, has remained locked in continuous border negotiations with China since 1981—the longest and the most-fruitless process between any two nations post-Second World War. This process has only aided China’s containment-with-engagement strategy.
● In the same way that India under Nehru unwittingly created the context to embolden Beijing to wage aggression, New Delhi is again staring at the consequences of a mismanagement of relations. The more China’s trade surplus with India has swelled—jumping from $2 billion in 2002 to more than $30 billion now—the greater has been its condescension toward India. To make matters worse, the insidious, V.K. Krishna Menon-style shadow has returned to haunt Indian defence management and policy. India has never had more clueless defence and foreign ministers or a weaker Prime Minister with a credibility problem than it does today.
In fact, as it aims to mould a Sino-centric Asia, China is hinting that its real geopolitical contest is more with India than with the distant United States. The countries around India have become battlegrounds for China’s moves to encircle India. From a military invasion in 1962 and a subsequent cartographic aggression, China is moving towards a hydrological aggression and a multipronged strategic squeeze of India. China’s damming of rivers flowing from Tibet to India are highlighting Indian vulnerability on the water front even before India has plugged its disadvantage on the nuclear front by building a credible but minimal deterrent.
Whether Beijing actually sets out to teach India “the final lesson” by launching a 1962-style attack will depend on several factors. They include India’s domestic political situation, its defence preparedness, and the availability for China of a propitious international timing of the type the Cuban missile crisis provided in 1962. If India does not want to be caught napping again, it has to come out of the present political paralysis and inject greater realism into its China policy, which today bears a close resemblance to a studied imitation of an ostrich burying its head in the sand.
(c) India Today.
- The Living Tibetan Spirits – Tibetan Consciousness Movement (bhavanajagat.com)
- India Blinks While Tibet Got Gobbled (bhavanajagat.com)
- The United States-tibet Relations-the Reincarnation of Tibetan Spirits (bhavanajagat.com)
- The Great Problem of Tibet-sixty Years of Occupation (bhavanajagat.com)
- Special Frontier Force and China – Tibet Dispute (bhavanajagat.com)
- Ten Truths about the 1962 War (bhavanajagat.com)